Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TOKYO5491
2007-12-07 07:02:00
SECRET
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

ACTING U/S ROOD'S NONPROLIFERATION MEETINGS WITH

Tags:  KNEP MNUC PARM PINS PREL PTER IAEA JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5931
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKO #5491/01 3410702
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 070702Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0107
INFO RUCNDSC/DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0499
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1991
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 8416
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 4809
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 7208
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 8475
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 5467
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7306
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0463
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 005491 

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DEPT FOR ISN THY NGYUEN
DEPT FOR EAP/J JESSICA WEBSTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2017
TAGS: KNEP MNUC PARM PINS PREL PTER IAEA JA
SUBJECT: ACTING U/S ROOD'S NONPROLIFERATION MEETINGS WITH
GOJ OFFICIALS ON NOVEMBER 9, 2007

TOKYO 00005491 001.2 OF 005


Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 b,d

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 005491

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DEPT FOR ISN THY NGYUEN
DEPT FOR EAP/J JESSICA WEBSTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2017
TAGS: KNEP MNUC PARM PINS PREL PTER IAEA JA
SUBJECT: ACTING U/S ROOD'S NONPROLIFERATION MEETINGS WITH
GOJ OFFICIALS ON NOVEMBER 9, 2007

TOKYO 00005491 001.2 OF 005


Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 b,d


1. (C) Summary: Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security, John C. Rood, conducted a
series of successful and substantive nonproliferation
meetings with senior GOJ officials November 9 on the margins
of the U.S.-Japan Commission on Arms Control, Disarmament,
Non-Proliferation and Verification. Japan continues to be a
strong partner in important nonproliferation areas of
concern. On North Korea, Japan shares the U.S. view on the
importance of a complete and correct declaration of North
Korea's nuclear programs. Regarding the removal of the DPRK
from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, at least one
GOJ official noted that de-listing North Korea without
progress on resolving the abductions issue could undermine
U.S.-Japan relations. With respect to China,s expanding
military modernization efforts and the lack of transparency
provided by Beijing, GOJ officials agreed that China
increasingly poses a security challenge. On Iran, Japan is
in favor of a third UNSC sanctions resolution. Discussions
on ballistic missile defense (BMD) revealed that Japan
believes the program is critical to deterring potential
actions by rogue states such as North Korea and Iran.
However, one GOJ official commented that Japan would like to
deepen cooperation so that in the future Japan will have
&real8 joint BMD development with the U.S. The importance
of Information Security and nuclear energy/security
cooperation, including DOE/NNSA's Radiation Emergency
Response Workshop, was also discussed. End Summary.

MOD Vice Minister Masuda: China Concerns and BMD Cooperation
-------------- --------------


2. (S) Acting U/S Rood,s discussion with Ministry of

Defense Administrative Vice Minister Kohei Masuda focused on
issues related to regional security. Stressing that China is
Japan,s &main concern,8 Masuda said he felt it was
important to understand the reasons behind China,s current
military expansionism. Contrasting the current view of China
with the Cold War perception of the Soviet Union, Masuda
noted it was hard to think of China as an enemy given Japan's
economic ties with the country. He added he believes China
may be heading down a &path of (military) development that
it can,t slow down,8 and that China may not yet have fully
considered the rationale for growing its military might.


3. (S) Noting that the United States also views China as a
significant security challenge, Acting U/S Rood agreed that
relations with China are complex. Acting U/S Rood
highlighted the multi-dimensional U.S.-China relationship and
said the United States, economic relationship with China
helped mitigate conflict. Emphasizing that the United States
is particularly concerned with the growth in China,s armed
forces industrial infrastructure, U/S Rood said it would be
imperative to manage China,s rise in military power. He
added that the United States is experimenting on working with
China on a number of strategic security issues, most notably
Iran and North Korea, and said the recent progress in
beginning disablement and Yongbyon would not have been
possible without China. Acting U/S Rood conceded results
have been somewhat mixed on strategic engagement with China,
but said the process has helped produce important bilateral
ties with senior Chinese officials.


4. (S) Turning to BMD, Acting U/S Rood said he was pleased
with Japanese cooperation, emphasizing that it was an
important element to take away the coercive capability of
potential enemies and protect critical assets during the
early stages of a conflict. Highlighting the December 2007
planned missile test by Japan, Acting U/S Rood noted that BMD
added a new dimension to the U.S-Japan relationship. Masuda
agreed on the importance of BMD, and stressed that he views
the program as essential for deterring any potential actions
by &rogues states such as North Korea or Iran.8 He

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stressed, though, that he also viewed BMD as an important
part of countering the growing military power of China.
Masuda said he felt that the current BMD relationship was not
truly joint development, noting that he saw the United States
as having a deeper relationship with other countries on
similar programs. He hoped that in the future Japan would be
able to have &real8 joint BMD development with the United
States. Masuda said, however, that this might require a
public-private partnership in order to overcome the
&hurdle8 of Japanese arms export laws.


