Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TOKYO4563
2007-09-28 09:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE ON BURMA UNLIKELY

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM BM SN JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0679
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHFK RUEHHM RUEHKSO RUEHPB
DE RUEHKO #4563/01 2710918
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 280918Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8072
INFO RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZU/ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION PRIORITY
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 2260
RHMFISS/USFJ PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 004563 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM SN JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE ON BURMA UNLIKELY


Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 004563

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM SN JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE ON BURMA UNLIKELY


Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).


1. (U) This cable contains an action request. Please see
paragraph 5.


2. (C) Summary: Tokyo is publicly condemning the violent
government crackdown on demonstrators in Burma and is urging
Burmese leaders to "exercise restraint," but has no plans to
change its foreign policy strategy on Burma, MOFA contacts
told Embassy Tokyo Political Officer on September 27. MOFA
issued a public statement on September 25 urging the Burmese
government to show restraint and Chief Cabinet Secretary
Machimura repeated calls for Burma to resolve the current
situation in a "constructive way" during press conferences on
September 26 and 27. MOFA will convey its concerns to the
Burmese Ambassador to Tokyo on September 27, MOFA First
Southeast Asia Division Principal Deputy Director Atsushi
Kuwabara noted. Japan is seeking details on the United
States Government decision to tighten economic sanctions on
Burma, he noted. Vice Foreign Minister Yabunaka is still
planning to visit Burma on September 29 to October 3. End
Summary.

Stepping Up Public Criticism on Crackdown
--------------

3. (C) Tokyo is publicly criticizing the crackdown while
downplaying the need to increase pressure on Burma. MOFA
spokesman Mitsuo Sakaba released a short two-sentence press
statement on September 25 urging Burma to "exercise
restraint" and to make "sincere efforts including dialogue
for national reconciliation and democratization." Chief
Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura is calling on the
Burmese Government to refrain from using violence against
protestors, and on September 27 told reporters the crackdown
on protestors was "extremely regrettable." During an earlier
press conference on September 26, Machimura told reporters he
hoped the crackdown on demonstrators would be resolved "in a
constructive fashion." Japan will keep "a close watch" on
the situation, Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura told
reporters during a separate press conference on September 26.
When Political Officer asked if Japan will take additional

steps to pressure Burma if the growing monk-led protests
trigger a violent repression, Kuwabara replied that Japan has
no plaQto change its foreign policy approach at this time
but will watch the situation closely and take "appropriate
measures" as needed. (Comment: MOFA confirmed a Japanese
reporter was killed in Burma on September 27 and Machimura
told reporters Japan will lodge a protest with the Burmese
Government over the death. End Comment).

Questions on USG Tightening Economic Sanctions
-------------- -

4. (C) Turning to the September 25 announcement that the
United States will tighten economic sanctions on Burma,
Kuwabara thanked Political Officer for sharing a copy of the
September 25 White House press release and said it helps
clarify confusion within MOFA on President Bush's September
25 speech at the United Nations. MOFA officials were
uncertain what the decision to tighten economic sanctions
meant, since the United States has already imposed sanctions
on Burma. While the White House press release helps clarify
this, additional information on what steps the United States
plans to take would be appreciated, Kuwabara noted.


5. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Please provide additional details on
U.S. plans to tighten economic sanctions on Burma,
specifically information on how these sanctions will differ
from the sanctions already in place under Executive Order
13047, Executive Order 13310, and the Burmese Freedom and
Democracy Act. Details on USG plans to designate specific
individuals identified as responsible for violations of human
rights and for impeding the nation's transition to democracy
would also be helpful.

Yabunaka's Upcoming Trip to Burma
--------------

6. (C) Turning to MOFA Vice Foreign Minister Mitoji
Yabunaka's planned September 30 to October 3 trip to Burma,
Yabunaka will meet with the Burmese Vice Foreign Minister,
and MOFA is still working to confirm additional meetings.
When asked if Yabunaka would be meeting with nongovernment
officials during his visit, Kuwabara paused, and then
hesitantly stated he did not have additional information to
share with the United States at this time, and reiterated
that meetings were still being arranged.


7. (C) In response to Political Officer's question on whether
the Japanese Embassy in Burma had its own communication

TOKYO 00004563 002 OF 002


channels with nongovernmental officials, including
pro-democracy leaders, Kuwabara explained that Japan has
"information sources" outside the official Burmese
Government, but stated Tokyo will not reveal who, or where,
its interlocutors are located. (Comment: Kuwabara was
evasive when responding to questions on Yabunaka's travel
plans and schedule while in Burma. He was reluctant to
comment on who Japanese Embassy officials meet with in Burma,
and appeared to be less than completely forthcoming. He
abruptly ended the meeting but said he looked forward to a
more detailed meeting on Burma in the future. End Comment).


8. (C) Comment: MOFA's response to the crackdown in Burma may
not accurately reflect Japan's concern that the protests
could trigger a violent repression. For example, LDP House
of Representatives member Kazuo Aichi told Tokyo Embassy on
September 26 that he was anxious about the situation in Burma
and said it is reminiscent of 1988. He explained that too
much pressure on the military regime will merely make Burma
more pro-China, a concern MOFA officials have expressed
repeatedly in the past. He questioned the effectiveness of
stopping Japanese ODA to Burma and said applying too much
pressure would not be beneficial. End Comment.
Schieffer