DARFUR TALKS STRUGGLE WITH POOR REBEL ATTENDANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000929

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU LY
SUBJECT: DARFUR TALKS STRUGGLE WITH POOR REBEL ATTENDANCE

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CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, AmEmbassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: UN/AU-led Darfur mediation talks began as
announced on October 27 in Sirte, Libya, even in the absence of
major political and military leaders from the Darfur rebel
movements. The UN/AU leadership is slowly proceeding with a
plan to dispatch teams to Juba and Darfur to encourage rebels
not in attendance to sign a ceasefire agreement and move their
internal consultations to Sirte. Libyan leader Muammar
Qadhafi's chilling comments that the international community
should leave the Sudanese alone to resolve the Darfur crisis and
affirming the GOS's "sovereign right" to use violence against
the Darfurians have encouraged some rebel groups to stay away
from Sirte. While welcoming Sudanese Presidential Advisor Nafie
Ali Nafie's unilateral ceasefire declaration, international
observers cautioned that a meaningful ceasefire agreement must
include mechanisms to identify violations and delimit concrete
penalties for parties that broach the ceasefire. With the Sirte
meeting looking increasingly precarious, international observers
cautioned the UN/AU against boxing themselves in with
unrealistic timetables or overly optimistic projections that the
Sirte meeting will conclude with a final political settlement
for Darfur. End summary.

KEY PLAYERS BOYCOTT SIRTE MEETING


2. (U) Most key rebel leaders and military commanders,
including SLM faction leader Abdulwahid Mohammad al-Nur and JEM
leader Khalil Ibrahim, made good on their threats to boycott the
Sirte meeting. Factions in attendance included JEM/Collective
led by Bahar Idriss Abu Gharba and Abdullah Banda and SLA/Khamis
Abdullah (although Khamis himself is not in attendance). An
Arab faction led by Abu Sarra and Fur leader Ahmed Ibrahim
Diraige also participated.


3. (U) By contrast to the movements, representation from the
Government of Sudan and the international community was strong.
Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi and MFA Secretary for Africa
Affairs Ali Treiki hosted the meeting. A large GOS delegation,
headed by Sudanese Presidential Advisor Nafi Ali Nafi and
intelligence chief Salah Gosh, consisted entirely of top NCP
officials and vowed to be the last delegation to leave the Sirte
talks. SLM/Minawi did not attend -- the GOS vowed to block his
participation unless he came as part of Nafi's GNU/GOS
delegation. Special Envoys and top MFA officials from the U.S.,
U.K., France, China, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada, the
European Union and Japan also participated. The three regional
governments -- Egypt, Chad, and Eritrea -- were represented at
the FM level. Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa also
participated. Representatives from the SPLM's Taskforce on
Darfur, Reverend Clement Janda and Edward Lino, were on hand in
Sirte. Thirteen tribal and civil society representatives
attended as well, but the GOS prevented 15 from attending who
had been invited by the UN/AU.

NO CLEAR PLAN TO BOOST REBEL PARTICIPATION


4. (C) Recognition that the absence of major rebel leaders
threatened serious discussions on either a ceasefire or a
political settlement was widespread in all but the UN/AU camps,
with UN S/E Eliasson characterizing the conference both publicly
and privately as "off to a good start" and "relatively on
schedule". The UN/AU leadership has been slow to entice key
rebel figures into the Sirte meeting. In a meeting October 29
with international observers, UN S/E Eliasson announced, and
international observers endorsed, plans to send mid-level teams
to Juba and Darfur to encourage rebels to sign a draft ceasefire
agreement as a confidence-building measure to facilitate forward
movement of the political process. SPLM criticized the
proposal, and two JEM splinter groups currently in Sirte
threatened to walk out if the UN/AU dispatched the teams. By
October 30, working level UN/AU staff conceded that UN/AU envoys
were considering shifting the conference venue outside of Libya
in the hope more rebels might attend if the conference were held
at a less objectionable venue. Sources, however, indicate that
UN SYG Ban is firm on continuing to hold the talks in Libya.

U.S. ENCOURAGES FLEXIBILITY IN THE SIRTE PROCESS


5. (C) S/E Natsios embraced the proposal to send out teams,
encouraging the UN/AU to pursue the Darfur peace process in the
field rather that at the 4,000-seat Sirte convention center if
necessary. S/E Natsios encouraged the UN/AU to clearly define
the endgame of the current meeting and suggested an enforceable
ceasefire might be a more realistic short-term goal necessary to

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build confidence among the rebel movements before real political
dialogue could begin. He cautioned the UN/AU not to box
themselves in with an inflexible process and unmovable dates.
Detailed written reports on progress every 2-3 weeks would help
sustain support for UN/AU process in national capitals.


6. (U) In addition, in public remarks at the October 27
plenary session, S/E Natsios told delegates that a meaningful
peace in Darfur requires both a robust peacekeeping force and an
inclusive political settlement. Peacekeeping and the political
track are mutually re-enforcing and should be pursued
simultaneously. S/E Natsios stressed that preconditions for
negotiations are illogical -- if everything has already been
agreed upon, what would be the point of negotiations? There are
five significant issues for discussion: security, disarmament,
compensation, reconstruction / development, and land rights. A
meaningful discussion on these issues requires participation by
parties with significant military and political strength in
Darfur. According to S/E Natsios, the Sirte meeting is the
beginning of a process that will eventually lead to a political
settlement. A cessation of hostilities would be a welcome first
step.

