Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TUNIS1345
2007-10-03 15:44:00
SECRET
Embassy Tunis
Cable title:  

THE WAY AHEAD IN THE MAGHREB

Tags:  PREL ECON KPAO KMPI PINS PTER SCUL XI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0005
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #1345/01 2761544
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031544Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3960
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T TUNIS 001345 

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DEPT FOR NEA A/S DAVID WELCH AND DAS GORDON GRAY FROM
AMBASSADORS FORD, GODEC AND RILEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2032
TAGS: PREL ECON KPAO KMPI PINS PTER SCUL XI
SUBJECT: THE WAY AHEAD IN THE MAGHREB

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT F. GODEC; reason 1.4 (b) & (d)

-------
SUMMARY
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S E C R E T TUNIS 001345

SIPDIS

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DEPT FOR NEA A/S DAVID WELCH AND DAS GORDON GRAY FROM
AMBASSADORS FORD, GODEC AND RILEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2032
TAGS: PREL ECON KPAO KMPI PINS PTER SCUL XI
SUBJECT: THE WAY AHEAD IN THE MAGHREB

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT F. GODEC; reason 1.4 (b) & (d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) On Friday, September 14, we (Ambassadors Ford, Godec
and Riley) met in Tunis to review developments in Algeria,
Morocco and Tunisia, assess US policy, and chart a way ahead.
While our three countries are different in important ways,
they all face a difficult challenge from extremists and need
to accelerate progress on democracy. Based on our
discussions, we offer three principal recommendations:

-- The North African countries represent almost half of the
population of the Arab world and high-level Washington
engagement, particularly from the most senior State
Department officials, is critical to advancing US foreign
policy goals. We urge the Secretary to visit the region.

-- The threat of extremism is real and growing, particularly
from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Nevertheless,
we have adequate resources from Washington and from EUCOM for
military and counter-terrorism assistance (assuming resumed
adequate FMF funding for Tunisia and approval of the Tunis
1206 proposal).

-- To reduce extremism, however, and to deepen ties, Tunisia
and Algeria need significantly more resources, especially
funding, for education programs, greater public affairs
outreach, and small but useful levers to secure faster
economic reform.

We look forward to another Maghreb COM meeting following the
NEA COM session in December.

End Summary.


2. (C) On Friday, September 14, we (Ambassadors Ford, Godec
and Riley) met at Embassy Tunis to discuss our three
countries, US policy and the way ahead. Members of the Tunis
country team participated in many of the sessions.

--------------
Countering Extremism
--------------


3. (S) Extremism, and particularly the threat from AQIM, is a

growing challenge in each of the countries. In Algeria,
security has slowly deteriorated over the past year,
especially with the appearance of suicide bombers. The GOA's
hold on power is not threatened, but the violence will
continue. Morocco and Tunisia also face a significant risk
of extremist attacks.


4. (S) The roots of extremism in the countries vary. In
Algeria, AQIM is recruiting young, unemployed men, who move
to the mountains for training and attacks while a smaller,
more educated cadre (most likely irreconcilable) recruit and
maintain an urban support network. Many join for jihad in
Iraq but end up involved in terrorism inside Algeria. In
Tunisia, the pool is broader, with some educated Tunisians,
particularly those living abroad, choosing to join al-Qaeda.
In Morocco, there is also a significant challenge from
individuals and small groups carrying out independent
terrorist acts.


5. (S) We agreed that there is excellent cooperation among
our political, regional affairs and defense attache offices.
Cooperation among the GOT, GOA and GOM, however, has been
intermittent. Algeria engages with each of its neighbors
carefully and usually at a very operational level, rather
than planning broad, joint strategies. Moreover, the three
governments have little interest in having the US Government
act as a catalyst for cooperation among the three states.
This will limit the prospects for the RSI process and TSCTP,
although we may find niches in areas like Sahelian
cooperation. The combination of counter-intelligence
paranoia, limited administrative capacity and protocol
sensitivities means that we can only move at a measured pace
in expanding regional military and intelligence
relationships. Proposing small, practical information
exchanges, however, will help build more trust (but it will
always be an uphill battle). A focus, for example, on
al-Qaeda,s use of the Internet at the upcoming NAS
conference would be useful.


