TUNISIA - DEMOCRATIC REFORM STRATEGY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TUNIS 001293

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/PI, DRL AND NEA/MAG (HARRIS AND
HOPKINS)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2017
TAGS: PHUM KDEM PGOV PREL TS
SUBJECT: TUNISIA - DEMOCRATIC REFORM STRATEGY

REF: A. STATE 130991


B. TUNIS 409

C. TUNIS 389

D. 05 TUNIS 1045

Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Even non-French-speaking observers of Tunisian
politics use the phrase, "Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme
chose" to describe the country in recent years. As we review
our democratic reform strategy, despite some minor
achievements, our two main objectives remain promoting
increased freedom of speech and freedom of association.
Unlike many countries in the region, the GOT has invested
heavily in creating economic opportunities, improving
education and empowering women. But political progress has
been glacial in a country that has only enjoyed two
presidents in fifty years of independence. While a
benevolent dictatorship may have had a certain value in the
early years of independence, the repressive policies of
President Ben Ali have created a political stagnation that is
threatening the core values that defined post-independence
Tunisia: moderation, education and tolerance. The time for
engagement is now, as we have seen small indications the GOT
may be considering reform. To nurture the possibilities for
genuine political reform, the USG must use every opportunity
to press the GOT for greater freedom of expression and
association. End Summary.

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CONTEXT
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2. (C) As outlined in Refs B and C, fifty years after
independence, Tunisia's freedom deficit is impeding its
political, economic and social modernization. For years,
Tunisia was a development model for Arab and African
countries. However, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who
will celebrate twenty years of rule this November, has
created a quagmire of control and statist policies that lead
many to question whether Tunisia is progressing at all.
Tunisia is ready for freedom. But Tunisia today is also a
country at risk, near a key crossroad. Tunisia could go
further down the road of repression, lack of freedom, and
greater instability and extremism; or it could begin to
embrace and reap the benefits of political and economic
freedom.


3. (C) US Government efforts to promote democratic reform
over the past two years have meet the same stale GOT response
that is recycled ad nauseam for Tunisians: "We have a plan."
But the plan is not public, and we have not seen any major
efforts to promote increased freedom. The challenge for the
United States is to persuade GOT leaders that the plan is
failing and that only increased freedom will secure Tunisia's
future as a moderate, secular and developed country.
Judicious US intervention could help Tunisia realize its
potential and become a model in the region. But we must be
prepared to use every opportunity to advance our agenda. If
USG officials do not raise the freedom agenda, the GOT will
be left with the impression that it can rest on its moderate
laurels.


4. (S) The time for such engagement is now, as we have seen
several small indications in the past year that Ben Ali's
regime may be considering reform. In 2006, Ben Ali told
former SecDef Rumsfeld that he envisioned himself as a
retired president. In 2007, he told CODEL Tanner that he
recognized the ruling RCD party was too powerful. We
recently learned that a senior GOT political strategist has
made some discrete inquiries about how to level the elections
playing field for opposition candidates. While these quiet
signals may not mean free and fair elections are on the
horizon, it is clear that Ben Ali and others are thinking
seriously about what type of political reform may be
possible. Given these indications, and the upcoming 2009
presidential and legislative elections, our democracy
strategy takes on new relevance.

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DEMOCRACY STRATEGY
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5. (C) Post's democracy strategy for Tunisia has two main
themes: freedom of expression and freedom of association.
Each theme has four main components, the developments of

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which we follow carefully to judge whether or not progress is
being made.

-- Freedom of Expression

a. Increase Media Freedom
i. Grant new media licenses (independent newspapers, radio
and television)
ii. Allow unrestricted distribution

b. Increase Media Access for Independent Political Voices and
Encourage Public Debate
i. Encourage media coverage of opposition party activities
ii. Expand opposition party and NGO access to domestic
television
iii.Review election and campaign laws to improve media
access
iv. Encourage public debate; convey that self-censorship
not required

c. Encourage Independent Journalists, Activities and Ensure
that Harassment Against Them is Ceased
i. Lotfi Hajji
ii. Slim Boukhdhir
iii.Omar Mestiri

d. End Blocking of Internet Websites
i. Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org)
ii. Reporters without Borders (www.rsf.org)
iii.TunisNews (www.tunisnews.net)
iv. Kalima (www.kalimatunisie.com)
v. Arab Network for Human Rights Information (hrinfo.net)