QADHAFI HARANGUES INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN PEACE PROCESS


7. (C) In a rambling, 45-minute speech delivered in a monotone
at the October 27 plenary session, Qadhafi told assembled rebel
movements, Sudanese officials, international envoys, and a large
press contingent that the absence of key rebel leaders in Sirte
confirms that the international community, including Libya,
should let the Sudanese and Darfurians resolve this conflict for
themselves. He singled out Abdulwahid Mohammad al-Nur and
Khalil Ibrahim as the "essential" leaders without whom "we
cannot conclude a peace." Expressing disappointment that more
rebel movements opted not to attend the Sirte talks, Qadhafi --
speaking several feet from UN S/E Eliasson -- said he had hoped
"to salvage the prestige of the United Nations and the UN's
efforts" to further the Darfur peace process.


8. (C) Qadhafi also referenced traditional Fur tribal
hierarchies, claiming that "had the international community not
gotten involved, the people of Darfur would have resolved the
conflict already". Reiterating his view that the Darfur
conflict is strictly tribal, the Libyan leader said the crisis
has no implications for regional or international security and
does not/not fall within the purview of a UN Chapter 7
intervention. In addition, Qadhafi gave an impassioned defense
of the GOS's "sovereign right" to use violence against the
Sudanese people, referring to a state's use of violence to quell
perceived insurgency as "legal and legitimate". Qadhafi
reietered his familiar refrain that the world faces "graver
threats" than the Darfur crisis.

NICE CEASEFIRE -- IF THEY CAN KEEP IT


9. (C) Sudanese Presidential Advisor Dr. Nafi Ali Nafi
announced (to polite applause) October 27 that the GOS declared
a unilateral ceasefire in Darfur. "The Government of Sudan will
not be the first to fire arms in Darfur", said Nafi. (Note: In
an meeting October 30 reported septel, CEN-SAD Secretary-General
Mohammad al-Madani told S/E Natsios that Nafi had agreed in
consultations with the GOL to offer a longer list of
concessions, only to revert to "the one thing (a ceasefire) they
agreed on before he left Khartoum". End note.) Nafi reiterated
that a sustainable peace in Darfur requires tackling poverty and
underdevelopment in the region, calling on international
observers to increase reconstruction assistance grants for
Darfur. Nafi identified three obstacles to peace: the
impossibility of consulting with the rebel movements, limited
international commitments to reconstruction, and the lack of
clear punishments for individuals or movements who step outside
the UN/AU peace process.


10. (C) Virtually all attendees in Sirte agreed that for a
ceasefire to be credible, it must include a mechanism to
identify and punish violators. In a private meeting on October
27, Treiki told S/E Natsios that Libya would consider a regional
travel ban on rebel movements and individuals that signed a
ceasefire and reneged. Treiki praised U.S. unilateral sanctions
on JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, but conceded U.S. sanctions are
strictly symbolic and incapable of raising the political costs
of violating the ceasefire. Though Treki offered to broach the
subject with Chad and Eritrea, the Eritrean FM spoke publicly
against the proposal later that day.

NON-MILITARY LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PROPOSAL


11. (C) S/E Natsios proposed a non-military logistical support

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package, involving both food and medical supplies, financed by
international donations and aimed at those rebel groups and
militias that signed and respected a cessation of hostilities,
including SLM/Minawi. The U.K., the Netherlands, the European
Union, and Norway endorsed the plan in principle and agreed to
investigate logistics and funding options should the UN/AU
choose to pursue the plan in the future. After international
observers presented the plan to the UN/AU on October 29, UN S/E
Eliasson asked for more time for internal UN deliberations about
the non-military logistical support plan. The Italian
delegation leader offered generous funding for the idea in a
private conversation with S/E Natsios.

DISCUSSIONS UNDERWAY TO EXPEL ABDULWAHID FROM FRANCE


12. (C) Treiki told S/E Natsios on October 27 that French FM
Bernard Kouchner said France is prepared to expel SLM faction
leader Abdulwahid Mohammad al-Nur in December when his French
residency permit expires. According to Treiki, Senegalese
President Abdallah Wade is ready to accept Abdulwahid if France
expels him. In a separate meeting October 30, CEN-SAD SYG
al-Madani told S/E Natsios that both the French government and
President Wade have spoken with Abdulwahid about relocating him
to Senegal, but Abdulwahid refused. Al-Madani said it was
"preferable to convince Abdulwahid to bless the peace or attend
the talks" than to expel him from France, but acknowledged
expulsion was a viable option. He recounted a meeting between
Chadian President Idriss Deby and Abdulwahid in Paris in July in
which Abdulwahid promised that he would attend the final UN/AU
negotiations.

AN EMBARASSMENT FOR LIBYA


13. (C) Libya's failure to deliver major rebel leaders --
despite repeated promises to the UN and AU that "everyone except
Abdulwahid" would come -- is a clear embarassment to the
conference's hosts. A/S Treiki was conspicuously silent
throughout the plenary sessions, often sitting in the audience
alongside other international observers but refraining from any
public comments throughout the Sirte meeting. In a private
meeting with S/E Natsios, Treiki was clearly embarassed by
Qadhafi's comments that the international community had no role
in the resolution of the Darfur conflict and cautioned that
Qadhafi's harsh message was "not what brother leader intended".
The GOL's low profile throughout the conference suggests that,
were the conference to collapse, Libya -- like the rest of the
international community -- would lay the blame squarely at the
UN/AU's doorstep.


14. (U) S/E Natsios cleared this message.
MILAM