GOVERNMENT SUBMITS NEW OEF BILL; MSDF TO WITHDRAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 004903

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS JA
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT SUBMITS NEW OEF BILL; MSDF TO WITHDRAW
FROM INDIAN OCEAN ON NOVEMBER 2

REF: A. TOKYO 4678


B. TOKYO 4816

C. TOKYO 4674

D. TOKYO 4636

E. TOKYO 4467

F. TOKYO 4043

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, reasons
1.4(b),(d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) The Fukuda Cabinet voted to forward a new bill
authorizing a continuation of Japan's Indian Ocean refueling
efforts in support of Operation Enduring Freedom to the Diet
late on October 17. Maritime Self-Defense Forces assets will
be withdrawn on November 2, one day after the current law
expires. The new measure will be valid for only one year, in
response to concerns from junior coalition partner Komeito
that it does not contain a provision requiring prior Diet
approval for each dispatch. The legislation also differs
from the current law in that it limits Japan's Maritime
Self-Defense forces to providing only fuel and water to
coalition forces engaged in maritime interdiction operations
in the Indian Ocean. The bill will be introduced to the
Lower House for committee deliberations on October 23. The
main opposition DPJ has already indicated it will hold the
measure for up to 60 days in the Upper House and then reject
it. This DPJ tactic would force the ruling parties into a
tactical decision on whether to extend the Diet beyond its
November 10 end date and use their two-thirds majority in the
Lower House to pass the measure this term. End Summary.

Legislation Partially Responds to Opposition Complaints
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2. (SBU) As expected, Japan's Cabinet approved a new
anti-terror special measures law on the evening of October

17. The new law:

-- aims at contributing to the prevention of international
terrorism by providing re-supply support for foreign forces
engaged in anti-terrorism maritime interdiction operations
(MIO);
-- defines that support as supplying oil and water to foreign
vessels engaged in MIO in the Indian Ocean;
-- bans the threat or use of force in carrying out these
refueling activities;
-- limits operations to "non-combat" areas in the Indian
Ocean and elsewhere;
-- required that the Diet be notified of any Cabinet-approved
implementation plan defining the framework of the activities,
or any changes to the plan, and of any termination of the
activities;
-- allows Self-Defense Forces (SDF) personnel engaged in
these activities to use weapons to protect their own lives,
other SDF personnel, or people under their control; and,
-- expires one year after coming into forces, but its
validity can be extended within the set period of up to one
year, if the activities are deemed necessary.

The current law was enacted in 2001 for an initial period of
two years, and has been extended three times. It allows for
a more expansive list of approved activities than the new
bill.


3. (C) By specifically citing UN Security Council Resolution
1776, the ruling parties hope to overcome objections by the
opposition that Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) refueling
efforts in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) are
unconstitutional. (Note: UNSCR 1776 expressed "appreciation
for the contributions of many nations to ISAF and to the OEF
coalition, including its maritime interdiction component."

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End Note.) The decision to limit the bill to a validity of
one year, with a possible one-year renewal, represents a
compromise between the ruling Liberal Democratic (LDP) and
Komeito parties over the issue of civilian control, in the
absence of a clause requiring Diet approval for each
dispatch. Opposition control over the Upper House is assured
through at least 2010, and the LDP is eager to avoid a fight
in the Diet every time MSDF assets are dispatched. The
opposition will still challenge the bill over the lack of a
prior approval clause, as well as the failure to include
safeguards for assuring that all MSDF-provided fuel is used
in support of OEF-MIO, and that none is diverted to Iraq or
elsewhere. The ruling parties have promised to address those
concerns in an exchange of notes with the United States, once
the bill is passed.

"Heavy-handed" Tactics Needed for Passage Could be Risky
-------------- --------------


4. (C) The upshot of this new bill's submission is that there
will be an interruption in MSDF operations in the Indian
Ocean. The government will not recall the supply ship Tokiwa
and the escort destroyer Kirisame until November 2, but they
are expected to wrap-up refueling operations as of October
27, according to press reports. No new vessels can be
dispatched until a new measure is passed. Embassy contacts
expect the bill to be taken up in Lower House committee
deliberations as early on October 23, despite opposition
attempts to stall the legislation in the Diet Affairs
Committee.


