Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TOKYO4801
2007-10-15 00:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

BILATERAL INFORMATION SECURITY TASK FORCE ADVANCES

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR MARR JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #4801/01 2880005
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 150005Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8548
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/USFJ
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKO/USDAO TOKYO JA
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 004801 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

OSD FOR APSA SHINN/SEDNEY/HILL/BASALLA; USFJ FOR
J00/J01/J2/J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MARR JA
SUBJECT: BILATERAL INFORMATION SECURITY TASK FORCE ADVANCES
TERMS OF REFERENCE MILESTONES ON INFORMATION SECURITY

REF: TOKYO 3690

Classified By: CDA Joseph R. Donovan, Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 004801

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

OSD FOR APSA SHINN/SEDNEY/HILL/BASALLA; USFJ FOR
J00/J01/J2/J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MARR JA
SUBJECT: BILATERAL INFORMATION SECURITY TASK FORCE ADVANCES
TERMS OF REFERENCE MILESTONES ON INFORMATION SECURITY

REF: TOKYO 3690

Classified By: CDA Joseph R. Donovan, Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) The DAS-level U.S.-Japan Bilateral Information
Security Task Force (BISTF) and the Tokyo-based
Implementation Group (IG) have made steady progress on
implementing milestones agreed upon bilaterally on August

3. The BISTF process is divided into three broad phases.
The first aims to enhance mutual understanding of existing
information security laws and policies. The second phase
involves a bilateral process to administratively correct
information security practices identified during a series
of information exchanges. The contents of the final stage,
enhancing the legal framework for protecting classified
information, are still subject to "refinement" by the two
sides. While Japan has agreed in principal to discuss
"visionary" objectives like new legislation governing
security clearances, the Japanese government is reluctant
to commit to a timetable given political variables. This
cable chronicles progress made to date on implementing
near-term objectives and formulating a way forward on
future actions. The Terms of Reference and Milestones
document can be accessed from SIPR site
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Bilateral_I nformation_Secu
rity_Task_Force. END SUMMARY.

BACKGROUND
--------------


2. (C) On August 1 and 3, U.S. and Japanese DAS-level
officials convened the first Bilateral Information Security
Task Force (BISTF) meeting in Tokyo to approve the Terms of
Reference (TOR) and Milestones aimed at strengthening
Japan's ability to protect classified information
(reftel). Subsequent to the TOR's approval, the
Tokyo-based BISTF Implementation Group (IG) has convened
numerous meetings between August 16 and September 14 to
advance and refine near- and mid-term milestones in the
run-up to the second DAS-level meeting, held September 19
in Washington. The IG comprises Embassy and USFJ officers

and Director-level officials from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA),the Ministry of Defense (MOD),the Cabinet
Secretariat, the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office

SIPDIS
(CIRO),the National Police Agency (NPA),and the Public
Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA).

AUG 21 IG: INFO/BEST PRACTICES BRIEFINGS
--------------


3. (C) The first BISTF Implementation Group (IG) plenary
meeting convened on August 21 with information and best
practices briefings from both sides. The U.S. briefings
also included discussion on establishing secure links
between the Embassy and relevant ministries and agencies,
reciprocal visit/surveys under the recently signed General
Secrets of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA),

SIPDIS
transferring pre-packaged security materials per Foreign
Military Sales, and enhancing DOD's Foreign Visit System.
Embassy and USFJ staff also provided briefings on Security
of Diplomatic Information and Communications, Threats to
Cybersecurity, Personnel Security Clearances and Access,
Courier Procedures, Government-to-Industry Transfer of
Classified Information, and Physical Security.

JAPAN'S NEW COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE POLICY
--------------


4. (C) Counselor Yuji Kawabe from the Cabinet Intelligence
and Research Office (CIRO) explained Japan's new
counter-intelligence (CI) policy, which the Japanese
Cabinet approved on August 10. Under the new framework,
the head of each government agency will classify national
security and diplomatic information as "Specially
Controlled Secret" beginning April 1, 2009. The new policy
requires government agencies to make infrastructure
upgrades for protecting classified information, as well as
procedural upgrades, including security clearances and

training. It establishes, for the first time, a
government-wide security clearance system. The new policy
also provides the basis for the establishment of the
National Counter-intelligence Center (NCC),Kawabe said.
The NCC, to be established in April 2008, will collect and
analyze counter-intelligence data for reporting to the
Cabinet and relevant ministries and agencies. The center
will support the CI Driving Committee and act as liaison
and coordination body for CI policy implementation.

