DAS CHRISTENSEN'S OCTOBER 21 MEETING WITH ASIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 005101

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017
TAGS: PREL AADP
SUBJECT: DAS CHRISTENSEN'S OCTOBER 21 MEETING WITH ASIAN
AFFAIRS DDG KOHARA

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Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).


1. (C) Summary: Japan and China are both working hard to
find common ground, MOFA's Asian Affairs Deputy Director
General told EAP DAS Tom Christensen October 21. Although
many conflicts remain, including territorial disputes, the
two countries are seeking to develop a "mutually beneficial
relationship." This warming of ties gives Japan a chance to
address its concerns about the economic situation in China,
including IPR protection, environmental issues, and aid
transparency. Japan's position on Taiwan remains unchanged,
and Japan is unlikely to join the United States in publicly
criticizing the DPP referendum on applying to join the UN
under the name of Taiwan. End Summary.

--Japan's relations with China are warming--


2. (C) Japan and China are working to establish a "mutually
beneficial relationship based on common interests," Deputy
Director General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs Masahiro
Kohara told Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs Tom Christensen during a October 21 meeting.
This stands in sharp contrast to relations during the Koizumi
administration, which were at "an all time low" due to the
former Prime Minister's visits to Yasukuni Shrine.


3. (C) Former Prime Minister Abe's visit to Beijing last
year marked the beginning of what has been a steady
improvement, centering on the exchange of high-level visits,
Kohara continued. Prime Minister Fukuda is tentatively
scheduled to visit China this year, and if Chinese President
Hu Jintao comes to Japan next spring as planned it will be
the first time in ten years. Discussions are also underway
for an exchange of economic ministers.


4. (C) In addition to these high-level visits,
people-to-people exchanges are more common than ever, Kohara
said. The two countries are coordinating a variety of sports
exchanges, and Japan invites over two thousand young Chinese
students to attend Japanese schools each year, both examples
of programs that have made a dramatic improvement on the
image of Japan among young Chinese people. This year marks
the 35-year anniversary of normalization between Japan and
China, and next year will be the 30th anniversary of the
Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Kohara observed.
Although next year will also be the 70th anniversary of the
Nanking Incident, Japan is hoping that the two countries can
rely on these people-to-people exchanges to keep the focus on
the more positive 30th anniversary.


5. (C) The United States welcomes the warming of Japan-China
relations, DAS Christensen replied, including Abe's visit to
Beijing as well as Japan's strategy for future relations.
The U.S.-Japan alliance is solid, and U.S. officials are not
worried about Japan developing closer ties to China.
Likewise, Japanese officials should not see U.S. engagement
with China as a threat to Japan's relationship with the
United States: regional relationships are not a zero-sum
game. The U.S. purpose in engaging China is to "shape
China's choices." Kohara agreed that the U.S.-Japan
relationship is strong, thanking DAS Christensen for U.S.
support in addressing the DPRK abductions issue. DAS
Christensen assured Kohara that EAP A/S Hill takes the
abductions issue "very seriously."

--But territorial disputes remain--


6. (C) Japan and China have agreed to "seek joint
development" in the East China Sea, but differences over
national boundaries remain difficult to overcome, Kohara
explained. The two countries completed their 10th
consultation over border demarcation two weeks ago without
any substantial developments. China's adherence to the
"natural prolongation" theory is the biggest obstacle to
progress, and is not compliant with international law. Japan
is ready to bring the dispute before an international body,
confident in its legal position that delimitation should be
based on the median 200 nautical mile-entitlement. The fact

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that China has resisted resolving the case through a
third-party organization indicates their lack of confidence
in their own position, Kohara opined.


7. (C) Vietnam is also struggling with China over maritime
borders, DAS Christensen replied. Although there is
tremendous potential for collaboration on energy and
environmental issues in the region, these disputes render
such cooperation difficult. The Vietnamese are particularly
concerned about China's expansive claims in the South China
Sea, which draw maritime borders almost all the way up to the
Japanese coast, as far south as Indonesia, and as far East as
the Philippines. The Vietnamese refer to this giant sweeping
arc as "the Cow's Tongue." The United States has no official
position on the sovereignty disputes, but does find the
Chinese claims to be so expansive as to be hard to consider
reasonable.

