SCENESETTER FOR 22ND US-TUNISIA JOINT MILITARY

S E C R E T TUNIS 000615

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG (HARRIS AND HOPKINS)
DOD FOR OSD (DAS WHELAN, AXELROD, AGUIRRE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2017
TAGS: OTRA PREL MARR TS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR 22ND US-TUNISIA JOINT MILITARY
COMMISSION (JMC)

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT F. GODEC FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d)

--------------
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The Embassy welcomes the visit of DASD Whelan and
other USG officials for the 22nd US-Tunisia Joint Military
Commission (JMC). The Government of Tunisia (GOT) will see
your visit and the JMC as an indication of the solid
relationship it has with the United States; a relationship it
considers very important. Africa Command, reduced foreign
military training assistance levels, the Status of Forces
Agreement, and President's Freedom Agenda are likely be
issues during the JMC meetings.


2. (S) As to the newly created United States Africa Command,
the host nation is eager to learn more about this initiative
and it will likely be a topic of discussions in both formal
and informal discussions. For their part, Tunisian officials
have indicated that they generally support its establishment
but are uncertain how it will affect bilateral activities
with the United States as they relate to North Africa, the
Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative, NATO, broader European
relations, and other regional matters. In fact, one Tunisian
official has indicated that Tunisia's interests do not lie in
Africa but rather with the Mediterranean, Europe, and the
West.


3. (S) Foreign Military Financing (FMF) will be cut in 2008
by approximately 400 percent from roughly US $8 million to
some US $2 million. Historically, national funding for the
Tunisian military has also been inadequate and will likely
not improve given the increasing pressures on the government
to fund social programs. As a consequence, the Tunisian
military's ability to assist the United States military in
countering the growing Islamic extremist threat to the region
and in other parts of the world will be reduced.


4. (U) The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) should be
discussed at some point during your meetings. Currently, it
is with the Tunisian Government for review, following
additional changes made by the US Government. Indications
are that the host nation may be uncomfortable with certain
sovereignty issues. This could prevent Tunisia from signing
the document. Lastly, as laid out in the Mission Strategic
Plan, we remain focused on the President's Freedom Agenda.

--------------
US-TUNISIAN RELATIONS ARE GOOD
--------------


5. (C) Our overall relationship with Tunisia remains solid,
and Tunisians recognize that good relations with the United
States are important to Tunisia's future. The President's
Freedom Agenda constitutes a critical element of our
relations with Tunisia, and we continue to promote the pace
of political reform. We also seek to increase Tunisia's
cooperation in combating terrorism and increase economic
prosperity through trade, investment, and economic reforms.
For its part, the Government of Tunisia (GOT) is anxious to
increase commercial ties with the United States and Tunisian
students continue to seek out US universities. Both
governments see military assistance programs and joint
military exercises involving US military personnel on
Tunisian soil as beneficial. On regional issues, the
government has allowed the controlled media to harshly and
repeatedly criticize US policies. That said, while Tunisians
may not like US foreign policy, Tunisians in general still
view the American people and their values positively.


6. (C) Although we phased out our Peace Corps program and
USAID mission here in the mid-1990s (Tunisia has "graduated"
from development assistance because of its economic and
social progress),Tunisia now receives limited funding
through the USG's Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI),
which supports reform across the Middle East and North
Africa. The GOT claims to be on the path of democratic
reform, through the rhetoric is much stronger than the
reality. The GOT has welcomed MEPI programs in non-sensitive
areas, such as trade and economic growth, but opposes
programs on political reform or direct outreach to
independent Tunisian civil society. It has prevented several
US NGOs from implementing programs here and in one case

actively discouraged journalists from attending a training
session on professional standards.

--------------
REGIONAL ISSUES
--------------


7. (C) The Government of Tunisia frequently plays a
moderating role among the Arab states on Palestinian-Israeli
issues. To its credit, the GOT still maintains quiet
backchannel relations with Israel and may have held discreet
discussions about re-opening the Israeli trade office in
Tunis (closed in 2002). The GOT also hosted Israeli Foreign
Minister Shalom as head of that country's delegation to the
United Nations' World Summit on the Information Society
(WSIS) in November 2005 and arranged a visit by him to his
birthplace in southern Tunisia.


8. (C) On Iraq, Tunisia has generally followed the Arab
League position although they were one of the first to
recognize the post-war government and have cooperated on
repatriation of Iraqi assets. Historically, they have had
strong economic, trade, and human ties with Iraq, but
Tunisian government and businesses have been slow to
contribute their very limited resources and energy to the
reconstruction efforts. Meanwhile, US policy toward Iraq has
been played in local media and some intellectual circles as
unilateralism and part of a broader oil-driven scheme to
remake the Middle East map. Even the Iraqi elections failed
to elicit much interest or a positive response on the streets
of Tunis.

-------------- --------------
SUPPORTS THE WAR ON TERROR BUT SOME DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH
-------------- --------------


9. (C) The GOT strongly shares our concern over terrorism,
although we sometimes differ on the definition of terrorism,
whom to label a terrorist, and how to combat it. The GOT
unwaveringly condemned the September 11 attacks, cooperated
on financial and other anti-terrorist measures, and provided
support for our military campaign in Afghanistan. It has
also tried several terrorist suspects who were extradited
from Libya, Italy, and Algeria. The GOT conducts several
active counterterrorism training/exercise programs with a
variety of US agencies, but should have been more forthcoming
about the thwarted terrorists attacks and operations from
late December 2006 to January 2007, and subsequent
investigations and arrests.

