PDAS STEPHENS JULY 23 MEETINGS WITH JAPANESE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 003470

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MANILA FOR D/KAYE LEE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017
TAGS: PREL KNNP JA DPRK
SUBJECT: PDAS STEPHENS JULY 23 MEETINGS WITH JAPANESE
OFFICIALS ON THE NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY MECHANISM

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons 1.4 (b)/(d).


1. (C) Summary: MOFA officials took a very cautious line
on the Six-Party Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism
Working Group during meetings with Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary Stephens on July 23. They were also cautious in

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reacting to initial U.S. ideas for core principles for
regional security, emphasizing that such principles should
focus heavily on denuclearization and peace on the Korean
Peninsula. They emphasized that too rapid movement on this
track runs the risk of taking the focus off denuclearization
and affording the DPRK an opportunity to slow down the
Six-Party process. PDAS Stephens said the mechanism could in
fact reinforce denuclearization. She noted that while the
United States envisioned this issue remaining within the
Six-Party process as we focus on full implementation of the
September 2005 Agreement, the Northeast Asia Peace and
Security Mechanism might eventually become a separate forum,
growing out of success in the Six-Party Talks. PDAS Stephens
also reassured MOFA officials that the U.S. would consult
closely with Japan on the four-party Korean Peninsula peace
regime process. End Summary.


2. (C) Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs Kathleen Stephens had separate meetings
July 23 with MOFA North American Affairs Director General
Shinichi Nishimiya, Deputy Director-General for Asian and
Oceanian Affairs Junichi Ihara, Director-General for Asian
and Oceanian Affairs Kenichiro Sasae, Deputy Director-General
of Foreign Policy Yasumasa Nagamine, and Deputy Vice Minister
Chikao Kawai. Explaining that she was embarking on a series
of bilateral consultations to prepare for the August meeting
of the NEAPSM Working Group and the September Six-Party
Ministerial, she outlined initial U.S. thinking on the NEAPSM
and the separate (though people sometimes blurred the two)
issue of the Korean Peninsula peace regime process.


3. (C) PDAS Stephens said we envisioned a general
discussion on regional peace and security at the Six-Party
Foreign Ministers meeting and a ministerial tasking to the
Working Group to develop a charter, or core principles, for
the NEAPSM. Deputy Ministers might subsequently meet to
finalize and endorse the set of core principles. Stephens
outlined initial U.S. thinking on what these core principles
might cover, emphasizing that our thinking was still in its
early stages. DDG Nagamine agreed that because the six
parties might not be able to agree on NEAPSM principles by
September, it was more realistic for the ministers to task
that effort to the Working Group. He stressed that even
these basic principles would require close U.S.-Japan
consultations. Nagamine also expressed concern over using
the word charter ("We don't like the word."),saying it
suggested something legally binding and requiring legislative
action. He made clear Japan would not support anything
legally binding. PDAS Stephens said we were not attached to
any particular word.


4. (C) DDG Nagamine questioned the involvement of Deputies,
asking if we envisioned Deputies launching a new forum or
grouping. PDAS Stephens clarified that we envision a
possible Vice Ministers meeting as a one-off event to boost
the Working Group's efforts at an appropriate time to agree
to a set of principles. DDG Nagamine cautioned that a Vice
Ministerial should not be held only for the NEAPSM Working
Group; if Vice Ministers were to meet, it should be for
Six-Party working groups across the board.


5. (C) PDAS Stephens told DDG Nagamine that in regard to
talks on a Korean Peninsula peace regime as envisioned by the
September 2005 Joint Statement, the directly related parties
were the two Koreas playing the central roles, plus China and
the U.S. She emphasized that the Korean peace talks would
only get underway after the denuclearization process was in
disablement phase. PDAS Stephens added that the U.S. would

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closely consult with Japan as those talks unfolded. DDG
Nagamine emphasized that peace on the Korean Peninsula was a
vital concern for Japan and the image that Japan was involved
in the process was politically important. DDG Nagamine
suggested that Korean peace talks should "report" to the
NEAPSM Working Group, an idea to which, he said, Russia was
sympathetic.


6. (C) In a separate meeting, Deputy Vice Foreign Minister
for Foreign Policy Chikao Kawai emphasized that
the Japanese government believed the Six-Party Working Groups
should focus first on 1) confidence-building among the
parties; and 2) issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula. The
agenda could expand over time, but the parties needed to keep
their attention on the immediate task at hand -- the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, any
discussion of Northeast Asia peace and security should be
within the overall Six-Party framework; creating a new
framework outside the Six-Party process was vulnerable to
DPRK manipulation.


