SUBJECT: A/S SILVERBERG MEETINGS ON UN REFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 000585

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017
TAGS: PREL UNSC KUNR KPKO JA BM
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: A/S SILVERBERG MEETINGS ON UN REFORM
WITH MOFA


Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)


1. (C) Subject: Improving efficiency in peacekeeping
operations, promoting strong ethical practices, insisting on
improvement in the Human Rights Council, and cooperating
behind the scenes on upcoming international organization
elections are some of the ways the United States and Japan
can work together to bolster reform in the United Nations,
A/S Kristen Silverberg told UN Affairs Ambassador Masato
Kitera on January 25, 2007. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is
committed to building momentum for UNSC reform, Ambassador
Kitera told A/S Silverberg. When discussing criteria for
expanding UNSC membership, A/S Silverberg outlined challenges
for Japan and suggested shifting the debate away from
regional representation. Turning to the elections for a
2009-10 non-permanent UNSC seat, Kitera declined to speculate
on whether Iran would withdraw from the race. The U.S. will
remain a quiet supporter of Japan's candidacy for a new
non-permanent term, but will openly avoid active campaigning
to avoid having Japan pegged as a U.S. proxy, agreed A/S
Silverberg and Kitera. It is important for Japan to complete
internal discussions before beginning to campaign for the
post, and consult with the United States as the process gets
underway, Kitera stated. End Summary.

UN Security Council Reform
--------------


2. (C) In a January 25 meeting with Assistant Secretary
for International Organizations Kristen Silverberg,
Ambassador for UN Affairs Masato Kitera opened the discussion
by noting that Japan had been continuously revising its
position on UNSC Reform over the past two years. Japan had
been in contact with the very top levels of the USG seeking
support for its "Model D" plan, and did not yet have a direct
US reaction. Ambassador Kitera noted that new Japanese Prime
Minister Abe Shinzo was personally committed to UNSC Reform,
having made it part of his campaign platform last year and
raising it in his first speech to the Japanese Diet. Abe was
keenly interested in receiving as much insight as possible on
US positions toward the issue and had instructed Foreign
policy Bureau Director General Kawai Chikao to make the best
possible use of A/S Silverberg's visit.


3. (C) Ambassador Kitera, who had just returned from G-4
consultations, noted that Prime Minister Abe had discussed
UNSC Reform with the UK, France, Germany, and Belgium during
his early January European tour. The Prime Minister received
British, French, and German assurances of support for Japan's
candidacy for a permanent UNSC seat. Foreign Minister Taro
Aso also raised the issue in visits to Romania, Bulgaria,
Slovakia, and Hungary. Aso also used those visits to follow
up on his earlier proposal for an "Arc of Freedom and
Prosperity," to explain Japan's philosophy of assisting its
neighbors in an arc from South Asia to Eastern Europe, build
greater levels of freedom, democracy, and human rights, and
boost their economic prosperity.


4. (C) Japan believed there was still momentum for UNSC
reform, Ambassador Kitera affirmed. He raised the December
11 discussions at the UN in New York, when a majority of the
members touched on the topic in their speeches. Japan
recently met in New York with the other G4 members, who all
agreed that momentum still exists, but who also believe that
a new version of the G4 resolution is needed in order to
garner broader support.


5. (C) Ambassador Kitera conceded that Japan's "Model D"
was not highly popular, but argued that Japan's aim was to
hold down the increase in permanent UNSC seats as much as
possible. Japan was also trying to urge other countries not
to be "too ambitious" on the issue of veto power. Japan was
seeking G4 consent to the concept of a review conference to
discuss additional members in 10-15 years. He also suggested
a review mechanism whereby the UN General Assembly would have
a vote of "no confidence" in new members if they performed
badly. Kitera judged that reaching a common G4 position
would be difficult, despite the desire of the other G4
members to find one.