--------------
US-TUNISIA MILITARY COOPERATION
--------------


10. (C) Our military cooperation program is one of the most
active in the Mediterranean region. Tunisia is still among
the top recipients worldwide of the International Military
Education and Training (IMET) program. In fact, a high
percentage of its officer corps have attended US military
schools under this program, including much of its senior
military leadership. Our annual combined exercises and other
training events have nearly ceased but, when coupled with
other programs, are probably sufficient to ensure the
potential sea and air access we might require for future US
military operations in the region. If Tunisia is to become a
more active partner for the United States, it must upgrade
and modernize its military hardware as well as force
structure and be prepared to engage in multilateral military
activities.


11. (S/NF) US-Tunisian military intelligence cooperation is
strong -- focused primarily on Libya, and more recently on
terrorism in neighboring countries. In fact, over the past
couple years the exchange has provided timely information on
extremist activities in both Libya and Algeria (a matter that
is considered very sensitive locally and should not be
discussed during the group meetings). It would be helpful to
thank Tunisian counterparts for their support in these
matters, but to note that GOT counterterrorism cooperation in
other channels still needs improvement.


12. (C) As mentioned, the need for increasing FMF to support
the Tunisian military's counterterrorism efforts will likely
come up as a host nation talking point. The Ministry of

National Defense refers regularly to the need for annual FMF
in the neighborhood of US $30-40 million for the next five to
seven years; the Country Team supports this request.

--------------
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
--------------


13. (C) In June 1999 the GOT signed the UN Standby Memorandum
of Understanding on Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) in New
York, signaling Tunisia's readiness to participate in future
PKOs. Given the Ministry of National Defense's (MND)
relatively small budget and costly daily surveillance
operations along the Algerian border, the Tunisians will
probably need help to equip, deploy, and maintain a PKO
force. Nonetheless, Tunisia has contributed some two hundred
and forty personnel for the MONUC in the DROC. Tunisia has
also sent an observer team to participate in UN operations in
Ethiopia and Eritrea, and offered to provide facilities in
Tunisia for US military trainers to train other African
Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) participating countries'
soldiers. Tunisia has repeatedly said it is unwilling to
provide significant military or civilian support in Iraq,
Afghanistan or Darfur.

--------------
SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
--------------


14. (C) While the GOT will request increased levels of FMF,
IMET levels are at their all-time highest (approximately US
$1.89 million) and IMET continues to be one of our best mid-
to long-range investments in shaping our future relations
with the next generation of Tunisian military leaders.


15. (U) Humanitarian Assistance. The well-organized,
EUCOM-funded Humanitarian Assistance Program has provided the
Tunisian people with almost US $5 million in assistance since

1999. It has been very well received by the local populace
and the projects usually receive positive local press
coverage. They also play an important part in the embassy's
public affairs and outreach efforts. Past projects have
included schools for the physically and mentally handicapped,
a shelter for battered women and their children, an AIDS
testing clinic, and several other important community efforts.


16. (U) Demining. The Tunisian government is a signatory to
the Ottawa Convention and is therefore committed to
destroying its existing stocks of landmines by 2009. A US
Demining Policy Assessment Visit completed an assessment in
23-26 January 2006, subsequent training has been conducted --
including EOD training currently underway for Army
Engineering Command that includes lessons learned from Iraq
and Afghanistan -- and future training is slated to take
place.

-- (C/NF) Reporting indicates that the Tunisian military's
existing stocks of mines have been destroyed and work to
clear the Ras Jedir field, //GEOCOORD: 330854N/0113303E// is
now complete. Tunisia will still have eight other minefields
to clear but they are in remote, unpopulated areas in the
southern part of the country along the Libyan border. The
Canadian, German, and perhaps Spanish governments have
provided them with equipment and training while the European
Commission is reportedly considering providing the Tunisian
government with equipment. Additionally, the United States
has provided equipment and training for Tunisian demining
units.

--------------
MILITARY EXERCISES
--------------


17. (C) The United States and Tunisia have a long-established
combined exercise program. In the past, exercises have
included large-scale command post exercises, maneuvers, and
air-to-air activities. Sometimes hundreds of US military
personnel were on the ground in Tunisia. However, financial
constraints, the closure of Tunisian training areas, and
limited force availability have severely impacted a once very
dynamic program. Likewise, the Tunisian military's
requirements to effectively patrol its borders have
significantly reduced the number of Tunisian forces available
to exercise with US units. Consequently, they have asked


that the size and scope of the exercise program be adjusted
accordingly. At present, only small-scale JCETs and a
medical exercise are scheduled to take place in the near
future. One JCET currently on the ground will enhance
Tunisian counterterrorism capabilities and the professional
development of host nation forces.


18. (C) There are currently no significant US Exercise
Related Construction (ERC) projects scheduled. Past,
unsupported requests have included Galite port, improvements
to the Ben Ghilouf air-to-ground range, and Cape Serrat
training area. The Tunisian military airfield at Sidi Ahmed
airbase is unfortunately unusable by the United States Air
Force due to the condition of the runway and will require a
major reconstruction effort.

--------------
ACCESS & TRANSIT
--------------


19. (S/NF) The Tunisian military facilitates access and
transit by high-level US delegations/visitors through
Tunisian military and civilian installations. This includes
not infrequent fuel stops by high-level US political and
military leaders at the Carthage-El Aouina dual-use airfield,
along with military aircraft at the Sidi Ahmed military
airbase in Bizerte. In the case of humanitarian missions,
such as the Darfur crisis, the Tunisian government allowed
unrestricted overflight and landing rights to US military
aircraft. As explained by one senior Tunisian official, this
is an example of the GOT's trust of the United States. (Begin
protect) Finally, Tunisia also allows for the overflight of
special reconnaissance missions by the United States
military, however, this information is very tightly
controlled within the Tunisian government and should not be
discussed. (End protect)
GODEC