OPPOSITION DPJ STRUGGLES FOR CONSENSUS ON OEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 004905

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS JA
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION DPJ STRUGGLES FOR CONSENSUS ON OEF
COUNTERPROPOSAL

REF: A. TOKYO 4678


B. TOKYO 4593

C. TOKYO 4043

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, reasons
1.4(b),(d).


1. (C) Summary. Main opposition DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa has
drawn heavy criticism over the past week, including from some
members of his own party, over a series of counterproposals
seeking to replace Japan's current support to Operation
Enduring Freedom with some form of as yet undefined support
to the International Security Assistance Force in
Afghanistan. The ruling parties approved a bill authorizing
a continuation of Japan's Indian Ocean refueling efforts on
October 17. This bill will be introduced to the Lower House
for committee deliberations on October 23. The DPJ has
already indicated it will hold the measure for up to 60 days
in the Upper House, forcing the ruling parties into a
tactical decision on whether to extend the Diet beyond its
November 10 end date and use their two-thirds majority in the
Lower House to pass the measure this term. The DPJ says it
is drawing up its own bill, but has not yet disclosed the
contents. End Summary.


2. (C) The main opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)
continues to maintain that it will submit a counterproposal
to legislation approved by the Cabinet on October 17 seeking
to reauthorize refueling efforts by the Maritime Self-Defense
Forces in the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF),despite a lack of consensus within the party.
DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa has floated several trial balloons in
the press, but does not seem to have made up his own mind.
This may represent a conscious strategy to remain ambiguous
on the issue for the time being, according to at least one
news report. Either way, the DPJ is unified in its plans to
use its new-found majority in the Upper House to oppose the
government's measure (Ref A).


3. (C) Ozawa asserted in a letter in the October 9 Sekai
monthly that he would push for Japan Self-Defense Forces
participation in the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) in Afghanistan, were his party to gain power in the
next Lower House elections. He claimed that it is
unconstitutional under Article Nine for the SDF to
participate in OEF maritime interdiction efforts (MIO),given
the lack of an authorizing UNSCR, but constitutional for the
SDF to use armed force overseas while participating in the
UNSCR 1386-mandated ISAF. This assertion generated protest
within his own party, and was criticized by the government.
Shortly afterward, Ozawa said that support for ISAF is
official DPJ policy, and that members who disagree with the
policy should leave the party.


4. (C) Party leaders have since walked back that statement,
noting that Ozawa had only intended to state that support for
UN-authorized actions is official DPJ policy, and that those
who disagree are "free" to leave. DPJ Diet Affairs Chair
Kenji Yamaoka later told reporters that Ozawa meant to say
only that support for UN-authorized multilateral efforts was
in keeping with general party policy. DPJ policy chief
Masayuki Naoshima explained that it is "theoretically
possible" that air, land, or sea elements of the Self-Defense
Forces (SDF) could participate in ISAF.


5. (C) Ruling party leaders were critical. LDP policy chief
Sadakazu Tanigaki called Ozawa's view "extremely peculiar."
Even some-time allies Socialist Party of Japan leader Mizuho
Fukushima and Japan Communist Party leader Kazuo Shii slammed
the proposal as unconstitutional. Media reporting has been
slanted against Ozawa's interpretation of the Constitution as
well. Press reports speculate that Ozawa may have tried too
hard to differentiate his party from the ruling parties, once
he realized that his initial call for civilian participation

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in humanitarian and reconstruction activities is already
covered by existing assistance.


6. (C) Ozawa has taken a lower profile on the issue since
causing the flap, and has refused to discuss the contents of
the DPJ's counterproposal in any detail. He has reportedly
backed down from the idea of sending combat forces, but has
offered contradictory options, ranging from participation by
SDF military units in stabilization activities in conjunction
with provisional reconstruction teams, to provision of
non-combat supply and medical units staffed by civilian SDF
personnel and guarded by private security contractors, to
basic food aid.


7. (C) Embassy DPJ contacts confide that Ozawa is motivated
more by domestic political aspirations rather than the
substance of the refueling issue. His goal is to force the
dissolution of the Lower House as quickly as possible.
However, odds for forcing dissolution have fallen slightly
since the election of Prime Minister Fukuda to succeed Shinzo
Abe. Fukuda has had solid public support since his election
as Prime Minister on September 26, according to poll results.
Furthermore, the Prime Minister's conciliatory tone toward
the DPJ, which has responded negatively to offers to
negotiate on this and other legislation, makes him a more
difficult target than Abe. Some Embassy contacts say that
Ozawa's waffling on the OEF and ISAF reflects frustration
over these new, post-Abe political realities, as much as his
failure to gain the high ground on the OEF debate.


8. (C) Comment. However Ozawa decides to proceed, it will
take a balancing act to satisfy both security-minded
conservatives and former members of the Socialist Party
within the DPJ. Ozawa not only sees this issue as his main
opportunity to challenge the ruling parties, but also as a
way to consolidate his own leadership within the DPJ. Many
DPJ members, however, understand that it is safer and more
beneficial to Japan's national interests to continue
participating in OEF-MIO, rather than sending personnel into
a combat zone.
SCHIEFFER