LIBYA'S COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: HIV AWARENESS PROGRAMMING AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000169

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/16/2017
TAGS: SOCI KHIV LY
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: HIV AWARENESS PROGRAMMING AND
CONTINUING BLAME ON OUTSIDERS FOR AIDS OUTBREAK

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CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, Embassy
Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY: The Libyan government continues to move
forward with its own unique form of education awareness of HIV
and AIDs. There is some basic level of educational programming
in Libyan schools in conjunction with the UNDP office in Tripoli
and the government has also held additional activities including
a World AIDS day event in December 2006. Given the plight of
the Bulgarian nurses and Palestinian doctor found guilty in
Libyan courts of deliberately injecting children with the HIV
virus, despite conclusive scientific evidence from renowned
international experts that the infections spread in a manner
that precluded premeditated criminal intent, it is noteworthy
that Libyan medical professionals are still making public
statements claiming that the HIV outbreak in Benghazi was
deliberate and not the result of poor hospital hygiene or other
causes. The Libyan press has continued over the last two weeks
to print articles claiming that "foreign intelligence services"
are responsible for the outbreak, most recently claiming that
Bulgarian intelligence and Israeli intelligence were responsible
for the "crime". While some Libyans will privately admit that
they know the medics did not deliberately inject the Benghazi
children with HIV virus, most Libyans, despite their belief that
the Libyan medical system is unsafe, reflexively blame outsiders
for the disease outbreak. The cognitive dissonance on HIV
awareness makes it extremely difficult to manage public opinion
that prevents a quick solution in the Medics case. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) After months of failed attempts to meet with managers
of the Watassimo Foundation for Charitable Activities headed by
Dr. Aisha Muammar Qadhafi, a government-sanctioned, quasi-NGO in
Libya, about its work in AIDs awareness education, Embassy was
invited to a World Aids Day held at the Tripoli General People's
Congress Hall on December 2 that was jointly sponsored by UNDP
and Watassimo. Aisha Qadhafi did not attend, but was idolized
in a slide show that depicted her in halo'ed photographs
attending committee meetings and giving speeches.


3. (C) The sparsely-attended event had about 50 "boy scouts"
and 30 "girl guides" in the audience, along with a dozen public
health officials and the family members of the children
performing a skit as part of the program. In the lobby,
head-scarf covered women from Watassimo handed out promotional
materials for a Quran memorization contest sponsored by Aisha
Qadhafi, along with some basic informational materials about
AIDS. The General People's Congress Hall, one of the largest
government structures in Tripoli, features a large auditorium
that could hold several hundred people on both the main and
upper level seating areas. The building is decorated with two
large murals - one is an outline of all the Arabic-speaking
countries painted in green with the caption "All Arab Countries
are One." On the opposite wall is an outline of the African
continent in black, with only the Libyan territory highlighted
in green, along with the caption, "Africa isn't just an entity,
it is a message of future civilization."


4. (C) After a blessing from an Imam and introduction by the
head of the Libyan Infectious Diseases Center (LIDC),Secretary
of the General People's Committee for Health Dr. Mohamed
Abu-Ujaylah Rashed gave an address that broadly outlined the
scope of AIDS in a global context, but also commented in his
remarks that children in Benghazi were deliberately infected
with the AIDs virus. He told the audience that there were 7023
cases of AIDS in Libya and 6707 were Libyan citizens.


5. (C) There was also a brief presentation by a man, currently
under treatment for AIDS, who urged the crowd to accept those
with the illness and also called for the government to create a
special center to provide free treatment and support for all
people with AIDs. The man, wearing very conservative Islamic
dress including a white robe, crocheted white skullcap, and
facial hair worn by devout religious clerics, conveyed a sense
of repentance for past misdeeds in his remarks. The audience
reaction to the remarks was polite and reflective.


6. (C) More than half of the program was a play enacted by
young schoolgirls describing how viruses (using the example of
avian influenza, not HIV) could attack the body. The play
explained the role of good nutrition in heath, and also the
function of red and white blood cells in the body's immune

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system. The schoolgirls representing white blood cells (the
defender's of health) were dressed in copies of the white
military uniform Colonel Qadhafi usually wears on Revolution
Day, complete with gold-fringed epaulets just like the
"Leader's" outfits. In keeping with the revolutionary mindset
of the Jamahiriya (an Arabic word that translates as "the state
of the masses"),the play included air raid sirens when the
system was under attack by the virus, and the girls used toy
rifles and handguns to attack back, accompanied by background
sound effects simulating machine-gun fire.