6. (C) A/S Silverberg noted the United States had
encountered the same difficulties as Japan in reaching a
solution that would achieve the joint U.S.-Japan goal of a
permanent seat for Japan. A major challenge in the process,
in the U.S. view, was bridging the gap in expectations
between countries that wanted a large expansion of the UNSC,
and members leery of any expansion at all. A/S Silverberg

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noted that India's proposal to African countries favoring a
large increase and its position on veto rights were not
constructive because it raised African expectations regarding
a large expansion. The United States and a few other
countries found themselves in the middle of the expectations
gap, supporting a modest expansion. In the U.S. view, the
solution would lie in moving the opposing ends toward the
center, partly through convincing India not to feed Africa's
ambitions.


7. (C) China was another large challenge in the process,
A/S Silverberg noted, and the US applauded the efforts Japan
had made with China. While China's focus on securing new
seats for developing countries was not unexpected, the
Chinese were more positive on India than anticipated. The
U.S. and Japan needed to continue pressing China, and ongoing
Japanese outreach to China would also help. A/S Silverberg
suggested Japan's assuming the 2009-10 non-permanent seat
could be helpful in this process.


8. (C) The United States was very focused, A/S Silverberg
noted, not just on determining numbers of new permanent
seats, but which countries should take the new seats.
Establishing election criteria would feed into the selection
process, and the U.S. hoped for more direct private talks
with Japan on criteria. The USG had not come to any clear
view yet on which countries it wanted to support, aside from
Japan, but was reviewing the question.


9. (C) Without having a clearer idea of criteria, A/S
Silverberg explained, it was hard to agree on a framework
resolution. The G4 was unlikely to be happy with any new
resolution, because each country expected to be included and
was unlikely to sign on otherwise. The U.S., on the other
hand, could not support four new permanent members. The U.S.
did not want Japan to have unrealistic expectations on this
question.


10. (C) Japan has told the African countries they missed a
great opportunity to affect UNSC reform two years ago,
Ambassador Kitera remarked. Japan was staying in touch with
the African countries as much as possible, and had developed
a substantial information network through the Tokyo
International Conference on African Development (TICAD)
process. Japan was hearing from medium and small countries
that their positions were more flexible than that of the
African Union as a whole, and was asking these countries to
be more realistic. Overall, Japan was not pessimistic on the
prospects for progress with African states.


11. (C) On China, Ambassador Kitera noted that Prime
Minister Abe's October 2006 visit to Beijing had produced an
agreement to cooperate on UNSC reform. He noted Vice
Minister Shotaro Yachi would visit Beijing shortly for
discussions on the topic with Vice Foreign Minister Dai
Bingguo. Yachi would propose that Japan dispatch Deputy Vice
Foreign Minister Kawai to China for in-depth talks with his
Chinese counterpart, meaning, Kitera suggested, the two
countries were not far away form real, substantive
discussions. Japan believed China was considering the
question seriously, and might be willing to accept at least a
provisional solution. A/S Silverberg noted that she had
pressed Japan's candidacy with the Chinese, who had expressed
reluctance to support any expansion and supported, if
anything, the addition of a developing country.


12. (C) On the issue of criteria, Ambassador Kitera said
Japan guessed Brazil and Germany were the G4 countries least
happy with Japan's "Model D". India was more confident of
its chances as a candidate, and was also more patient and
less concerned with the timeline for its membership.


13. (C) United Nations Policy Division Director Takizaki
Shigeki added that any model must include Japan as a
candidate. Japan knew the U.S. preferred a model with Japan
as either the first or the only candidate, but this was a
non-starter as other countries would not support it. Japan
and the other G4 countries all agreed, however, that election
criteria could be used as instruments to remove potential
UNSC members from contention without excluding them from the
start. One such instrument that Japan strongly supported was
to have only one round of voting in each election, and to
hold vacant seats to which no member was elected until the
review period was up. Another instrument the G4 was
discussing was to allow no-confidence votes on new members,
either periodically or after the initial review period, to
ally concerns about new members' performance. Takizaki added
that a clearer idea of which countries the US favored as

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members would help greatly in establishing election criteria.


