IAEA/IRAN: HEINONEN'S VIEWS ON IRAN'S DECISION TO

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000194

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2022
TAGS: AORC IAEA IR KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: HEINONEN'S VIEWS ON IRAN'S DECISION TO
CURTAIL COOPERATION

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 (h)


1. (S) Summary: IAEA DDG for Safeguards Heinonen on March
26 said that the IAEA had received no notifications (orally
or written) from Iran concerning media reports that Iran was
canceling advance design notification under the Subsidiary
Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement. Such a step, he
felt, would be significant. The IAEA legal office has not
assessed whether this would constitute a safeguards
violation, but our Australian counterparts think it would
not. End Summary.


2. (S) IAEA Deputy Director General Heinonen acknowledged
reading in the press about the March 25 statements by Iranian
officials that Iran would no longer abide by "code 1-3" which
required early notification of design information of nuclear
facilities. Heinonen said he was confident this was a
garble, and that Iran meant to say "Code 3.1," which was the
proper reference in the Iranian Subsidiary Arrangement on
early notification of design information. Heinonen said that
IAEA had received nothing in writing or verbally from the
Iranians on this issue; all he had were press reports.


3. (S) Asked how important Code 3.1 was, Heinonen said it
was very important. He explained that after the Iraq nuclear
experience in the early 1990's, the IAEA Board of Governors
decided in 1992 that in the future, states under safeguards
must commit to provide advance notification of design
information. He recalled that in 2003, Heinonen and his
inspectors inspected Iran after the 2002 NCRI revelations.
Because of lack of advance design information about Natanz,
inter alia, Iran finally agreed to a formal modification of
its Subsidiary Arrangement in early 2003 to include the 1992
Board provision requiring advance notification.


4. (S) Heinonen suggested that because Code 3.1 was governed
by a special Board decision from 1992, it was a firm
safeguards obligation for Iran equal to other obligations in
the safeguards agreement itself. He said that abrogation of
advance design notification would be a significant safeguards
violation. Based on the press reports, he said that the
Iranian "decision" may only affect future facilities, but
would have no effect on Natanz. Heinonen said it would be
harder, without the provision, to have confidence in the
"bigger picture" in Iran.

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Legalities Uncertain
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5. (S) Our Australian counterparts, however, opined that they
do not think Iran's latest actions constitute safeguards
violations. Our best contact in the IAEA legal section is out
of the country, but another told us the Subsidiary
Arrangement is a "living document," and both sides have to
agree to the text and on changes to the text (Note: this was
a generic discussion on SAs, not specific to Iran. End
Note.)


6. (U) The Safeguards Agreement is the undertaking to allow
safeguards to be applied; the Subsidiary Arrangement is the
document that specifies how safeguards will be conducted.
According to INFCIRC/153 para 39: "The Agreement should
provide that the Agency and the State shall make Subsidiary
Arrangements which shall specify in detail to the extent
necessary to permit the Agency to fulfill its
responsibilities under the safeguards agreement in an
effective and efficient manner, how the procedures in the
safeguards agreement are to be applied." The Agency may
implement safeguards while the Subsidiary Arrangement is
under negotiation. Once a text has been agreed, lacking
notification from the State of a desired change, the IAEA
would continue to believe that existing text of the
Subsidiary Arrangements applied.

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Implications Of An Iranian Decision to Abrogate 3.1
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7. (S) The April 1992 Board resolution and the August 2003
DG's report cite the importance of providing early design
information for new nuclear facilities, as well as to
modifications of existing facilities. If Iran is curtailing
implementation of Code 3.1, it conceivably could establish
new enrichment facilities without having to provide early
notification to the IAEA. Since it also pertains to
modifications of existing facilities, Iran could possibly
change its plans at Natanz to eventually include P-2
centrifuges without providing early notification.
SCHULTE