6. (C) On resources, we agreed that we have sufficient
funds, personnel and training on the C/T front from the State
and Defense departments. (NB. This assumes a resumption of
adequate FMF funding for Tunisia and approval of the
Mission,s 1206 proposal.) We do not, however, have the
resources or engagement needed on other issues that matter,
including educational programs, economic/commercial
opportunities and public diplomacy broadly. In particular,
Tunisia and Algeria need additional funding for education and
other outreach programs. We are missing opportunities to
attack the root problem of extremist ideologies.

--------------
Pressing for Democratic Progress
--------------


7. (S) Our countries continue to face fundamental challenges
on the road to democracy. Algeria is stagnant, and there is
little sign of a wider democratic opening in prospect.
Tunisia is making painfully slow progress on opening up and
needs further encouragement and pressure. Morocco is making
some headway, with the King recognizing the importance of
change, but challenges remain, particularly economic. In
Algeria and Tunisia, the word "drift" best captures the
current state of affairs. The citizens of the Maghreb are
frustrated by this drift and long for progress. Algeria and
Tunisia are both led by aging leaders in poor health who
appear unwilling to give up power. In the case of both
President Ben Ali and President Bouteflika, a clear message
delivered by senior Administration officials about the
importance of permitting "public debate," allowing the
development of a genuine, democratic opposition, and
"alternance of power" is important. This message may be best
delivered while appealing to the two men's sense of their
future legacies.


8. (C) In Morocco, thanks to USAID, MEPI and the Millennium
Challenge Corporation (MCC),the US Government has many
programs to promote democracy. Algeria, largely through
MEPI, also has small programs with the Parliament, the
Justice Ministry and NGOs to eke out incremental reform and
boost reform advocates. The GOT,s tight restrictions makes
programs in Tunisia far more problematic, although the
Mission continues to seek opportunities. In Tunis, support
from the Europeans (particularly the French) for our Freedom
Agenda goals is important, and we have made some headway in
securing cooperation in recent months.

--------------
Economic/Commercial Challenges
--------------


9. (C) Each of the countries faces significant economic
challenges, albeit with important differences. While
creating jobs is the first challenge in each country, the
governments are addressing the problem in different ways. In
Algeria, with officials sitting on a pile of petro-dollars,
the GOA shows little interest in leaping forward on economic
reform. Morocco and Tunisia, however, are responsive to
business concerns and are working hard to attract investment.
Tunisia has had some success in stepping up the real GDP
growth rate over the last year, and creating more jobs, but
needs to do better yet. Morocco had a good year economically
in 2006-07, but 2007-08 promises to be very challenging.

--------------
MCC and FTAs
--------------


10. (C) Although there are differences in the numbers, the
US-Morocco FTA may not have increased Moroccan exports as
much as expected. Nevertheless, GOM officials acknowledge
and welcome the increase in US investment. The MCC has made
an important difference there. While Tunisia technically
qualifies for the MCC, the GOT has so far demonstrated little
interest. Embassy Tunis has, however, provided a wealth of
information to the GOT on the MCC, highlighting that Morocco
and Jordan now have programs, and underscoring the
extraordinary opportunity Tunisia is missing.


11. (C) The visit by EEB P/DAS Dibble to Tunisia and Algeria
was welcomed by the two governments and underscores the
importance of an economic policy dialogue. In Tunisia, the
GOT appears ready to reinvigorate our TIFA with a view to
possible FTA discussions. Follow up discussions in Algeria
indicate the GOA would also welcome a TIFA Council meeting
but the agenda would need to be defined carefully in advance
to maximize its utility. There are areas where the Algerians
are willing to work on reform, such as the dilapidated
financial sector. The US Treasury Department has an expert
team engaged and we need to make sure it has the resources
needed to help Algerian reformers advance their agenda. With
the Algerians we should also pursue a determined discussion

at a technical level about WTO membership. The Algerians
haven't yet made the political decision to implement the
necessary reforms, and they are stuck in the mode of thinking
that they can somehow escape. They need to hear repeatedly
that there is no other way.


12. (C) The Arab Maghreb Union has just established a
private employers organization which might prove a good
vehicle to encourage further progress on Maghreb-wide
integration and reform. Nevertheless, regional integration
will remain slow.

