Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TOKYO4559
2007-09-28 08:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

JAPANESE READOUT OF IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Tags:  PREL PGOV AF IZ JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0637
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHPW
DE RUEHKO #4559/01 2710856
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 280856Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8065
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USFJ PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 004559 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF IZ JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE READOUT OF IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS IN NEW YORK


Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 004559

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF IZ JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE READOUT OF IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS IN NEW YORK


Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d
)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Japan was very pleased with the outcomes of
both the Iraq and Afghanistan High-Level Meetings held in New
York September 22-23. Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura
(now Chief Cabinet Secretary) decided at the last moment to
attend, despite the fact the meetings took place at the same
time the next Prime Minister was being selected. On Iraq,
Machimura took advantage of the meeting to reemphasize
Japan's support for the Maliki government and to stress the
important role the United Nations can play in bringing
stability to the country. The high points of the visit were
Machimura's bilateral meeting with Afghan President Karzai,
who reiterated Afghanistan's desire to see Japan remain
engaged in the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Maritime
Interdiction Operation (MIO),and the fact that mention of
OEF was included in the High-Level Meeting's final
communique. Japan's continued involvement in this operation
is the subject of a major political debate in Tokyo, so
obtaining Karzai's message of support, along with a favorable
mention of the operation in the final communique of the
meeting, were Machimura's major objectives. The Japanese
were extremely appreciative of support from the United States
Mission in New York throughout this process. While in New
York, Machimura also met with Iranian Foreign Minister Motaki
(septel). END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Foreign Minister Machimura, deeply involved in the
selection process for the next Prime Minister, decided at the
last possible moment to fly to New York to attend the Iraq
and Afghanistan High-Level Meetings on the margins of UNGA,
according to MOFA Second Middle East Division Principal
Deputy Director Motosada Matano. One factor which convinced
Machimura of the need to leave Japan despite the ongoing
political drama was the government's desire to obtain clear
signals of Afghan and international support for Japan's
continued involvement in OEF. (NOTE: Japan's participation
in the Indian Ocean MIO is the subject of intense political

debate in Tokyo and is being used by the opposition party in
its attempt to bring down the ruling Liberal Democratic
Party. END NOTE.) Machimura arrived back in Tokyo in time
to cast his ballot for the next Prime Minister on September
25 and was, on the same day, named Chief Cabinet Secretary in
the new cabinet, making him the second highest ranking
official in the government after the Prime Minister.

--------------
IRAQ
--------------


3. (C) Japan utilized Machimura's presence at the Iraq
meeting to reemphasize its support at the highest levels for
the Maliki government and to stress the importance of
continued efforts to achieve national reconciliation,
reported Matano. Machimura also spoke of Japan's desire to
see the United Nations play a more robust role in bringing
peace and stability to Iraq. He recounted Japan's assistance
to date, including the deployment of Ground and Air Self
Defense Force units and the billions of dollars worth of
grants, loans, and debt relief that Tokyo has extended to
Baghdad.

--------------
AFGHANISTAN
--------------


4. (C) Machimura's main reason for making the trip to New
York was to ensure that the communique issued following the
High-Level Meeting on Afghanistan contained words of support
for OEF, and to meet with Afghan President Karzai to elicit
from him a positive statement regarding Japan's
participation. According to Matano, all Japan wanted from
both the communique and Karzai was mention of Operation
Enduring Freedom. Machimura believed that this was vital to
the government's struggle to beat back the opposition
Democratic Party of Japan's efforts to use this issue to
precipitate a snap election. The Japanese were therefore
very pleased with President Karzai's words of thanks and
encouragement.


5. (C) Obtaining the sought-after language in the communique
was a more difficult task, related Matano. The Japanese, for

TOKYO 00004559 002 OF 002


domestic political reasons, could not be seen as the moving
force behind placing words of support for OEF in the
communique. Accordingly, they turned to the United States.
Matano went out of his way to say several times how
appreciative Japan was of the U.S. Mission's efforts to
insert the desired language. The problem was that the
Iranians were opposed to the language for three reasons.
First, they did not want to agree to anything the United
States tried to insert, on general principle. Second, they
were particularly loath to agreeing to language supporting a
military operation close to Iranian shores. And third, in
the context of the United Nations, Iran and Japan have become
competitors, as both are vying for election by the Asia Group
for a nonpermanent seat on the Security Council for the
2009-2010 term.


6. (C) When the Japanese learned the Iranians would be an
obstacle, reported Matano, they went to work on Iranian
Ambassador to Tokyo, Mohsen Talaei, who telephoned Tehran to
explain Japan's point of view and the importance Tokyo
attached to this issue for domestic political reasons.
Ambassador Talaei relayed to MOFA the morning of September 21
that Tehran would send a message to New York instructing
their mission to "cooperate" with the Japanese. This
apparently didn't persuade the Iranian mission in New York
which, Tokyo learned the evening of the 21st, remained
adamant about opposing anything inserted by the United
States. When MOFA called Talaei to ask what was happening,
he told them the New York mission had replied that they
"always cooperated with the Japanese," but that the
instruction they received had no clear direction to agree to
the language in question. MOFA went back to Ambassador
Talaei, whom they had already thanked for his earlier support
and so now had a personal stake in the matter. He again
intervened with Tehran. FM Motaki, upon arrival in New York,
consulted with the Iranian PermRep and together they decided
to withdraw their opposition to the OEF language.


7. (C) The Japanese considered the inclusion of language
acknowledging OEF to be a major victory. Shedding some light
on intra-MOFA rivalries, Matano explained that the United
Nations Policy Division had received the credit for obtaining
language acknowledging OEF in Security Council Resolution
1776 which extended the ISAF mission, and that put additional
pressure on Second Middle East to come through with something
in the High-Level Meeting communique. As a result, Middle
East and Africa Bureau Director General Norohiro Okuda was
directly involved in every facet of the negotiations and was
"very serious" about getting it done.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) Matano was clearly proud of MOFA's "victory" in
obtaining the sought-after language in the communique, and
several times expressed gratitude to the United States for
the active support given Japan for, what is to them, an
extremely important matter.
Schieffer