Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ULAANBAATAR480
2007-08-24 08:14:00
SECRET
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Cable title:  

REGIONAL STRATEGIES TO COUNTER THE TERRORIST

Tags:  PTER CASC PGOV PINS KJUS KISL KPAO ASEC MG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0008
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUM #0480 2360814
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 240814Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1403
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5728
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2902
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2614
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1874
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
S E C R E T ULAANBAATAR 000480 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT AND EAP/CM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2017
TAGS: PTER CASC PGOV PINS KJUS KISL KPAO ASEC MG
SUBJECT: REGIONAL STRATEGIES TO COUNTER THE TERRORIST
ENEMY: MONGOLIA'S VIEW AS A COALITION PARTNER

REF: A. STATE 112723


B. ULAANBAATAR 0049

C. ULAANBAATAR 237

D. ULAANBAATAR 786

E. ULAANBAATAR 836

Classified By: DCM Brian L. Goldbeck for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T ULAANBAATAR 000480

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT AND EAP/CM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2017
TAGS: PTER CASC PGOV PINS KJUS KISL KPAO ASEC MG
SUBJECT: REGIONAL STRATEGIES TO COUNTER THE TERRORIST
ENEMY: MONGOLIA'S VIEW AS A COALITION PARTNER

REF: A. STATE 112723


B. ULAANBAATAR 0049

C. ULAANBAATAR 237

D. ULAANBAATAR 786

E. ULAANBAATAR 836

Classified By: DCM Brian L. Goldbeck for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) As requested in ref A, post would like to suggest that
Washington consider how it can best retain and strengthen
support by counter-terrorism allies and coalition partners
such as Mongolia. Mongolia,s General Intelligence Agency's
(GIA) has repeatedly pressed the USG for CT assistance and
cooperation (refs B through E). While Mongolia acknowledges
it does not face a serious home-grown or foreign terrorist
threat (Mongolia's Muslims comprise less than 5% of the
population, are secular and non-radicalized, and are isolated
in the far west),Mongolian officials have expressed concern
that Mongolia could be targeted due to its support for and
participation in coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.


2. (C) Post continues to believe that modest USG-provided CT
training and assistance would be appropriate, if only to
boost GOM professionalism, and thus confidence that there is
indeed no great domestic terrorist threat. But CT assistance
would also strengthen Mongolia,s ability to deny terrorists
access or a venue for action, thereby enabling the GOM to
continue to participate in coalitions in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and elsewhere, and mitigate criticism that such participation
has made Mongolia itself a target. Such assistance would
also mute complaints from some quarters that the U.S. is
indifferent to Mongolia,s risks and concerns, which are very
real in their minds. A little attention and assistance to
Mongolia (and perhaps other non-Muslim, non-front line
states) might be a wise, worthwhile investment.
MINTON