5. (S) In closing, Acting U/S Rood stressed the U.S.
concern over the Aegis information leak and said that the
United States and Japan needed to work together to improve
information security. Masuda said he was &very concerned8
about the matter and noted that the Japanese government
understood the critical importance of preventing leaks of
confidential information. He added that &improvement8 was

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needed on the Japanese side and said Japan would take the
&advice8 of the United States from the bilateral
information security task force (BISTF) process.


MEXT Looking to Contribute to Radiation Emergency Response
Workshop
-------------- --------------

6. (C) Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and Technology
(MEXT),Director General Yasutaka Moriguchi opened the
discussion by highlighting the Ministry,s two major safety
missions: the prevention of radiation injury to local
citizens and detection of radiation levels released into the
environment. Under this umbrella, MEXT regulates the usage
of domestic radioactive isotopes and the safety of research
reactors.


7. (C) After outlining MEXT's mission, Moriguchi segued to
discussion of DOE,s Radiation Emergency Response Workshop.
He pointed out that several agencies should be involved
because Japanese law requires all relevant GOJ entities to
work together and provide a coordinated response in the event
of an actual radiation emergency. Moriguchi explained the
Cabinet Secretariat is responsible for leading the GOJ's
interagency coordination on Emergency Response. Moriguchi
stated that MEXT is studying how to contribute to the
workshop in the areas related to MEXT,s capabilities. MEXT
can share the burden by measuring and analyzing radiation
levels, developing a plan to quarantine and transport injured
persons, and dispatching appropriate experts. MEXT works
closely with a number of experts, namely the Japan Atomic
Energy Agency, National Institute of Radiological Sciences
and national universities. Experts from those institutions
along with MEXT officials will be sent to affected areas to
provide technical and medical advice as needed. Moriguchi
ended the meeting by stating that a formal response on
Japan,s participation will be sent through diplomatic
channels.

METI on Export Controls: Strict on Iran and Wary of India
-------------- --------------


8. (C) In his meeting with Ministry of Economy, Trade, and
Industry (METI) Director General Tsuneyoshi Tatsuoka, Acting
U/S Rood began by saying the United States is increasingly
using financial measures to target nations such as Iran and
the DPRK because of their effectiveness in bringing about
concrete results. On October 25, the USG took financial
actions against Iran,s Revolutionary Guard Corporation and
other entities, including three of Iran's top four banks and
certain corporations and individuals. Given Iran,s
deceptive business practices, these measures aim to restrict
Iran's ability to finance proliferation activities as well as
to put pressure on Tehran to comply with its IAEA and UN
Security Council commitments. Acting U/S Rood suggested the
GOJ consider issuing an advisory on how Japanese industry can

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take precautions to ensure transactions do not support
illicit activities. Acting U/S Rood reiterated Secretary
Rice's message that &Now is not the time for business as
usual with Iran.".


9. (C) Tatsuoka stated METI takes a very strict approach on
export controls with regard to Iran. Japan imports 12 ) 13
percent of its crude oil from Iran and disrupting that flow
would have a large impact on the economy, Tatsuoka said. The
GOJ will watch closely any developments in the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding the situation in Iran.


10. (C) The United States is also very concerned about
nuclear security, particularly with regard to nuclear power
plants and fuel storage sites, Acting U/S Rood continued.
There will be a nuclear renaissance in the U.S. and around
the world given rising oil prices and climate change
concerns. Given terrorists' desire and efforts to acquire
nuclear materials that can be used in an attack, in 2001 the
U.S. launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism, which now has 62 participating countries. Acting
U/S Rood stated the U.S. would like to work with Japan to
host a workshop on nuclear security capacity building, and to
establish a legal framework under which the two nations can
share classified information in support of this objective.


11. (C) Tatsuoka relayed that the GOJ is most concerned
about China and India being able to keep nuclear and dual-use
technology secure. Tatsuoka said the Government of India has
asked the GOJ to relax its export control regulations toward
India so that India can import more sophisticated technology.
METI remains skeptical, however, about India's export
control regime and has not as yet relaxed those regulations.
Tatsuoka stated he would travel to Delhi in late November to
discuss this issue further with the GOI. Acting U/S Rood
agreed while significant improvements have been made, more
work needs to be done to bring India,s export control and
proliferation trade regulations and ability to exercise
effective controls up to international standards.

ACCS Ando: Cautions on Delisting and Wary of Chinese Business
With Iran
-------------- --------------


12. (C) The Russian vice-foreign minister had expressed
concerns to the Japanese about U.S.-Japan cooperation in BMD,
according to Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyasu Ando.
U/S Rood noted the Russians had generally not complained
about U.S. BMD initiatives with Japan in the past but had
recently raised questions about possible placement of BMD
facilities in the Czech Republic or Poland. In particular,
the Russians did not want BMD sites to be located in former
Warsaw Pact states that had now joined NATO. Ando said the
Japanese response to Russian concerns had been to stress that
U.S.-Japan BMD cooperation was not directed at Russia.


13. (C) Turning to the issue of North Korea, Ando stressed
three points of concern which had also been relayed to A/S
Hill during his visit to Japan the previous week. First,
North Korea needed to complete disablement of Yongbyon's core
nuclear facilities and to disclose their remaining facilities
by the end of the year. Second, the United States should
take into consideration reports of North Korean weapons
transfers to Syria when reviewing the possibility of removing
North Korea from the list of terrorism-sponsoring states.
Third, the United States should understand that de-listing
North Korea without progress on resolving the abductions
issue would undermine U.S.-Japan relations.


