Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07UNVIEVIENNA204
2007-03-30 13:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/IRAN: IRAN INFORMS OF INTENT TO STOP CODE 3.1 EARLY

Tags:  IAEA AORC IR KNPP 
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0204/01 0891311
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301311Z MAR 07
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6280
C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000204 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2017
TAGS: IAEA AORC IR KNPP
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: IRAN INFORMS OF INTENT TO STOP CODE 3.1 EARLY
NOTIFICATION, IAEA URGES IRAN TO RECONSIDER

Classified By: Classified by Amb. Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4
(d) and (f)

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000204

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2017
TAGS: IAEA AORC IR KNPP
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: IRAN INFORMS OF INTENT TO STOP CODE 3.1 EARLY
NOTIFICATION, IAEA URGES IRAN TO RECONSIDER

Classified By: Classified by Amb. Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4
(d) and (f)


1. (SBU) Iran on March 29 submitted a letter (text at para 5) to the
IAEA informing of its intent to halt implementation of Code 3.1 of its
Subsidiary Arrangement, requiring early notification of decisions to
construct new nuclear facilities or modify existing ones. As
justification, the letter cited the "illegal" UNSC resolutions. It also
noted that, given Israeli and U.S. threats against Iranian nuclear
facilities, Iran would no longer provide information to the IAEA that
could jeopardize its security, while citing the IAEA's inability to
maintain the confidentiality of sensitive information.


2. (SBU) The IAEA sent a reply (text at para 6) on March 30 citing the
1992 Board decision "concerning the modalities for the provision of
design information pursuant to Article 42 of Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreements as an important measure to strengthen the effective
implementation of safeguards." It notes that Iran's decision is
"regrettable" and asked Iran to reconsider its decision.


3. (C) We discussed the legal implications of the letter with the head
of IAEA's legal Department, Johann Rautenbach. He said that while the
IAEA could not agree to the Iranian move because of the 1992 Board
decision, it does not appear that Iran has yet violated its safeguards
agreement concerning the provision of design information. The agreemen
calls on Iran to provide design information as early as possible prior
to the introduction of nuclear material. Article 3.1 of the Subsidiary
Arrangements under the 1992 decision defines "as early as possible" as
"at the time of the decision to construct." We note that the IAEA has
already found Iran in non-compliance in part for this very reason, i.e.
the DG in his November 2003 report noted that Iran had introduced
nuclear material into the Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plant without
declaring or providing design notification of the plant to the IAEA.


4. (C) At this point, however, the political and practical
implications of Iran's move seem more significant than the legal. In
our initial consultations with like-minded missions, all agreed that

Iran is moving in the wrong direction: less transparency and less
cooperation, leading to more questions and suspicion. We will wait to
see if the Iranians are able to satisfy the Secretariat on the issue of
monitoring at Natanz before making a recommendation on the advisability
of a special Board meeting.


5. (SBU) Letter from the Permanent Mission of Islamic Republic of
Iran to the IAEA, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General, Internationa
Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.

BEGIN TEXT:

No. 034/2007, 29 March 2007

Excellency,

Upon the instruction of my Government I have the honor to convey the
followings:


1. The nuclear issue of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been
referred to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in
contravention with the provisions of the Statute of the IAEA and
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In accordance with Article 12
of the Agency's Statute, recognition of non-compliance (diversion
to nuclear weapons) is entrusted to the inspections, where the
inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the Director General
who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors.
Not only the inspectors have not reached or concluded any "non-
compliance" but instead, they have confirmed non-diversion of
nuclear activities to prohibited purposes.


2. Whereas resolution of the Board of Governors had consistently
addressed the request for suspension of enrichment related
activities as a "voluntary and non-legally binding measure", the
request has since been abruptly and unilaterally displaced by
"requirement". The Agency in accordance with the letter and spirit
of its bilateral agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, can
in no way justify a demand to suspend a field of activity which not
only is permitted, but should indeed be subject of Agency's
assistance. The Board of Governor's unlawful reference to
suspension as a "requirement" has, in turn, served as the basis for
UNSC resolutions. As such, the Board of Governors has failed its
obligations towards the Islamic Republic of Iran and unduly paved
the way for UNSC's forceful measures.


