Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TOKYO4797
2007-10-12 07:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

JAPAN: POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS ON BURMA

Tags:  EAID PREL PGOV PREF BM JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7697
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHFK RUEHHM RUEHKSO RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHKO #4797 2850736
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 120736Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8532
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZU/ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION PRIORITY
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 2271
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USFJ PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 004797 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EAP/MLS FOR AARON COPE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2017/10/12
TAGS: EAID PREL PGOV PREF BM JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN: POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS ON BURMA


Classified By: Charge D' Affairs Joseph R. Donovan, reasons 1.4(b),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 004797

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EAP/MLS FOR AARON COPE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2017/10/12
TAGS: EAID PREL PGOV PREF BM JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN: POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS ON BURMA


Classified By: Charge D' Affairs Joseph R. Donovan, reasons 1.4(b),(d).


1. (C) Summary: Thus far, Japan has taken a number of steps
to influence events in Burma, including formal protests at
the ministerial level. However, Japan can do more to signal
to the Burmese junta that it is increasingly isolated. This
cable summarizes Embassy Tokyo's view on possible next steps
the United States can encourage Japan to take, including
narrowing down what Japan refers to as humanitarian ODA,
limiting travel and exchange programs for Burmese officials,
increasing refugee numbers, taking more active leadership in
multilateral efforts, and extending export controls. End
summary.


2. (C) Japan publicly welcomed the October 11 UNSC
Presidential Statement on Burma, and has issued public
statements deploring the use of violence against peaceful
demonstrations in Burma on several occasions over the past
two weeks. Foreign Minister Komura and Deputy Foreign
Minister Yabunaka have also protested formally to their
counterparts over the death of a Japanese journalist, while
encouraging Burma's leaders to release political prisoners,
exercise restraint, and engage in dialogue with the
opposition.


3. (C) Japan currently grants only humanitarian assistance
to Burma, according to Embassy contacts at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Those contacts confirm that Japan is
currently considering narrowing down that humanitarian
assistance, as noted in a policy paper issued by MOFA on
October 4, three days after Deputy Minister Yabunaka's
meetings in Burma. The document cites assistance to a human
resources development center as one possible area to cut,
while noting that truly humanitarian aid, such as the
provision of polio vaccines, should remain in place. Cuts in
official development assistance (ODA) are probably the
simplest, most symbolic steps that Japan can take to send a
signal to both Burma's leaders and the international
community. MOFA contacts have also expressed interest in
funneling their remaining ODA through non-governmental
organizations. The United States could encourage those
efforts.


4. (C) Limiting the entry of Burmese officials into Japan, to
include a freeze on scholarship and training programs for
those officials, is another possible step under
consideration, according to MOFA. The United States could
encourage a visa ban on regime members and their families, as
well as a limit on senior-level exchanges. Such measures are
easy to implement, even if they are largely symbolic, given
the small number of official exchanges between Japan and
Burma, and the fact that many Burmese officials who are
considered friendly toward Japan are under house arrest or
out of favor. As the flip-side to entry restrictions, the
United states could encourage Japan to improve its poor
record on accepting Burmese refugees. Japan accepted only 28
asylum applications out of 626 from Burmese who applied in

2006.


5. (C) Japan's strong embrace of the UNSC Presidential
Statement, coupled with the ministerial level demarches, may
indicate that Prime Minister Fukuda is amenable to making
additional strong statements on Burma, or supporting
additional multilateral efforts. MOFA has already told the
Embassy that Japan wants to take part in international
dialogue on Burma. The United States could encourage Japan
and Prime Minister Fukuda himself to play a greater
leadership role in international efforts.


6. (C) Targeted export controls are another possible step
that Japan might take to gain Burma's attention. However,
any attempt to limit wide categories of Japanese exports, or
halt investment, are likely to generate a strong, negative
reaction from the Japanese business community here. This
could prove tricky to the new Fukuda administration,
particularly given the unsettled domestic political climate
in which the administration believes needs all the support it
can get.
DONOVAN