S/P DIRECTOR KRASNER MEETS DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 000374

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP ZK IN KN KS AS CH RS JA
SUBJECT: S/P DIRECTOR KRASNER MEETS DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR
NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS KAWAI

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires W. Michael Meserve for reasons 1.4(b)
and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: During a January 12 meeting with S/P Director
Krasner, Director General for North American Affairs Chikao
Kawai (since elevated to Deputy Vice Minister of Foreign
Affairs for Foreign Policy) explained that Japan cannot, for
domestic reasons, provide humanitarian assistance to the DPRK
and urged patience in dealing with the North through the Six
Party Talks. With regard to India, Kawai reiterated Prime
Minister Abe's desire to establish a quad grouping including
Japan, India, Australia, and the U.S., but acknowledged that
what this group would address or do is still in the formative
stages. Developments in Central Asia, Russia, and China that
are of interest to Japan were also touched upon. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) MOFA North American Affairs Director General Chikao
Kawai (who was elevated to Deputy Vice Minister and Director
General for Foreign Policy on January 16) hosted a luncheon
for visiting Policy Planning Director Krasner December 12.
Dr. Krasner was accompanied by Charge Donovan, NSC Senior
Director for Strategic Planning William Inboden, S/P Staff
member James Green, and Embassy Tokyo Political Officer
(notetaker). DG Kawai was joined by Yusuke Arai and Takeomi
Yamamoto, both of the First North American Affairs Division.

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SIX PARTY TALKS
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3. (C) Dr. Krasner told Kawai the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral
talks just completed in Seoul had been useful. While there,
he also met bilaterally with Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign
Policy Kohno to discuss a number of issues, including the way
forward with the DPRK. Foreign aid to the DPRK was
mentioned, the hope being that aid offered by Seoul should be
more tactically applied to achieve agreed upon strategic
goals. Kawai commented that Japan is not in a position at
present to offer any humanitarian assistance to the DPRK.
Such a gesture is precluded by domestic political concern
over the abduction issue. Kawai confirmed no progress has
been made on this issue, and commented that the trip to
Pyongyang by former LDP Vice President Taku Yamasaki was not
sanctioned by the government and was viewed as unhelpful. He
went without consulting anyone, embarrassing the Prime
Minister and upsetting Director General for Asian Affairs
Sasae, who was at the moment in Washington, and drawing
negative remarks to the press from Chief Cabinet Secretary
Shiozaki.


4. (C) The United States is willing to be flexible with the
DPRK if the North abandons its nuclear program, Dr. Krasner
explained. A problem that remains is our lack of
understanding about what exactly motivates Kim Jong Il, and a
concern his motivations aren't even all that clear to the
Chinese. Kawai replied it is Japan's hope that China will
exert more pressure on the DPRK, even though this might
worsen relations between the two countries. For example, the
fact that China voted, along with Russia, in favor of a UNSC
resolution aimed at the DPRK was a significant development.
However, the possible downside is that Pyongyang will now
fear that its two security guarantors, Beijing and Moscow,
have become less reliable, further justifying in their own
minds the need for nuclear weapons as a deterrent force.


5. (C) Kawai said he is not optimistic that the North will
make any concessions and urged maximum patience in the
negotiating process. Even though time is on Kim's side - he
can continue his program and manufacture nuclear weapons - we
should not appear too anxious to make major concessions to
get him to stop. As for Kim's popular support among his
military and the public, Kawai said that Japan has no idea.
He counseled the need for contingency plans both in case the
North takes military action or if it collapses, unleashing a
wave of refugees that none of the countries of the region can
handle. The Japanese people, Kawai added, will accept the
need for such plans, as the recent missile and nuclear tests

TOKYO 00000374 002 OF 003


have given them a more realistic view of the North Korean
threat.


6. (C) When asked whether Japan would accept a Five Party
format if the Six Party Talks were to fail, Kawai responded
that the six party formula is the best for right now. We all
need to take this step by step, with the realization that
China must play a leading role. If China decides, Russia
will follow, Kawai stated.

