Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TOKYO500
2007-02-02 09:33:00
SECRET
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

JAPAN NEGOTIATING TO RESUME ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA

Tags:  PREL EAID PTER SY JA 
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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0335
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0252
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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5706
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RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0208
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1977
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0404
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RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0465
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1789
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0645
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0282
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3185
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T TOKYO 000500 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017
TAGS: PREL EAID PTER SY JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN NEGOTIATING TO RESUME ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA
WITH PORT REHABILITATION PROJECT

REF: A. 2002 STATE 137904


B. 2002 DAMASCUS 4559

C. 2003 STATE 68977

D. 2003 STATE 219556

E. 2003 TOKYO 4930

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d
)

S E C R E T TOKYO 000500

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017
TAGS: PREL EAID PTER SY JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN NEGOTIATING TO RESUME ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA
WITH PORT REHABILITATION PROJECT

REF: A. 2002 STATE 137904


B. 2002 DAMASCUS 4559

C. 2003 STATE 68977

D. 2003 STATE 219556

E. 2003 TOKYO 4930

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d
)


1. (S) SUMMARY: The Japan International Cooperation Agency
(JICA) is engaged in discussions with the Syrian Ministry of
Transport and the Latakia Port General Company about entering
into a technical assistance agreement to provide training and
equipment to upgrade cargo handling facilities at the Latakia
port, confirmed Japanese MOFA counterparts. The contract, if
agreed upon, is to last for two years and will focus on the
improvement of management and cargo handling operations at
the port. This development appears to signal the resumption
of an earlier agreement to develop the port that was frozen
in 2002 at the request of the United States out of concern
that Syria was using the port to transship military equipment
to the Saddam regime in Iraq (refs A, B.) Embassy Tokyo
advised MOFA that any projects that could foreseeably assist
Syria to receive and transport illicit shipments of weapons
or equipment bound for militias in Lebanon or Iraq would
become a subject of concern. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Embassy Tokyo political officer was initially
approached several weeks ago by a counterpart at the Israeli
Embassy who was checking a Syrian wire-service report that an
agreement between Japan and Syria had been executed in
December concerning a project to upgrade the port facilities
at Latakia. Embassy Tokyo political officer contacted MOFA
First Middle East Division Syria desk officer Hitoshi
Ishizuka to inquire. Ishizuka was initially hesitant to
respond and said he was unaware of any such project.


3. (C) Subsequently, following additional inquiries to MOFA,
Ishizuka on January 31 provided political officer with a
paper outlining a "Modernization of Cargo Transportation
Project" JICA is discussing with the Syrian Ministry of
Transportation and the Latakia Port General Company following
the dispatch of an evaluation study team November 13-30,


2006. According to the information provided by Ishizuka, the
duration of the contract would be for two years and the
objective is to improve port management capabilities and
cargo handling operations. The five specific activities to
be addressed are: (1) to realize proper port management and
operations procedures, (2) to improve technical skills in
cargo handling, (3) to improve container terminal operations,
(4) to improve conventional terminal operations, and (5) to
improve and speed up port documentation processing
procedures. Japanese assistance will include the dispatch of
Japanese experts, the training of Syrian personnel in Japan,
and the provision of unspecified training equipment.


4. (C) The stated reasons for moving forward with the
project are to help Syria to improve the out-of-date
transportation and management operations at the port and to
bring it up to speed with other regional and international
port operations. The Japanese believe that the port will see
increased volumes of traffic due to the fact that the Arab
countries abolished customs barriers between themselves in
2005 and to the possible creation of a Free Trade Zone in the
Mediterranean area. Finally, the Japanese note that improved
port facilities will enable increased numbers of freight
shipments to and from Iraq.


5. (S) This project appears to be the resumption of a port
development project the Japanese and Syrians initially
undertook in Latakia which was subsequently frozen in 2002 at

the request of the United States due to concerns we had
concerning the transshipment of military equipment to Saddam
Hussein's Iraq (ref A.) The Japanese later expressed their
displeasure over taking such actions and believed it caused
them to expend political capital and lose face when the
European Union ignored our requests to them that they suspend
a similar project they were undertaking with the Syrians in
Tartus (ref B.) (NOTE: The EU later did suspend its project
in Tartus, see ref C. END NOTE.) Department's concerns about
the project did not cease following the removal of the Saddam
regime. At the Department's direction, the Embassy, in July
2003, demarched MOFA to urge them not to resume the Latakia
project out of concern for Syria's support for terrorist
organizations, rather than for shipping arms to Iraq (refs D
and E.)


6. (C) The MOFA Bureau of International Cooperation Second
Country Assistance Planning Division has informed AID
Counselor that Japan has maintained a modest assistance
relationship with Syria over the years that has focused
mainly on small grants administered by MOFA in the "grass
roots/human security" fields, technical assistance programs
administered by JICA, and Japanese Overseas Corps of
Volunteer (JOCV) exchanges also run by JICA. There are
currently no active yen loans to Syria. The MOFA small
grants projects are usually run out of Japan's Embassy in
Damascus and are directed to community development projects
such as water supply, sanitation, clinics, etc. One grant
aid project run out of Tokyo was a project concluded in
FY2006 that involved the supply of garbage trucks to rural
communities. In FY2007 the second phase of an eight million
USD grant project run out of Tokyo will be a water
supply/sanitation project for the city of Damascus. Under the
auspices of JICA, Japan trains approximately 100 Syrians a
year in Japan in a variety of programs that last anywhere
from one week to one year. In addition, approximately 20 to
40 JOCV volunteers serve in Syria each year, as do
approximately ten "senior volunteers" who are usually
business or professional people dispatched to spend short
periods assisting the Syrians with specific projects.
According to a MOFA publication dated November 2006, total
assistance to Syria between 1975 and 2004 amounted to 964.8
million yen in cultural grant aid and 7.6 million yen for
grant assistance for cultural grassroots projects. (NOTE:
These numbers don't appear to take into consideration the two
projects mentioned above. END NOTE.) Finally, the Second
Country Assistance Planning Division contact told us that the
Latakia port project is currently being discussed with Syria
by JICA representatives in Damascus.


7. (C) COMMENT: Japan seeks to maintain a "normal"
relationship with Syria, as it does with other countries in
the region that sometimes prove problematic for the United
States. A recent issue of a newsletter that follows Japan's
relations with countries in the Muslim world also gave play
to a number of calls the newly arrived Japanese Ambassador to
Damascus is making on Ministers, including the Ministers of
Transport, Culture, Higher Education, and Islamic Endowments.
We note, also, Japan's hesitancy to be more forthcoming with
assistance for Lebanon and wonder whether one reason for this
is a possible aversion to creating friction in its relations
with Syria. Political officer thanked Ishizuka for providing
the information on the port project but cautioned that any
projects that could potentially make it easier for the
Syrians to facilitate shipments of weapons and other supplies
to militias operating in Lebanon or Iraq would be a cause for
concern. END COMMENT.
DONOVAN