--------------
Securing Help on Our Regional Issues
--------------


13. (C) The Maghreb countries can provide valuable support
to the United States on a range of regional challenges,
including Iraq, Iran, and the Palestinians. We must engage
with the three countries, however, on each issue and in
different ways. Morocco is likely to remain the most forward
leaning on assisting the United States, as the result of
closer ties generally and in an effort to secure our support
on the Western Sahara. Tunisia will continue to provide
quiet support, but is unlikely to lead. Algeria's
leadership, stuck in their 1970s world view, will rarely be
forward leaning, although we might occasionally secure quiet
help on individual issues.


14. (C) The continuing struggle between Algeria and Morocco
over the Western Sahara will hang over all we try to do with
them. Even if solved, however, Algeria and Morocco are
unlikely to be close anytime soon. The animosity between the
two has historical roots that will continue to impede
regional integration.

--------------
Public Affairs: Winning Hearts and Minds
--------------


15. (C) We agreed that public affairs engagement is critical
to progress on US foreign policy objectives in the region.
The missions in Algeria and Tunisia, in particular, need more
resources to support education programs, including:

-- ACCESS for underprivileged high-school students to study
English, a means by which they themselves believe they can
advance economically;

-- English language programs through Amideast in cities such
as Sfax, Tunisia;

-- e-math type programs that introduce IT skills to primary
school students;

-- High-school linkage programs which teach relevant
computer and English-language skills as well as reach out to
the most important target group in terms of limiting
extremism;

-- University partnership programs that again teach highly
marketable computer and English language skills in addition
to more technical subjects via long-distance learning.

Despite a clear and important opening in this area, and
requests from both posts, we do not have adequate funding for
these programs. It is reasonable to ask host governments to
contribute resources to expanded programming, but we need to
put resources on the table ourselves to extract movement from
these Jurassic bureaucracies.


16. (C) Making better use of the media is essential. In
each of the countries, television is the key, but it is the
regional satellite channels that are the most important. We
need to pay the most attention possible to the al-Jazeera
station in Rabat, and there are other Maghreb-oriented
satellite networks being established, often in France. (Ford
appeared on the Rabat al-Jazeerah newsbroadcast in a live
interview on September 23 and got plenty of subsequent media
coverage in Algeria September 25.) We must seek new ways to
get our message on to these channels. To influence local
elites, we could do more with other regional media, notably
Jeune Afrique, which is widely read by influential officials
in each of the countries. Better use of the Internet offers
another avenue of access, especially to younger people. IIP
has started doing this, but our posts should start ensuring
that our messages get published on locally generated web and
blog-sites (without having to check with Washington first).

--------------
High-Level Engagement Too
--------------


17. (C) Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya together have a
population of roughly 85 million people, nearly half of the
Arab world. Its proximity to our NATO allies and its energy
resources make it strategically very important. Since the
diminution of the Algerian civil war, however, it has not
garnered great US Government attention. The relative
stability, as we have outlined above, is not pre-destined to
endure. In these protocol-conscious countries, high-level
engagement is essential to getting messages across
effectively. In that regard, we welcome the decision by Under
Secretary Burns to meet with the Arab Maghreb Union Foreign

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Ministers in New York.


18. (S) We also urge other high-level engagement. The
single, best step we could take would be a visit by the
Secretary of State. In each country, the Secretary would

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find ample ground to encourage greater cooperation on
regional issues and on domestic challenges, notably to
advance democracy and to combat extremism. While a visit by
the Secretary would not be a &magic bullet8, it would
underscore for the leaders in each country the deep US
commitment to the region and it would advance our most
important, and most difficult, goals for the region. Beyond
a visit by the Secretary, it will be important to find
additional ways to engage with the region in a sustained way
at a high level.


19. (C) In the end, we are struck as much by the differences
among Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco as by the similarities.
While they share a common religion and language, they are in
many ways more different than alike. In addressing the
challenges of the region, we must tailor country-specific
responses. If we do so effectively, we can help each of them
emerge stronger, more stable, more democratic and more
prosperous. A successful Maghreb would help us across the
entire broader Middle East.
GODEC