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INDIA
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7. (C) Dr. Krasner asked DG Kawai about Japan-India
relations, and specifically about the proposal by Prime
Minister Abe to establish a quadrilateral relationship
between Japan, India, the United States, and Australia.
Kawai explained that PM Abe has a strong interest in such a
grouping of powerful Asian/Pacific democracies. The Japanese
understanding is that the Secretary supports this concept,
but is urging that it be developed slowly so as not to give
concern to China. Kawai maintained that the quad grouping is
not meant to isolate China, but rather to bring them more
into the process. When asked what the quad's role would be,
or what issues it would address, Kawai admitted that the
GOJ's thoughts on this are still in the formative stages.
Cooperation in "non-threatening" activities such as disaster
relief or maritime security come immediately to mind. Kawai
also acknowledged that before any type of multilateral
grouping can be set up, it is critical that Japanese-Indian
relations be further developed. While Japan and India are
very different in many ways, they also share many of the same
values. Both peoples have a positive image of each other and
there is a desire to increase economic and, with it,
political cooperation.


8. (C) In addition, said Kawai, India, as a strong and
thriving multi-ethnic democracy working with Japan, the
United States, and Australia, can also play a major role in
Foreign Minister Aso's vision for an "Arc of Prosperity."
While these four countries share core values, they are still
very different in many ways, and these differences can be
used to an advantage when dealing with and helping young and
struggling democracies. For example, India may be able to
relate better to some countries that do not wish to be openly
tied to the United States. India can no longer be viewed as
simply a strong regional player, but rather as a growing
global power, said Kawai. He continued that India seems more
interested in further exploring a four-way grouping than
Japan had expected, and this is something that should
continue to be thought about.

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CENTRAL ASIA
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9. (C) Japan is very interested in furthering bilateral and
multilateral relations with the countries of Central Asia,
and was very encouraged by SCA DAS Evan Feigenbaum's recent
visit to Tokyo, said Kawai. He recalled former Prime
Minister Koizumi's visits in August to both Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan, which Japan considers the key countries of the
region. In Uzbekistan, in particular, Koizumi had urged his
hosts of the need to develop democratic institutions that
would acknowledge, observe, and protect human rights. One
hindrance to developing further relations with Central Asia
is increased competition for diminishing ODA resources. The
"Arc of Prosperity" concept enunciated by FM Aso foresees
closer cooperation with the countries of Central Asia, among
others, but remains more of an "umbrella" concept that seeks
to coordinate existing assistance programs and add new ones.
Kawai explained that FM Aso also believes that each Central
Asian country must develop their own initiatives and that a
key goal of development assistance must be aimed at
developing a middle class.


TOKYO 00000374 003 OF 003


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RUSSIA
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10. (C) Kawai touched briefly on Japanese relations with
Russia, explaining that Japan is not all that upset by recent
developments involving the Sakhalin 2 energy project. Tokyo
realizes that the original agreement was made at a time when
Russia was weak and accepts the fact Moscow is trying to
renegotiate to its benefit. That said, Japan believes it
would be helpful for consumers of Russian oil to coordinate
better to make it more difficult for Russia to put pressure
on other countries that are too overdependent on Moscow for
their energy needs. With regard to territorial issues, Japan
will continue to press its position. Tokyo believes that
President Putin is strong enough to withstand domestic
pressures were he to decide to make concessions on such
issues.

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CHINA
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11. (C) References to China permeated the wider discussion.
But with regard to its thriving economy, Kawai said he
believes the Chinese government is becoming concerned about
too much growth, too fast. Much of China's economy depends
on foreign factors such as trade and investment, making the
country potentially vulnerable to external threats. And as
the economy grows, issues such as income disparity and
corruption might threaten the political order from within.
In addition, Kawai said, the Chinese are not unaware of what
happened to the Japanese economy in the 1990's. So while the
businessmen in Shanghai are smiling, government officials are
more wary. It is therefore perhaps premature to conclude
that rapid economic growth will lead to more political
liberalization.


12. (C) Kawai concluded that it is inevitable that China and
Japan will continue to strongly influence each other and that
their economies will continue to interact, particularly in
southern Japan where, he noted, Nagasaki is closer to
Shanghai than it is to Tokyo. And while Japan will cease its
ODA program to China in 2008, assistance will continue in
some sectors, including the environment, in which actions or
events in China have direct impacts on Japan, for example
pollution and shifting sands borne aloft.


13. (U) This cable was cleared by S/P Director Krasner.
MESERVE