7. (C) Kawai agreed that China's taking on a constructive
role in the Six-Party process was a positive step, but such a
"by-product" ought not to displace the DPRK nuclear issue
among the Six-Party priorities. He acknowledged that, while
premature, the parties needed to think about the future.
Responding to PDAS Stephens's comment about looking to
examples of confidence-building measures (CBMs) from other
multilateral fora, Kawai opined that neither ARF nor OSCE
presented a viable model for a Northeast Asian security
framework due to the former's questionable effectiveness and
the latter's relatively simple framework (i.e., East versus
West blocs). In the Six-Party process, the DPRK, China, and
Russia all had different regimes and separate interests that
ran counter to the relatively consolidated stance of the
U.S., Japan and the ROK. From Japan's perspective,
addressing the DPRK's missile program and the abduction issue
remained important factors in engaging with the DPRK.


8. (C) Director-General Nishimiya said MOFA's "gut
reaction" to the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism
(NEAPSM) was that it was premature, and he advised against
introducing "new, untested ideas" at this point in the
Six-Party process. Establishing a set of guiding principles
for the mechanism would also be quite difficult, he
predicted. Even nomenclature was problematic, he asserted,
since there was no clear agreement on the geographic
boundaries of Northeast Asia. DG Nishimiya recommended that
U.S.-Japan discussions focus on specifics, to avoid us
"talking past one another." Citing initial confusion in the
Japanese press over the proposed security mechanism and a
separate four-party Korean peace process, Nishimiya stressed
the need to carefully manage public perceptions.


9. (C) Denuclearization was the immediate task at hand,
stated Director-General Sasae, a point later reinforced by
DVM Kawai. Sasae doubted the effectiveness of the NEAPSM
process, contending that it would turn into just another
"academic" forum. DDG Ihara cautioned that the NEAPSM would
send the wrong signal to the DPRK and ran the risk of being
used by the North Koreans to drive a wedge between allies, or
to slow down the denuclearization process. Six-Party
participants needed to be careful about whether
denuclearization was a "driver" or "follower," observed DDG
Nagamine, adding that only if denuclearization moved forward
would confidence grow in the Six-Party process.


10. (C) Discussions on alliances could also be problematic,
DDG Nagamine said. Although Japan and the U.S. agree that
our alliance is key to peace in the region, that view was not
universally held by all Six-Party participants. First North
America Division Director Mori seconded this line, saying we
should be extremely cautious about bringing alliances into
the Working Group discussions. North Korea might try to use

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seemingly unobjectionable things, such as UN principles, for
its own purposes, cautioned DDG Nagamine. Statements about
peaceful settlement of disputes, especially territorial, was
another area where there might be unwanted connotation
applied to specific issues, continued DDG Nagamine. On the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),where Japan had doubts about
the DPRK's resolve, there might be difficulty in reaching a
common definition among the six parties of what constituted
the NPT regime. North Korea, Nagamine noted, had already
called for nuclear inspections in the ROK. Should we, he
asked rhetorically, be prepared to accept a North Korean
demand for denuclearization in areas surrounding the Korean
Peninsula?


11. (C) DDG Nagamine said Japan wanted to be constructive
and was "not being negative for the sake of being negative."
He agreed that Northeast Asia lacked the kind of multilateral
security institutions that existed in Europe, but argued that
the Six-Party process was not a good "fit" for addressing
issues such as China's expanding military capabilities, the
China-Taiwan issue, or the U.S.-Japan security alliance. He
advocated concentrating on confidence building mechanisms and
then identifying principles that would assist that focus. DG
Nishimiya said that while China may have warmed to the idea
of a ministerial meeting, it did not want to put sensitive
issues on the table. The views of South Korea also needed to
be addressed with care, he said, at least until after South
Korea's presidential election in December.


12. (C) PDAS Stephens responded that the U.S. was not
proposing to create a separate process outside the Six-Party
Talks and that we agreed the NEAPSM should not detract from
denuclearization, but rather reinforce it. She explained
that if Six-Party talks achieved success on denuclearization
and normalization of relations among the parties, then there
was a hope, or a vision, that the Six-Party process could
develop into a multilateral forum to address other regional
security issues. She made clear that the U.S. did not have a
roadmap at this point. But, in Washington's calculus, she
observed, discussing a framework for the long-term security
interests of the region was not only possible, but desirable.



13. (U) PDAS Stephens has cleared this cable.
SCHIEFFER