7. (C) After the program, P/E Chief spoke with a doctor who
lived in the U.S. for seven years and did post-graduate work in
medicine at Tulane University. She now runs public health
programs at the LIDC. Asked to confirm P/E Chief's
understanding of the Health Secretary's remarks in Arabic, she
said that yes, the children had been deliberately infected.
Asked how she, as a health professional, knew the infections
were deliberate, she said that the Libyan health authorities had
conducted studies that proved the crime of the accused
Bulgarians and Palestinian. She was not aware that the Libyan
courts had rejected expert testimony from leading AIDS
researchers from outside Libya. While earlier in the
conversation, the doctor complained about Libya's abysmal state
of public health, health education and service, when it came to
the AIDS investigation, she insisted that Libyan doctors and
equipment were world-class and capable of conducting a thorough
investigation.


8. (C) Similarly, the head of the Tuberculosis prevention
program for the General People's Committee of Health, a doctor
who lived and studied in Budapest for seven years before
returning to Libya also said he believed the Benghazi HIV
infections were deliberate. When P/E Chief ran through a list
of medical reports issued by internationally-recognized experts,
including Libyan expatriate medical specialists, and offered
other explanations for the outbreak, the doctor was not
receptive to any citations of scientific studies.


9. (C) Last year P/E Chief had dinner in Benghazi with a
working-class family with one son in medical school. Asked
about the case and local Benghazi opinion, the future doctor
said that "everyone" in Benghazi knew the infections were
deliberate and that if the medics were released it was a sign
that the government was corrupt and bowing to pressure from the
West.


10. (C) In late November the charge had a conversation with a
Libyan doctor now living outside Libya but who returns from time
to time to provide consultative services to the government. The
doctor gave many examples of the declining quality of the
education available in Libya's medical schools, and cited the
absence of quality control in the educational system. He then
told the charge that he had been asked to write a report about
AIDS and its treatment, with reference to the Benghazi problem.
At first his interlocutors had been reluctant to provide him
requested data, and remained vague as to whether the report was
to be read by specialists or by laymen or someone in between.
After persistent questioning the doctor finally ascertained that
the report was to be prepared for Muammar Qadhafi. The doctor
concluded that Qadhafi was intensely interested in this
technical issue and was following the Benghazi case closely.
The doctor made it clear to the charge that he did not believe
the Bulgarian nurses were guilty of intentionally infecting the
children but it was not clear how much of this conclusion was
conveyed in the report he wrote.


11. (C) COMMENT: The disconnect between the public rhetoric
of health policy officials and the often privately-acknowledged
admittance that the HIV infection was not a deliberate criminal
act by the medics reflects the deep threat felt by the
authoritarian regime. There are a number of factors
influencing the government's current stance that outsiders are
to blame for the HIV infections in Libya. Religious, social and
cultural stigmas make it very difficult to admit that behaviors
or practices that contribute to the spread of HIV may exist in
Libya. The government also, given Benghazi perceptions that it
receives less than a fair share of state resources, has to
manage public opinion. It is not willing to accept
responsibility for the lack of basic hygiene, sanitation,
equipment or adequately trained staff in state-run facilities.
The government's image problems became even more tangled after
its initial attempts to blame the outbreak on outsiders, (at one
time claiming U.S. and Israeli intelligence services were behind

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a plot to kill Libyan children). After 8 years of blaming
outsiders, now the government also faces heavy criticism from
oppositionist forces, especially conservative Islamic groups,
who decry the government falling under the influence of western
forces. While some Libyan officials acknowledge privately and
confidentially that they know the HIV outbreak was not a
deliberate, criminal conspiracy they have not found a way to
manage the situation in a way that protects the Libyan regime
from damaging criticism. The cognitive dissonance on HIV
awareness makes it extremely difficult to manage public opinion
that prevents a quick solution in the Medics case.
CECIL