14. (C) Acting U/S Rood indicated the United States believed
disablement of the Yongbyon's core facilities would largely
be completed by the end of the year, although in the interest
of thoroughness, a few actions might require a bit more time.
Some quick, if less complete measures, had already been

TOKYO 00005491 004.2 OF 005


taken to disable the facility. The USG has set aside about
$20 million to cover the initial cost of the disablement
process. Acting U/S Rood added that the USG would likely ask
Congress for additional funding and might also seek financial
assistance from other countries as the disablement process
moves forward. Ando responded he was not in a position to
make a commitment, but that funding for disablement could be
discussed.


15. (C) A full declaration of North Korea's remaining
nuclear facilities, however, could be more difficult, Acting
U/S Rood noted. The United States wanted to discuss a
declaration with the North Koreans before December to clarify
what the acceptable content of such a declaration should be.
He acknowledged his own skepticism about North Korea's
intentions to provide a complete and correct declaration, but
added the only way to test those intentions is to move ahead
with the disablement and declaration process and see what
actions North Korea takes.


16. (C) Acting U/S Rood emphasized A/S Hill understands
Japan's concerns about moving too quickly on removing North
Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and
reviewed the procedures by which a country is removed from
the list. Acting U/S Rood explained that the President must
notify Congress of his intent to remove a country from the
state sponsor of terrorism list, and that upon receiving such
notice, Congress has 45 days to undertake action preventing
the removal. If no such action is taken, the President then
has the authority to de-list, though he is not obligated to
do so. Should the President wish to proceed with removing a
country from the list, the Secretary of State executes that
action on behalf of the President. Ando pressed for
clarification of whether the final decision on removing North
Korea from the list would fall to the President or to the
Secretary of State. Acting U/S Rood replied that, while the

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Secretary of State formally takes the action to remove a

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country, in the case of North Korea this would be done with
the approval of the President.


17. (C) Ando observed Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka
Machimura had raised the abduction issue with Defense
Secretary Gates the previous day (November 8) and added the

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issue remains of great importance to Machimura, Prime
Minister Fukuda, and other members of the Cabinet.


18. (C) Acting U/S Rood highlighted U.S. concerns about the
direction of events in Iran. Although Iran had probably
overstated their development of nuclear technology in an
attempt to convince other countries that any efforts to block
the program would be futile, progress nevertheless is
continuing. In particular, further progress in enrichment
technology would put Iran on the "glide path" toward a
nuclear weapon. This was the reason behind the United
States' diplomatic effort regarding the Iranian nuclear
program, U/S Rood indicated.


19. (C) At present, however, Iran has not felt the need to
come to the negotiating table, the Acting Under Secretary
observed. In fact, political factions in Iran had hardened
their positions on the nuclear program. This situation
contributed to the U.S. decision to take financial measures
against Iran as a way to increase pressure on Tehran to
comply with its IAEA and UN Security Council commitments.
Acting U/S Rood emphasized the United States. would have
liked to deal with this question through the United Nations
Security Council but Russian and Chinese opposition had
bogged down that channel, with differences on the content of
a possible Security Council resolution still under debate.


20. (C) The new U.S. financial sanctions on Iran, Acting U/S
Rood stated, were the largest imposed by the United States
since the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Most notably, the
sanctions endeavored to target institutions related to Iran's

TOKYO 00005491 005.2 OF 005


Revolutionary Guard, an element involved in weapons
proliferation and support for terrorism. Acting U/S Rood
expressed hope that Japan would adopt similar financial
measures against Iran and noted other major states such as
France and the United Kingdom were considering sanctions of
their own. He stressed action by just those few countries
that possess major financial centers could have a significant
impact on the Iranian government.


21. (C) Ando responded Japan has fully implemented the
relevant U.N. sanctions against Iran and will continue to do
so despite the economic impact on Japan, which imports over
ten percent of its oil from Iran. Noting China appeared to
have been taking advantage of the fuel situation, however, he
asked whether the U.S. had engaged the Chinese on the
problems with Iran. Acting U/S Rood affirmed that the United
States had discussed Iran with the Chinese, albeit with mixed
results. The U.S. efforts now centered on convincing the
Chinese not to engage in "business as usual" with Iran.
Treasury U/S Levey would be meeting with the Chinese in the
near future to convey U.S. concerns, he added.


22. (C) Ando queried whether the United States had any
information regarding possible nuclear cooperation between
Iran and North Korea. Acting U/S Rood indicated no evidence
had been found of exchanges on nuclear or associated
technology between the two countries despite longstanding and
ongoing cooperation on missile development. He also
reaffirmed the President's statement last year that any
transfer of nuclear technology by North Korea would be seen
as a grave threat to the United States, and that North Korea
would be held accountable for any such action taken.


23. (U) This cable was delayed in order to obtain Acting
Under Secretary Rood's clearance.
SCHIEFFER