Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TRIPOLI664
2007-08-03 12:38:00
SECRET
Embassy Tripoli
Cable title:  

LIBYA, FRANCE CONCLUDE "VERY GENERAL" CIVILIAN NUCLEAR DEAL

Tags:  PREL PGOV KNNP ENRG MNUC ECIN EINV ETRD KPWR FR 
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TelegramS E C R E T TRIPOLI 00000664 
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PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0664/01 2151238
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031238Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2505
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 0153
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0338
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0144
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 2866
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000664 

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG; NSC FOR RAMCHAND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/2/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP ENRG MNUC ECIN EINV ETRD KPWR FR
LY
SUBJECT: LIBYA, FRANCE CONCLUDE "VERY GENERAL" CIVILIAN NUCLEAR DEAL

REF: TRIPOLI 641

TRIPOLI 00000664 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: John Godfrey, POL/ECON Counselor, AmEmbassy
Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000664

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG; NSC FOR RAMCHAND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/2/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP ENRG MNUC ECIN EINV ETRD KPWR FR
LY
SUBJECT: LIBYA, FRANCE CONCLUDE "VERY GENERAL" CIVILIAN NUCLEAR DEAL

REF: TRIPOLI 641

TRIPOLI 00000664 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: John Godfrey, POL/ECON Counselor, AmEmbassy
Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (S) Summary: According to French diplomats, a civilian
nuclear deal concluded between Libya and France during President
Sarkozy's visit to Tripoli constitutes only a "very general"
framework for future cooperation, with no clear financial
commitment from the French side and little expectation from
either the French or Libyan side that it will be completed soon.
President Nicholas Sarkozy is sensitive to and fully engaged on
non-proliferation concerns surrounding a nuclear desalinization
project discussed within the framework of the MOU. Libyan
leader Muammar Qadhafi focused on plans for a 2008
"Mediterranean Union" head of state conference during two
private meetings with Sarkozy, and only briefly raised the case
of the Bulgarian medics. High-level Libya-France consultations
on Darfur will be reported septel. End summary.

CIVILIAN NUCLEAR MOU: A "VERY GENERAL" FRAMEWORK


2. (C) French PolCouns Pierre-Antoine Molina described a
civilian nuclear MOU August 1, signed by FMs Kouchner and
Shalgham July 25, as only a "very general" framework for future
cooperation on civilian nuclear power programs. He stressed
that the MOU is in line with previous French policies and
emphasized that the impetus for the agreement came directly from
President Sarkozy's office, with only marginal involvement by
the French MFA. MFA Americas Desk Office Director Muhammad
Matari echoed Molina's characterization in a meeting with
Pol/Econ Chief August 1, saying the deal was "not very detailed"
and provided only a "general roadmap" for cooperation on nuclear
programs, to include a nuclear-fueled water desalinization
plant.



3. (S) Molina described Sarkozy as actively engaged on
non-proliferation concerns and recounted steps the French
President took to ensure any French involvement in a
nuclear-powered water desalinization plant could not be used to
help reconstitute Libya's WMD program. Molina said no dual-use
technology was under discussion and that the reactor France
envisions powering the desalinization plant would include
safeguards that prevent it from being reconfigured to produce
plutonium. In addition, Sarkozy reportedly insisted on and
received assurances that the reactor could be shut down remotely
from France.


4. (S) Contrary to Libyan press reporting, Molina said the
July 25 MOU does not/not commit France to fund construction of
the nuclear desalinization facility. Details of France's
financial commitment will be resolved during upcoming
negotiations involving (on the French side) the MFA, energy
officials, and the Areva company, the majority of which is
French-owned. The French team does not yet know who will
negotiate modalities on behalf of the GOL, although the MFA's
Muhammad Matari said it would be MFA Secretary for European
Affairs Abdulati Obeidi. The GOL expressed interest in
completing the facility and initiating operations by 2009, but
France views this timeline as unrealistic. (Note: 2009 will be
the 40th anniversary of the 1969 revolution that brought Qadhafi
to power. A slew of high profile infrastructure projects,
including new power plants and a major overhaul of the Tripoli
International Airport, are underway to help augment the visible
benefits of the revolution. End note.) Privately, some GOL
officials also acknowledge that completion by 2009 is overly
ambitious. Matari conceded to Pol/Econ Chief that "no one
realistically expects this to move very quickly." He noted that
the deal is "a very complicated subject" that requires "much
study" by both sides, and added that the GOL is aware that there
are serious European sensitivities involved that could limit
France's ability to deliver on the project.


5. (C) Molina acknowledged European concerns, chiefly German,
about the nuclear agreement, but noted that France's
understanding is that Siemens, a 28% stakeholder in Areva, does
not have the authority to stop the investment from moving
forward. He dismissed publicly-reported calls by German
parliamentarians for Siemens to move to block the deal as
"grandstanding," but conceded that the nuclear MOU had become a
political issue for France and Germany that goes beyond the
mechanics of the July 25 Libya-France deal.

QADHAFI, SARKOZY DISCUSS MEDITERRANEAN UNION, IGNORE BULGARIAN
MEDICS


TRIPOLI 00000664 002.2 OF 002



6. (C) According to Molina, Qadhafi and Sarkozy spent much of
their time together discussing Sarkozy's plans to convene a
Mediterranean head of state conference in spring 2008 to discuss
migration and water management concerns (Reftel contains further
details on Sarkozy's visit). The French delegation described
Qadhafi as very interested in the Mediterranean Union proposal,
but said he voiced serious reservations about inviting Israel's
head of state to participate in the proposed conference. Beyond
an opening line expressing "anger" at Bulgaria's decision to
immediately pardon the six medics upon their return to Sofia
July 24, Qadhafi did not discuss the case with Sarkozy.
Claiming that the GOL considers the case of the medics to be
closed, the MFA's Matari said the GOL tried to focus
"exclusively on the positive" during Sarkozy's visit.


7. (C) Qadhafi and Sarkozy held two, separate meetings on the
night of July 25-26 -- one at Qadhafi's Bab Azizia compound in
Tripoli attended by Tripoli's diplomatic corps and a second,
more private meeting the same evening at the Corinthia Hotel.
According to French diplomats, Sarkozy decided on July 20 to
visit Libya. Initially, the Libyans planned to host the visit
in Sirt, Qadhafi's desert home about 400km east of Tripoli. The
GOL changed the venue four times in five days between Tripoli
and Sirt, greatly frustrating Sarkozy's 20-person security
advance team.


8. (C) Comment: GOL interlocutors at all levels have routinely
stressed that "average Libyans" need to see tangible rewards
from the U.S. and Europe in response to Libya's 2003 decision to
renounce WMD and terrorism. Most have focused on two
infrastructure projects -- a nuclear-powered water
desalinization plant and a regional nuclear medicine center.
Last week's Libya-France agreement to move forward with the
water desalinization project will allow the GOL to boast to its
domestic audience that it has finally secured one of these
long-sought "tangible rewards." Apart from a well-timed public
relations coup, though, it remains unclear how much tangible
benefit the GOL will actually garner from the agreement. End
comment.
STEVENS