PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR SAYS NEW IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L ULAANBAATAR 000275

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2017
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV MG IZ PL
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR SAYS NEW IRAQ
ROTATION REMAINS UNDECIDED

REF: A. ULAANBAATAR 220


B. ULAANBAATAR 173

C. ULAANBAATAR 266

Classified By: Charge Brian L. Goldbeck, for reasons 1.5(B) and (D).


1. (C) During a May 7 meeting on other matters, Charge asked
Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Tsogtbaatar about the
status of Mongolia's decision on sending an 8th rotation of
troops to provide force protection for Polish troops at Camp
Echo. Tsogtbaatar replied that he knew that the deadline for
a decision is drawing closer, and said he would look into the
issue -- but likely after he returns from a trip out of
Mongolia from May 9-15. He added that after his return, he
would be focusing on preparations for President Enkhbayar's
May 28-30 visit to South Korea. E/P Chief noted that, after
he returns June 3, the Ambassador almost certainly would
request meetings with the President, Speaker and Prime
Minister (the three members of Mongolia's National Security
Council) to discuss his consultations in Washington and the
8th rotation. Tsogtbaatar replied that having the Ambassador
raise the 8th rotation would be a welcome idea. While
discussing it with the President would be "preaching to the
choir," Tsogtbaatar said, it would usefully highlight for the
Mongolian system that a decision needed to be made, rather
than have the President need to make this point.


2. (C) During an April 27 meeting with A/DCM, Tsogtbaatar
said he did not know when the National Security Council
might discuss the 8th rotation. He commented that it really
should be the Cabinet of Ministers which first makes a
recommendation on a rotation, which the NSC would then
endorse. However, he said, this is not how the March
extension of the 7th rotation (ref b) had occurred. Instead,
the Cabinet had done nothing, and military leaders had gone
to President Enkhbayar noting that the March 20 departure
date for the 7th rotation was fast approaching, and the
troops needed to be told something. Enkhbayar had then had
the NSC urge an extension of the 7th rotation until July 1,
which the Cabinet had endorsed. Tsogtbaatar commented that
Prime Minister Enkhbold does not want to be exposed to any
political risk by being the one to an initiate a decision,
and thus wants the NSC to act first and share any fallout if
casualties or other problems occur. However, Tsogtbaatar
said, the President is sensitive to assertions by some that
he is "taking up matters really within the Prime Minister's
portfolio." In approaching the decision on the 8th rotation,
Tsogtbaatar said, the President would rather not give further

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ammunition for such charges.


3. (C) DAO is reporting separately that training of the 140
troops who would form an 8th rotation recently began at Five
Hills Training Center. While the Mongolian Armed Forces
(MAF) always train somewhat more soldiers than are later
deployed, this number would allow an increase from the 100
troops in the 7th rotation, in keeping with MAF thinking
after Defense Minister Sonompil's end-March visit to Iraq.
The troops will finish their training in late May and, after
leave, would be ready to deploy sometime in June.


4. (C) COMMENT: We suspect it likely that an official
decision on the 8th rotation will not occur until June, since
Prime Minister Enkhbold and President Enkhbayar seem
determined to wait for each other to act first. The NSC
usually meets to hear the results of important overseas
trips, and a June NSC session to discuss the President's
South Korea trip may be the time for Enkhbayar to give in and
propose the rotation. Enkhbayar, who hopes to visit
Washington in October (ref c),is keenly aware that having
boots on the ground in Iraq will be warmly welcomed by his
U.S. interlocutors. Holding the decision for the last
possible moment also gives them maximum flexibility, should
conditions change or significant events occur affecting their
force's mission. On a related note, we understand, for
example, there may be a move underway for Georgian troops to
take over some or all of the Poles' mission. END COMMENT.
GOLDBECK