3. The nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran have
been peaceful with no diversion to military purposes, and all have
been in consent with Iran's legal obligations under the NPT, with
no threat to international peace and security, therefore, the
resolutions of the UNSC against Iran are contrary to the UN Charter
and does not have any legal and lawful basis.


4. The highest authorities of the United States and Israeli
Regime, in absolute breach of Para 4 of Article 2 of the United
Nations Charter, are threatening the use of force and attack
against the Islamic Republic of Iran and have repeatedly stressed

that military action is an option on the table. This endangers the
international peace and security and directly threats Iran's
national security.


5. In accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Article 3
of the Agency's General Conference Resolution 533, any threat of
attack or attack against safeguarded nuclear facilities of Iran
constitutes a violation of principles of the United Nations
Charter, and therefore, the United Nations Security Council has to
act immediately. Certainly, continuation of non-action by the UNSC
in this respect further endangers the national security of Iran.


6. So as long as such threats of military action persist, Iran has
no option but protect its security through all means possible,
including protection of information which can facilitate openly-
stated and aggressive military objectives of the war mongers. This
is particularly significant as the Agency has failed systematically
and repeatedly to maintain confidentiality of sensitive information
despite its firm obligations. At this stage, therefore, such
dangerous dissemination of sensitive information will have to be
curtailed through steps which limit their scope and availability.

Considering the aforementioned facts, the continuation of adoption
of resolutions by the UNSC against Iran, shall only complicate the
situation, and in no way helps the resolution of the issue
undermining the efforts and initiatives to restart negotiations.

In view of the above, according to the bill passed by the parliament of
the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2006, and considering the illegal and
unlawful United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747 on 14 March
2007, against Iranian Nation and its peaceful nuclear activities, the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has decided that: As long a
the full implemention of the provisions on the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT),specifically achieving the inalienable rights stipulated in
Article IV of the Treaty and the cessation of perusing Iran's nuclear
dossier with the United Nations Security Council, its full
disengagement, and thus the return of the dossier to the framework of
the IAEA, in full, is not realized; and as long as potential military
adventures are not removed from the table and threats to Iran's securit
are not eliminated, further implementation of the modified code 3.1 of
the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Safeguards Agreement, accepted in
2003, but not yet ratified by the parliament, aimed at enhancing Iran's
cooperation with the IAEA, shall be suspended and Iran reverts to
implement the codes 3.1 as reflected in the Subsidiary Arrangements on
12 February 1976. Therefore, considering above, the implementaiton of
the content of letter 90/95265 dated 26 February 2003, as of date of
this letter, is suspended.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Ali Asghar Soltanieh
Ambassador, Resident Representative

END TEXT.


6. (SBU) Text of IAEA response from Expo Director Vilmos Cserveny:

BEGIN TEXT

2007-03-30

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 29 March 2007 to the
Director General in which you informed the Agency that Iran has decided
to suspend further implementation of the modified Code 3.1 as reflected
in the Subsidiary Arrangements in effect since 26 February 2003, and
that it would revert to the implementation of Code 3.1 as reflected in
the Subsidiary Arrangements of 12 February 1976.

I would like to note that this is contrary to the Board's decision
reproduced in GOV/2554/Attachment 2/Rev. 2 (1 April 1992),
concerning the modalities for the provision of design information
pursuant to Article 42 of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements as an
important measure to strengthen the effective implementation of
safeguards. In this context, I should note that in accordance with
this Board decision, the modified text of Code 3.1 is now included
in all Subsidiary Arrangements General Parts in force with States
that have Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. Iran's decision
there is regrettable.

I would urge your authorities to reconsider their decision, and to
continue to implement the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part that
is in effect since 26 February 2003.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Letter from the Permanent Mission of Islamic Republic of Iran to the
IAEA, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General, International Atomic
Energy Agency, Vienna.

END TEXT.