14. (C) A/S Silverberg regretted she could not provide any
new U.S. insights on other potential members, as the issue
was still under discussion. She agreed that Japan's idea on
limiting voting rounds was very helpful, although not
airtight, as a country such as Cuba, which was very popular
in the General Assembly, could be elected in one round but
still not be a constructive UNSC member. She added her view
that a no-confidence vote might be unhelpful, if new members
become so worried about the General Assembly's support that
they found themselves inhibited from making necessary but
unpopular decisions.


15. (C) U.S. criteria for new permanent UNSC members, A/S
Silverberg continued, included a necessary ability to make
tough decisions, as well as the capability to take on
international responsibility and sufficient authority to make
their voices heard. In the U.S. view, these qualities were
not limited to developed countries, although
developing-country candidates should be able to wield
international, not just local, influence. Some of the
potential African and Latin American candidates were likely
to have trouble with the last criterion.


16. (C) Ambassador Kitera agreed that Japan's criteria were
much the same: putting these criteria on paper, however,
without causing misunderstandings or raising false
expectations, was the challenge. Takizaki believed one
possible solution was to elect new permanent members on a
global, rather than a regional, basis, which would eliminate
the regional slant of candidacies. A/S Silverberg agreed it
might be possible to shift the debate away from regional
representation. Takizaki added it might be possible to gain
African support by offering to reserve a future seat for
Africa, if it was unable to select a current candidate.

Possible Term as Non-permanent Member
--------------


17. (C) Ambassador Kitera told A/S Silverberg Prime
Minister Abe had met January 24 with Mongolian President
Nambaryn Enkhbayar, who informed Japan that Mongolia had
decided to withdraw as a candidate in the 2008 elections for
a 2009-10 non-permanent UNSC seat. This opened the seat to
other Asian candidates, and Japan was fully engaged in plans
to run for the seat. President Enkhbayar, Ambassador Kitera
added, had pledged Mongolia's support for Japan's candidacy.
Kitera was unable to speculate, in response to A/S
Silverberg's query, on whether Iran would also withdraw from
the non-permanent seat race. A/S Silverberg noted that,
until Japan requested otherwise, the U.S. would be a quiet
supporter of Japan's candidacy for a new non-permanent term,
but would avoid openly campaigning for Japan to avoid having
Japan pegged as a U.S. proxy. Ambassador Kitera agreed and
added that Japan needed to complete its own internal
discussions before beginning to campaign for the post, and
would consult with the US as the process got underway.

United Nation Peacekeeping Operations
--------------


18. (C) Japan agrees with the United States on the need to
improve UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) efficiency and
training, and it is important to focus on completing "old PKO
missions," Ambassador Kitera said. Japan has historically
shouldered a substantial portion of UN PKO costs and this
expense is a big concern for the Japanese government and
public, he emphasized. When asked about Japan's plans to
participate in future UN PKOs, Ambassador Kitera suggested
that with the elevation of Japan Defense Agency to the
Ministry of Defense (MOD) earlier this month, Japan will be
likely be more open to participating in future PKOs. MOD may
participate in a proposed PKO for Nepal, he added. Japan is
launching a pilot program this summer to provide civilian PKO
training, observed International Peace Cooperation Division
Director Masahiko Kiya.


19. (C) Japan is working on providing humanitarian
assistance to Darfur by increasing political engagement with
the African Union, Ambassador Kitera continued.
Participating directly in a Darfur PKO would be difficult for
Japan because the existing Japanese law requires formal
consent from the recipient government. Japan would need to
receive a formal letter from Sudan requesting help before
Japan could provide assistance. Asked whether consent is
required before Japan can provide bilateral assistance to a
country providing troops to a PKO, Kiya explained that if a

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peace agreement is in place, Japan can provide assistance to
the UN to be used in the PKO. Japan would appreciate it if
the United States could recommend a partner for Japan to
provide bilateral assistance to, Ambassador Kitera noted.
A/S Silverberg explained that the United States is working on
a "Plan B" that could involve sanctions, in the event of a
deterioration in the human rights or political situation, or
if Sudan does not accept a UN PKO mission in Darfur.