LAUNCH OF MOFA'S COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
-------------- -


5. (C) The Japanese side cited the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs as among the first Japanese government agencies to
establish an in-house CI division consistent with the new
policy. The newly-established MOFA Counter-Intelligence
Division is part of the Minister's Secretariat and reports
directly to the Deputy Vice Minister (Kanbocho),according
to CI Division Director Hitoshi Noda. Established on
August 10, the ten-person division is responsible for
planning and implementing the Japanese government's new CI
policy throughout MOFA, specifically on protecting
classified information at MOFA headquarters and at overseas
missions. The division is also responsible for refining
MOFA's security clearance system, enhancing physical
information security (i.e., technical security),and
improving infrastructure.

AUG 30 PLENARY: GOJ RESISTS SINGLE POC IDEA
--------------


6. (C) The second BISTF IG plenary session on August 30
centered on designating single points of contact for
incidents involving classified information and standing up
working groups and action groups for information and best
practices briefings. The U.S. proposed designating a
single POC to make initial notifications of a breach.


7. (C) The Japanese side subsequently provided a compromise
approach on the single POC concept, comprising of two
parts: first, how incidents are reported from the U.S. side
to the Japanese side in cases involving classified military
information (CMI) under the GSOMIA; second, all other
cases. Under the Japanese proposal, the Embassy's Defense
Attache would inform MOFA's Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
Division Director, who would subsequently inform the
Cabinet Secretariat, CIRO, MOD, NPA, and PSIA. The
Japanese side stressed that the procedure only applied to
initial notification of an incident, not the substance of
the compromised information or any investigatory details.
The process also does not supplant existing lines of
communication, which the two sides would use in all
non-CMI, non-GSOMIA cases.

WORKING GROUPS AND ACTION GROUPS
--------------


8. (C) At the August 30 meeting, the two sides also agreed
to establish two working groups and three action groups to
bring together relevant subject matter experts. The
working groups and action groups would convene sometime
after the September 19 BISTF meeting in Washington,
covering the following topics:

-- Working group 1: personnel security clearance,
cybersecurity, physical security

-- Working group 2: security of diplomatic
info/communications, courier procedures

-- Action group 1: development of AEGIS security plan

-- Action group 2: development of CI ramifications and
lessons learned from AEGIS compromise

--Action group 3: secured links

The working groups and action groups would each have U.S.
and Japanese co-chairs, who will report the results of
their meetings at the IG plenary.

SEP 14 IG: PREPARING FOR PLENARY
--------------


9. (C) The third IG meeting on September 14 centered on
four items: the agenda for the September 19 DAS-level BISTF
plenary meeting in Washington, single points of contacts
for incidents involving classified information, target
completion dates for the TOR mid-term milestones, and a
briefing from the Japanese side on their military
officer-journalist exchange program. The Japanese side
underscored repeatedly that the goal of the September 19
BISTF meeting was to have substantive discussions on
"refining" the long-term milestones, not necessarily
reaching final agreement on them. They proposed that the
BISTF plenary adhere to the exact wording of the TOR, which
stipulates the long-term milestones "will be refined
bilaterally at the second BISTF meeting."

SEP 19 WASHINGTON PLENARY
--------------


10. (C) The second DAS-level BISTF plenary meeting convened
on September 19 in Washington, with substantive discussion
on all the milestones. Both sides delegated a number of
tasks to the Tokyo-based IG. First, the task force added
one new near-term milestone, which states that the
Tokyo-based IG will prepare a joint status assessment for
all near-term milestones to be presented at the next BISTF
plenary, to be held in Tokyo on November 13. Second, the
group agreed that the IG will determine a new target date
for the draft damage assessment of the AEGIS compromise,
considering that ongoing criminal investigations made
completion by the original target date of October 20
impossible. Third, the IG will continue discussions on the
U.S. proposal on developing an Information Sharing
Roadmap. The Japanese delegation added that it will take
additional time to coordinate the U.S. proposal with
Japanese ministries not represented in BISTF, such as the
Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry (METI). Finally,
both delegations agreed to continue discussions on the
intent and wording of the long-term milestones at the IG
level, along with the addition of "cyber forensics" to the
list of topics.

SOME TARGET DATES EXTENDED
--------------


11. (C) The two delegations altered the target dates on a
number of mid-term milestones after assessing both sides'
logistic needs and domestic political situations. For
example, the reciprocal visits by survey teams under the
GSOMIA, which had a target date of October 31, was adjusted
to allow for a proposed trip by the National Disclosure
Policy Committee (NDPC) to Japan will have sufficient time
to translate and review Japanese laws and regulations for
the handling of classified information. Both delegations,
likewise, agreed that Qthe timing and contents of the first
BISTF report of recommendations to the ministerial-level
Security Consultative Committee (SCC) by October 31 -- will
be discussed further at the next BISTF plenary in November
in light of Japan's cabinet changes. Finally, the task
force agreed to delay the establishment of a bilateral
working group on standards and modalities for protecting
classified shared information to late November to allow the
Japanese government time to ensure that the proper mix of
agencies are able to participate.
SCHIEFFER