Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TOKYO4417
2007-09-21 08:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

ASO AND FUKUDA SOFTPEDALING REFORM, STRESSING

Tags:  ECON EFIN PGOV JA 
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RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 004417 

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SIPDIS

NSC FOR TONG
USTR FOR CUTLER, BEEMAN, AND MEYERS
PARIS FOR USOECD
DOC FOR ITA/MAC/4410/OJ/NMELCHER
TREASURY FOR IA/DOHNER, HAARSAGER, AND POGGI
PLEASE PASS TO FEDERAL RESERVE SAN FRANCISCO/A. MAEDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2017
TAGS: ECON EFIN PGOV JA
SUBJECT: ASO AND FUKUDA SOFTPEDALING REFORM, STRESSING
"STABILITY"


Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 b/d.

Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 004417

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR TONG
USTR FOR CUTLER, BEEMAN, AND MEYERS
PARIS FOR USOECD
DOC FOR ITA/MAC/4410/OJ/NMELCHER
TREASURY FOR IA/DOHNER, HAARSAGER, AND POGGI
PLEASE PASS TO FEDERAL RESERVE SAN FRANCISCO/A. MAEDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2017
TAGS: ECON EFIN PGOV JA
SUBJECT: ASO AND FUKUDA SOFTPEDALING REFORM, STRESSING
"STABILITY"


Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 b/d.

Summary
--------------

1. (C) Prime ministerial candidates Taro Aso and Yasuo Fukuda
continue to support economic "reform." But both are putting
more stress on "stability" in their campaigns and addressing
problematic side effects of reform. Specifically, Fukuda and
Aso are promising relief to rural areas and are paying lots
of attention to voters' pocketbook concerns. End Summary.

Two Elections, Two Visions of Reform
--------------

2. (SBU) Conversations with ruling Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) Diet members and staff reveal very different
interpretations of what the July 2007 and October 2005
elections have to say about economic reform. One group
stresses former Prime Minister Koizumi's structural reform
line as key to the LDP's landslide victory in 2005's "postal
privatization" Lower House elections. Retreat on reform,
they argue, is a rejection of the voters' will. The other
group focuses on how rural areas, which have not fared well
economically since the start of Koizumi's reform line,
deserted the LDP in its 2007 Upper House electoral loss. For
them, reform is a concept tainted with the voters and must be
tempered to shore up support in the LDP's traditional core
constituency.


3. (C) The difference in views came into sharp relief when
Chief Cabinet Secretary Kaoru Yosano and LDP Secretary
General Taro Aso began laying the groundwork in early
September to bring former Trade Minister and unrepentant
"postal rebel" Takeo Hiranuma back into the party. Hiranuma,
who was kicked out of the LDP in 2005 for opposing postal
privatization, would not have been required to sign a pledge
of support for the reform, as other returning "postal rebels"
had. A few days prior to PM Abe's abrupt resignation
announcement, LDP Diet member Masahiko Shibayama told Econoff

the LDP's leadership (specifically including Aso) was
mistaken in believing the issue of upholding Koizumi's
"reform agenda" had passed. Former PM Koizumi was reportedly
enraged by Hiranuma's possible re-instatement.

Reform and the Next Prime Minister
--------------

4. (C) Noting a coalescing group of "Koizumi children," first
term parliamentarians who rode the former PM's coattails in
the 2005 election, as well as the creation of a parliamentary
"reform study group" with former Minister of Internal Affairs
and Communications Heizo Takenaka as an advisor, media
speculated at the start of the campaign period about a new
"Koizumi Faction" centered on the issue of reform. These
groups appear to have been part of an early "draft Koizumi"
initiative. That push, however, ended when Koizumi threw his
support to leading candidate Yasuo Fukuda.


5. (C) Fukuda and rival candidate Taro Aso, for their part,
are straddling the reform divide in their bids for party
support. Fukuda's policy platform, for example, leads with
the intent to continue reform, but adds the qualification
that changes create a society with (among other things)
"self-reliance" and "interdependence." Fukuda promises
greater care for the disadvantaged, and talks about policies
to address related concerns about the pension system, health
care, and regional disparities, as well as the plight of
small and medium sized businesses. Aso's platform notes the
need for long-term reform, but places current priority on
remedying the disruptions and disparities rooted in reform.
Both candidates repeatedly promise stability to worried
voters.


6. (C) Asked about the prospects for economic reform under a

TOKYO 00004417 002 OF 002


new prime minister, former Japan Post President Masaharu
Ikuta took no position on policy differences between Aso and
Fukuda, but told Econoff either would be far better than PM
Abe. While acknowledging current discussions of greater help
to the regions, he noted Fukuda was chief cabinet secretary
-- and a strong supporter -- when former PM Koizumi began
pushing postal privatization. And Aso, at the time Minister
of Internal Affairs and Communications, worked with Ikuta to
persuade parliamentarians of the privatization's benefits.
Prime Minister Abe was always "shouting about reform on the
television," continued Ikuta, but he frequently shifted
policy around what he thought was best for the Upper House
elections, which resulted in backwards slippage on reform.
At least, he implied by comparison, Aso and Fukuda will show
leadership.

Comment
--------------

7. (C) In straddling differences within the LDP on reform,
Aso and Fukuda's platform statements are convoluted, but they
display a shift away from a discussion of reform's
relationship to growth and toward how its side effects should
be mitigated. More telling, however, is their focus on
stability. While they know the slogan of "reform" evokes a
variety of reactions, they are betting that "stability" will
now have more appeal, not only for the LDP's rank-and-file
and leaders who will choose the next Prime Minister, but also
for the Japanese public.
Schieffer