20. (C) Japan welcomes U.S. views on the role of UN PKO
under secretaries, Ambassador Kitera said. Japan has avoided
publicly announcing that the disarmament director post will
be downgraded but understands the need for two DPKO under
secretaries. Kitera requested that A/S Silverberg confirm

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the U.S. position on dividing the under secretaries for DPKO.
The U.S. is not likely to oppose a decision to divide the
DPKO under secretaries, A/S Silverberg explained.

Human Rights Council
--------------


21. (C) It is important to increase "best practices" at the
Human Rights Council (HRC) while maintaining a
country-specific approach, Ambassador Kitera said. A/S
Silverberg noted that a united effort had produced a strong
result in the Third Committee, and that a similar joint
effort was needed in the HRC. Canada is carrying too much of
the burden.


International Organization Elections
--------------


22. (C) The U.S. was very happy Nobuo Tanaka was elected
IEA Executive Director. Next time, however, Japan and the
U.S. should set up an informal mechanism to discuss potential
candidates in order to avoid a delay of U.S. support for
Japanese candidates in the future, A/S Silverberg suggested.
Japan appreciates U.S. support for its candidates and agreed
it is very important for Japan and the U.S. to inform each
other in advance, responded UN Planning and Administration
Division Director Akira Chiba. Chiba provided A/S Silverberg
with a list of upcoming UN elections in which Japan will
likely participate. Japan will run for the UN Security
Council, UN Economic and Social Council, and UN Human Rights
Council. Japan is also planning on fielding individual
candidates for the Director of the International Hydrographic
Bureau, Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, UN
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
(ACABQ),Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, and
UN Joint Inspection Unit. In addition, Chiba provided
background information on the potential candidates (faxed to
EAP/J). A/S Silverberg thanked Chiba for the information and
added that the U.S. is seeking a seat on the Commission for
Science and Technology for Development.

UN Reform Under New Secretary General
--------------


23. (C) It is very important to jump-start UN management
reform under the new secretary general, A/S Silverberg told
Kitera. A/S Silverberg recommended steps SYG Ban should take
within his first 30 days in office to improve ethics and
oversight. Necessary steps include cooperating fully with
fraud investigations, reissuing bulletins requiring staff to
cooperate fully with investigations of the Office of Internal
Oversight Services (OIOS) and the UN Board of Auditors (BOA),
and to hold managers accountable for implementing their
recommendations, A/S Silverberg emphasized. Kitera agreed on
the need to improve ethics and reduce fraud, and reiterated
the need to wrap up previous PKO missions, but emphasized the
UN cannot be run like a private company. We cannot
compromise on ethics, we need strong protections in place to
prevent fraud, and when fraud is discovered it must be
punished, replied A/S Silverberg. President Bush has already
told Ban twice that the U.S. will not tolerate another "oil
for food" problem and that the U.S. public will not tolerate
U.S. participation in UN activities rampant with fraud, A/S
Silverberg told Kitera. Japan understands the U.S. position
and agrees we need to work to avoid this, Kitera replied.

Burma
--------------


24. (C) A/S Silverberg thanks Kitera for Japan's support on
the UNSC resolution on Burma, noting that it had not been
easy for Japan. The United States is now thinking about next
steps and invited Kitera's views on a possible special envoy.

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Kitera observed that it is important that the UN play a role
in Burma, otherwise it will be influenced only by China. A/S
Silverberg noted that it was in China's interest to try to
influence both North Korea and Burma positively because
instability in either nation could directly affect China.


25. (U) A/S Silverberg has cleared this cable
SCHIEFFER