--Next Steps for Economic Relations--


8. (C) Japan intends to discuss four major issues with China
during high-level economic dialogue this December, Kohara
noted. In addition to conveying Japanese concerns about a
possible bubble economy in China, the Japanese representative
will request that China take action to improve its business
environment. Specifically, Japan would like to see more
stringent enforcement of intellectual property rights
protection at the local level. Japan will also address
environmental issues with China, attempting to draw it into
the post-Kyoto Protocol framework. Finally, Japan will raise
development assistance transparency, probably at the Director
General level. The United States is also closely monitoring
China's aid strategy in the developing world, replied DAS
Christensen, noting that the Chinese Foreign Ministry has a
surprisingly small role in China's aid policy.

--Developments in the Chinese Leadership--


9. (C) Japanese officials will be "closely watching" the new
Chinese leadership announced during the first plenum of the
17th Communist Party of China Central Committee, Kohara told
DAS Christensen. Kohara noted in particular the rapid
ascendancy of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang who had both "jumped
rank" to join the Political Bureau Standing Committee. These
two newcomers to the Standing Committee might be frontrunners
to succeed Hu Jintao as president when his term expires in
five years, Kohara predicted. In the meantime, the official
adoption of Hu Jintao's "Scientific Outlook on Development"
policies will significantly boost his authority and prestige
during the rest of his administration. Regardless of who is
in power, Chinese leaders will continue to wrestle with the
dilemma of trying to suppress dissent while still being
responsive to the needs of the people. Government crackdowns
on the media are still common, and restiveness in China's
provincial areas remains a problem.

--Taiwan--


10. (C) Japan adheres to the position established in the
1972 Japan-China Joint Communique regarding Taiwan, and will
not support Taiwan's membership in the United Nations,
affirmed Kohara. Japan has conveyed its position that
unilateral attempts to resolve the issue are unacceptable.
The international community "should take note" that President
Hu Jintao did not mention the use of force towards Taiwan in
his statement before the 17th Congress, which indicates the
current Chinese government's relatively moderate position.
Japan will continue to "encourage a calm attitude" with both
sides, pushing them to achieve a peaceful resolution through
direct dialogue, Kohara said.


11. (C) The United States has publicly criticized the DPP
referendum on applying to join the UN under the name of
Taiwan, and hopes Japan will do the same, DAS Christensen
stated. U.S. officials appreciate Japan's position, but
would like to see Japan join the United States in explaining
to the people of Taiwan why these types of provocative
political initiatives are not in Taiwan's long-term interest.
The United States does not expect this to change Taiwan

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President Chen Shui-bian's stance, but rather intends the
public statement to convince Taiwan's public that passage of
such a referendum would make Taiwan's foreign relations more
difficult. The statement is also intended to reduce concerns
on the mainland about the potential for U.S. backing of
Chen's initiatives. This policy approach will likely be more
effective than trying to directly influence President Chen
Shui-bian. A statement from Japan to the same effect would
be "very helpful," because many of Taiwan's citizens take
Japan-Taiwan relations very seriously.


12. (C) It is important to maintain contact with Taiwan's
leaders, Kohara replied, and the referendum is merely a
political tool. Because the referendum does not have legal
implications, it does not matter, China and Mongolian Affairs
Director Takeo Akiba added. Japan must save its political
capital for "more important issues," Akiba continued.
Calling for the Taiwanese public to reject the referendum is
tantamount to interfering in domestic politics. Preventing
the referendum from passing is not critical to maintaining
the peace, and "runs the risk of pushing President Chen
Shui-bian's Democratic Progressive Party into a corner,"
Akiba finished.


13. (C) President Chen Shui-bian is quick to interpret
silence as support for Taiwan's independence, replied DAS
Christensen. For example, President Chen claimed that when
President Bush did not mention Taiwan's bid for UN membership
in his speech at APEC, he was demonstrating his support.
Japan's public silence gives President Chen ammunition to
announce that the United States is isolated in opposing his
pro-independence activities.


14. (U) This cable was cleared by DAS Christensen.
SCHIEFFER