THE TUNISIAN SECULAR STATE: A MODEL FOR THE MUSLIM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TUNIS 001068

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/PI AND NEA/MAG (HARRIS AND HOPKINS)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV SOCI KISL PTER KDEM TS
SUBJECT: THE TUNISIAN SECULAR STATE: A MODEL FOR THE MUSLIM
WORLD?

Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) AND (d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Following independence in 1956, Tunisia has witnessed
the development of a largely secular system of government
that maintains a strict separation of mosque and state.
Former President Bourguiba implemented policies that,
building on Tunisia's secular leanings, established Tunisia
as one of the most secular, and secure, Arab and Muslim
societies in the world. President Ben Ali continued these
policies, while expanding government control over religious
institutions, including mosques, imams and education. Some
of these steps taken by the GOT could be considered "secular
best practices" for other Arab and Muslim countries, given
Tunisia's success in countering religious extremism. Most
Tunisians today grew up in this overtly secular system; yet,
increasingly Tunisians are turning to religion. At the same
time, more and more complain that Ben Ali's focus on regime
security over political progress and dialogue could lead to
the collapse of the "model" secular system. End Summary.

--------------
BOURGUIBA'S SECULAR MIRACLE
--------------


2. (C) Tunisia's first President Habib Bourguiba was famous
-- or perhaps infamous -- for his liberal interpretations of
the Quran and other Islamic texts. In fact, Bourguiba
famously drank juice in Ramadan and suggested the veil
retarded women's participation in Tunisia's development.
Bourguiba's views and policies framed the social progress
that defines Tunisia today, including the banning of polygamy
and the promotion of women's rights. However, these views
were not simply Bourguiba's; in fact, Tunisia has a long
history of pre-independence era intellectuals who promoted
moderate and secular views. While most Tunisians, like many
Arabs in the independence era, supported Bourguiba's
political and social changes, some increasingly were turning
to Islam for answers to the country's challenges as the
Bourguiba era drew to a close.

--------------
BEN ALI USES THE CARROT...AND STICK
--------------


3. (C) Following his 1987 palace coup, Tunisia's second
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali promised greater democracy
and more space for religious groups. For example, in 1992,
Ben Ali established the Ministry of Religious Affairs --
notably not Islamic Affairs -- to promote religious tolerance
and interfaith relations. According to one former GOT
insider, Ben Ali decided to create the Ministry in order to
reach out to conservative Tunisians who rejected Bourguiba's
strictly secular state. But, perhaps thanks to his security
background, Ben Ali took additional steps to solidify state
control over religious matters. If Bourguiba's policies
firmly entrenched a secular system, Ben Ali went further to
ensure religion could never be used to overthrow this system.
In 1989, Ben Ali passed a law making imams government
employees and, in 1990, reformed religious education in
public schools.


4. (C) Another key component of the GOT's separation of
religion and state is the 1988 law governing political party
organization, which bans the formation of parties based on
religion. In order to circumvent this law, the existing
Islamic Tendency Movement changed its name to an-Nahdha. In
1988 the "National Pact" brought the now banned Islamic party
an-Nahdha into the political realm, and the party fielded
independents in the 1989 elections although it was never a
legal party. But the perceived threat of the Islamist
movement, in Tunisia and in neighboring Algeria, brought the
end to the GOT tolerance of an-Nahdha and other "Islamists"
in the 1990s. Many an-Nahdha members were jailed and others
fled to exile in Europe, leading one GOT official to note
that countries who accept the political asylum claims of
religious extremists endanger all moderate society.

--------------
THE SECURITY TREATMENT
--------------


5. (C) Following the clashes with Islamists in the 1990s, Ben
Ali increasingly applied what many term the "security
approach" to conservative and secular Tunisians alike. The
Ministry of Interior (MOI) Director of International
Cooperation Tahar Fellous told PolOff that the Ministry of

TUNIS 00001068 002 OF 003


Religious Affairs (MRA) coordinates all religious issues in
Tunisia with the Ministry of Interior. Fellous explained
that the GOT has a three-pronged approach to combat religious
extremism: controlling religious speech or sermons, employing
all imams and maintaining strict supervision over mosques.
According to MRA Chief of Staff Belkacem Alioui, there are
approximately 4,300 state mosques in Tunisia. Mosques are
closed outside of prayer hours, and GOT security services
monitor communities to disrupt any suspicious gatherings.
Imams, who usually have other full-time employment, are
recommended by regional governors and appointed and
supervised by the MRA and MOI. Alioui explained that the
Minister of Religious Affairs personally suggests the topics
of weekly sermons, the text of which are written and then
distributed to imams by the Ministry. Like almost all public
events in Tunisia, plainclothes security officials attend the
sermons to ensure imams do not deviate from the text.
Independent imams are not allowed, as evidenced by the recent
removal of the well-known imam of the Tunis suburb and
tourist attraction Sidi Bou Said, who was not a GOT
authorized leader.