-- Freedom of Association and Assembly

a. Allow Establishment of Independent Domestic and
International NGOs
i. Encourage mediation of Tunisia Human Rights League
(LTDH) crisis
ii. National Council for Liberties in Tunisia (CNLT)
iii.Tunisian Journalists Syndicate (SJT)
iv. General Tunisian Labor Confederation (CGTT)
v. Fulbright Association

b. Register New Parties
i. Congress for the Republic (CPR)
ii. Tunisian Green Party

c. Allow Public and Private Gatherings
i. Encourage access to opposition events
ii. Encourage civil society meetings and activities in
public and private places, including NGO headquarters and
branch offices

d. Facilitate Domestic and International Funding for NGOs
i. Cease freezing of funding of legitimate NGOs
ii. Revise NGO laws to liberalize funding regulations and
allow foreign funding


6. (C) These two freedoms are fundamental to positive and
popular democratic change in Tunisia. With truly free media
and unfettered access to the Internet, Tunisia's highly
educated population would soon spark domestic debate that
would erase the current apathy of Tunisians about their
political system and spur demands for change. If, in
addition to saying and writing whatever they want, Tunisians
were free to gather as they please, real opposition political
parties headed by genuine and competitive candidates could
emerge.


7. (C) With the 2009 elections looming, amid a plethora of
orchestrated calls for Ben Ali to present his candidacy, now
is the time to make the case for an electoral law that will
create a more level playing field for opposition parties than
has pertained in previous elections. Of course, the degree
to which the 2009 elections will be free and fair will depend
on a lot of factors beyond the electoral law. For that
reason, Post is exploring the possibility of inviting a
third-party to conduct an independent assessment of Tunisia's
overall framework for carrying out democratic elections.
Such an assessment could include recommendations about
specific steps that should be taken to improve the prospects
of genuinely free and fair elections.

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MEPI: MAKE EVERY PROGRAM IMPOSSIBLE
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8. (C) While post has identified many current MEPI programs
in the region that could support these democratic reform

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strategy goals, the GOT has consistently blocked any effort
to organize political reform programs in Tunisia. The
Ambassador and other senior USG officials have explained
MEPI's goals and pitched less threatening programs on
multiple occasions to various GOT officials, but the GOT
consistently blocks our efforts to engage government or civil
society contacts on political programs. Even the MEPI logo
has become taboo, with one of our few grantees recently
reporting that unnamed GOT officials had asked that the MEPI
logo be removed from MEPI-funded publications. Despite these
challenges, we continue to look for ways to promote increased
freedom, including using MEPI programs that are conducted
outside of Tunisia.

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THE NEED FOR WASHINGTON SUPPORT
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9. (S) Regardless of the GOT impediments to MEPI, programs
alone cannot convince the government of the need for greater
freedom of expression and association. Rather, it is
diplomatic efforts that could turn the tide. However, when
we try to raise political issues, it is not uncommon for
Tunisian officials to respond that we simply have bad
information about the local environment. They often link
this point to their claimed close ties to various Washington
officials, suggesting that the US-Tunisian bilateral
relationship is blossoming. We must have consistent policy
being advocated at all levels if we are going to gain any
traction on the political reform message post has been
delivering for years. Specifically, the USG approach must be
twofold:

-- We advocate a frank and direct approach to President Ben
Ali, appealing to his sense of leadership and legacy. The
opportunities to do so are few and far between, but the
President's recent letter to Ben Ali was an excellent
opening, as it very clearly stated that "Tunisia is ready for
greater democratic freedoms, including freedom of association
and expression." Direct engagement with Ben Ali must be
followed up with other senior GOT officials. The USG should
take advantage of all opportunities, including Foreign
Minister Abdallah's upcoming trip to UNGA, to reiterate this
point.

-- We must press like-minded countries, particularly in the
EU, to make the same points. To that end, the Ambassador has
already shared our revised reform targets with the French and
UK ambassadors in Tunisia, who have indicated their
willingness to support our efforts. While working directly
with the European Union has been useful, it appears that the
consensus needed for EU action has and will continue to
stymie our efforts to cooperate on democracy promotion. With
the election of a new French president, and Sarkozy's recent
visit to Tunisia, cooperation with the French is even more
important today. We will need the support of Washington
officials to make headway with France and other like-minded
nations.

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REALITY CHECK
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10. (C) Even with full support of this strategy, there are
many who believe that the Ben Ali regime is inherently change
averse. While one could conclude that therefore USG efforts
should be directed elsewhere, we would argue that Tunisia is
in fact more ready for democratic change than most other
countries in the region. Tunisia has a moderate, secular,
educated populace that generally understands the principals
of democracy and believes that openness is in its best
interest. Its institutional structures, if allowed to
function freely, could adapt relatively easily to a broad
range of political discourse. Some observers here compare
Tunisia to pre-democratic Eastern European regimes. Just as
there, we believe an investment in Tunisia's democratic
future would yield high returns.
GODEC