5. (C) The bill's passage in the Lower House, where the
ruling coalition enjoys a greater-than two-thirds majority,
is a certainty. Prospects in the opposition-controlled Upper
House are much less certain. If the Upper House immediately
votes down the measure, it will be returned to the Lower
House, where it can be enacted on the basis of the ruling
coalition's two-thirds majority (Ref A). A more likely
scenario is that the opposition will exercise its right under
the Diet rules to hold the bill for up to 60 days in the
Upper House, after which the bill will automatically be
returned to the Lower House, where the ruling coalition can
still pass it with the same two-thirds' majority.


6. (C) While the ruling parties have the numbers for an
override, Embassy contacts note that some members may be
reluctant to take this unprecedented step, particularly if
public opinion polls show less than a majority in favor of
renewing participation in OEF-MIO. Many in the LDP and
elsewhere say the government will need at least 60 percent
public support before deciding to override the Upper House.
Support for refueling in most polls is currently running
slightly under 50 percent. Public support could be eroded
further if the current extraordinary Diet session is extended
well past its scheduled end date of November 10 to
accommodate the parliamentary maneuvering, a move that could
backfire on the ruling parties if public opinion views them
as being too heavy-handed. Public opinion polls over the
past year demonstrate that voters are largely disaffected
with politics, and want their elected representatives to pay
greater attention to livelihood issues. A long extension to
focus on OEF-MIO will distract from the necessary compilation
of a national budget, not to mention needed action on
pensions, health care and economic revitalization.


7. (C) The real disaster scenario, according to some LDP
Embassy contacts, is that exercise of the two-thirds override
could generate sufficient public discontent that Prime
Minister Fukuda would have no choice but to dissolve the
Lower House and call an early general election. Passage of a
non-binding censure motion against the Cabinet by the
opposition parties in the Upper House could provide the
tipping point. Even before the flap over OEF-MIO, most
observers expected the ruling parties to lose a large

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proportion of the seats won under former Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi in the 2005 "postal privatization" election.


8. (C) More cautious elements in the ruling parties worry
that "ignoring the will" of the Upper House might be seen as
ignoring the will of the people, who gave the opposition
control of the Upper House less than three months ago in July
29 elections. Embassy contacts are unanimous that the
results of the Upper House elections were meant to send a
clear message to the LDP. Furthermore, they are equally
unanimous that the message had very little to do with
security issues, such as OEF-MIO. For now, polls indicate
that nearly two-thirds of the public want to see more
cooperation and less divisiveness in the Diet. Prime
Minister Fukuda has played to that sentiment since he first
announced that he was running for LDP President and Prime
Minister back in early September.

LDP Divided; Some Call to Delay Until Next Diet Session
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Given these concerns, there is a possibility that the
ruling parties will feel compelled to hold off on the new
legislation until January's regular Diet session, sandwiched
between passage of the budget in late March and the G8 Summit
in July. Former LDP Secretary General Hidenao Nakagawa
acknowledged that possibility in a meeting with Embassy
Tokyo, expressing concern that a lengthy extension could have
an impact on budget compilation and tax reform. Senior LDP
leader Taku Yamasaki was also pessimistic about timing issues
in a conversation with Embassy Tokyo earlier this week (Ref
B).


10. (C) For now, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura
and LDP Secretary General Bunmei Ibuki are continuing to call
publicly for passage this Diet session, but divisions within
the ranks are already being referred to in the press as a
"lack of unity" in the LDP. In a conversation with Embassy
Tokyo, former Defense Agency Chief Tokuichiro Tamazawa was
blunt, labeling his nervous colleagues "weak-kneed." The
tremendous pressure applied by the opposition's constant
demands for information on OEF-MIO is beginning to wear on
ruling party leaders, as evidenced by the recent televised
comment by former Defense Agency Chief Nakatani Gen that
anyone opposed to the MSDF's refueling efforts is a
"terrorist." The longer the debate continues, the more
chances the opposition will have to make the government look
bad.
SCHIEFFER