6. (C) In many ways this system of control limits the ability
of extremists to spread their ideology and gain support in
Tunisia and has, when combined with Ben Ali's economic and
social development programs, done much to combat terrorist
ideologies. However, because the system does not allow for
the development of prominent religious leaders, it does
little to promote a culture of moderation and tolerance.
When asked about the absence of religious dialogue in
Tunisia, the MOI's Fellous opined that fatwas (Islamic legal
opinions) and ijtihad (Islamic legal interpretation) are only
used for political aims today. The GOT believes that the
Quran and Sunna are "clear" -- particularly regarding the
need for openness and moderation -- and require no further
interpretation. Therefore even though Tunisia's moderate
views might be helpful in combating extremism in the region,
the official religious establishment is silent, and almost
invisible, to Tunisians and, more broadly, the Arab-Islamic
community.

--------------
SECULAR ELITES VS. RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES
--------------


7. (C) However, the majority of Tunisians were born and
educated in this secular system and would still agree with
the GOT that religion must be separate from the state. The
independent Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (ATFD)
even argues that much-needed political liberalization in
Tunisia should exclude Islamists, who cannot be trusted to
support the secular achievements of the Tunisian regime.
Meanwhile, the Movement of 18 October, a disparate group of
secular and moderate Islamist opposition figures, continues
to face internal friction over the group's open door to
Islamists. In mid-2007, a group of intellectuals formed the
(as-yet unrecognized) Association for the Defense of
Secularism to press the GOT to go even further to solidify a
secular system. Among the group's aims would be to amend the
first article of the Tunisian constitution, which states,
"Tunisia is a free state...whose religion is Islam." While
the group's anti-Islamist focus appears on the surface to be
in step with GOT interests, members are pessimistic the GOT
will authorize a group that seeks to influence government
policies, never mind public opinion.


8. (C) Perhaps more troubling is the fact that secularism is
increasingly associated with the West, which causes some
Tunisians to flatly reject the concept. With the advent of
pan-Arab television and the spread of the Internet, an
increasing number of Tunisians -- particularly among the
youth -- are becoming religiously conservative. The pan-Arab
and Muslim identity is increasingly attractive to young
Tunisians, partly in reaction to US policies in the region
that are viewed as attacks on Arab and Muslim brothers, but
also due to Ben Ali's own repressive policies. Perhaps
cognizant of this shift, the GOT has allowed the moderate,
and apolitical, Sufi movement to expand its outreach to
Tunisian citizens through local zawiyas (or religious
"corners"). While public discourse -- particularly about
religious issues -- remains off limits, Sufi leaders have
struck an agreement with the GOT that allows their activities
to grow. One zawiya leader told EmbOffs that part of this
agreement requires the zawiya inform the MOI of all who
attend its activities. Further, Sufi communities refuse to
engage conservative Tunisians who may have run into trouble
with the secular state. Yet, Sufi leaders are quick to
clarify their disregard for the GOT's secular (uninformed)
speeches on religious issues. While they attend Friday
prayers at GOT-operated mosques, one explained "They can say

TUNIS 00001068 003 OF 003


anything they want, but their actions show their true faith."

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Tunisia's secular system offers much that is good:
religious tolerance, separation of "church" and state, and a
liberal approach to women's rights and other important
issues. In fact, some Tunisian policies might even be "best
practices" for a secular Muslim society. But they come at a
price. While President Ben Ali insists on moderate religious
views and denies extremists a platform, he goes further and
exercises close to total control over freedom of expression
and association. For example, despite the intense Tunisian
interest in the wearing of the hijab (veil),there is no
public debate of the question in the country. In doing so,
Ben Ali and his government prevent the public discourse
between secular and conservative Tunisians that could
effectively combat domestic -- and perhaps international --
extremism.


10. (C) So far, Tunisia's secular foundation, control of the
religious establishment and strong security forces have
largely prevented the emergence of domestic extremist threat.
But for how long? Few Tunisians have faith the country's
secular leanings can defeat extremism in the long run in the
absence of public discourse and the development of a true,
secular "center" for Tunisia. Helping Tunisians build that
"center," through more political and personal liberty, is at
the heart of our Freedom Agenda goals here. If they succeed,
then Tunisia may yet merit the moniker many here desire: "a
model for the Muslim world." But not yet. End Comment.
GODEC