Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TOKYO1681
2007-04-18 02:21:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

(S) JAPAN SEEKS ASSURANCES ON EXTENDED DETERRENCE

Tags:  PREL MARR PGOV PNUC JA 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #1681/01 1080221
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 180221Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2722
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
S E C R E T TOKYO 001681 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

OSD/APSA FOR LAWLESS/HILL; COMUSJAPAN FOR J00/J01/J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2022
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV PNUC JA
SUBJECT: (S) JAPAN SEEKS ASSURANCES ON EXTENDED DETERRENCE

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, Reasons: 1.4 (B/D)

S E C R E T TOKYO 001681

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

OSD/APSA FOR LAWLESS/HILL; COMUSJAPAN FOR J00/J01/J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2022
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV PNUC JA
SUBJECT: (S) JAPAN SEEKS ASSURANCES ON EXTENDED DETERRENCE

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, Reasons: 1.4 (B/D)


1. (S/NF) Summary: During April 11-12 meetings with visiting
P/DASD (Asia Pacific) Jim Shinn, Japanese officials asked the
USG to publicly and privately reiterate its commitment to
defend Japan, including with nuclear weapons. Ministry of
Defense (MOD) Vice Minister Takemasa Moriya said that DPRK
nuclear and missile tests have given the Japanese public a
sense of real threat for the first time. Moriya attributed
Japanese questions about the U.S. nuclear umbrella to unease
with the direction of U.S. North Korea policy. MOFA and MOD
officials praised Secretary Rice's October reassurances that
the U.S. would respond with all means available should Japan
be attacked. Nevertheless, they expressed frustration that
this message has not been repeated in other channels.
Japanese officials asked the U.S. to use the upcoming Summit
meeting and bilateral military planning activities to
reinforce the U.S. commitment. Chief Cabinet Secretary
Yasuhisa Shiozaki acknowledged Japan's concerns about being
left isolated in the Six-Party Talks process, but said that
the general public has not made a connection with extended
deterrence. End Summary.

Seeking Affirmation
--------------


2. (S/NF) Concerns over the validity of the U.S. nuclear
umbrella were raised separately by MOD Vice Minister Moriya
and senior working level MOFA and MOD officials during April
11-12 meetings with visiting P/DASD Jim Shinn. MOD Defense
Policy Deputy Director General (DDG) Hironori Kanazawa and
MOFA North American Affairs DDG Kazuyoshi Umemoto delivered a
formal, and specific, request for U.S. action to Shinn on the
margins of the April 11 Defense Policy Review Initiative
(DPRI) Principals meeting.


3. (S/NF) Kanazawa said that in the wake of DPRK nuclear and
missile test activities in 2006, the Japanese public is
uneasy over how firm the U.S. commitment actually is.
Kanazawa praised Secretary Rice's public affirmation on the

U.S. nuclear umbrella in the immediate wake of the October,
2006 nuclear test. He expressed disappointment, however,
that this message has not been repeated since that time,
especially by U.S. military officials. While Japan does not
require "details" on U.S. operational decisionmaking,
Kanazawa said that Tokyo does expect policy-level officials
to regularly acknowledge the U.S. willingness to employ its
nuclear forces in Japan's defense. MOFA DDG Umemoto
interjected that policy-level reassurances should be
accompanied by closer consultations at the policy and
operational levels.


4. (S/NF) Kanazawa emphasized that the Japanese government
seeks to maintain its current military force structure, but
asserted that this posture can only be sustained if Japan can
count on firm commitments from the U.S. on extended
deterrence. He added that "loose talk" from politicians
notwithstanding, Japan has no intention to pursue an
indigenous conventional or nuclear strike capability.

A Growing Gap: In Perception or Interests?
--------------


5. (S/NF) In a separate meeting with P/DASD Shinn, MOD
Administrative Vice Minister Moriya asserted that the
Japanese public for the first time sees North Korea's nuclear
and missile programs as a direct threat to Japan's national
security and existence. The only way to address these fears,
he continued, is to convince the public that the U.S. will
defend Japan effectively. Moriya urged the U.S. to use both
public venues, including the upcoming Summit meeting, and
bilateral operational planning activities to convey
"concrete" commitments to defend Japan against
non-conventional threats. As an example, Moriya suggested
that the U.S. specify Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) assets,
such as PAC-3 battalions and Aegis vessels, to be deployed to
Japan in a crisis.


6. (S/NF) Moriya stated that Japanese unease about extended
deterrence is linked to concerns over an apparent gap in
priorities and perceptions regarding North Korea. U.S.
gestures to showcase the strength of the alliance following
the October, 2006 DPRK nuclear test greatly reassured the
Japanese public, Moriya added. However, many in Japan were
confused over the subsequent U.S. decision to "lift
sanctions" on Pyongyang.


7. (S/NF) Moriya suggested that it was a change in the U.S.
attitude, not Pyongyang's, that has facilitated progress in
the Six-Party Talks. Moriya said that it appears to many in
Japan that the sudden willingness to accommodate Pyongyang is
related to the burden of military operations in Iraq. Moriya
referred several times to recent testimony by Joint Chiefs of
Staff Chairman Gen. Pace suggesting that deployments to Iraq
have limited U.S. options to respond to provocations from
North Korea.

Historical Parallels: Fmr. DefMin Nukaga's Views
-------------- ---


8. (S/NF) Former Defense Minister Fukushiro Nukaga told
P/DASD Shinn that calls last autumn by senior ruling party
leaders for a debate on possessing nuclear weapons were a
predictable outcome of the DPRK nuclear test. Nukaga said
that the U.S. should not be overly concerned about Japan's
questions about nuclear use policy. Extended deterrence is
obviously a fundamental aspect of the alliance and it is
natural for Japan to seek clarity on U.S. intentions. While
Japan is looking at new security roles for itself, Nukaga
emphasized that obtaining nuclear weapons would undermine
Tokyo's own security interests.


9. (S/NF) Nevertheless, Nukaga said that recent events have
increased interest in developing independent defense
capabilities. Nukaga drew a parallel between the current
situation and 1964, when he asserted that then-Prime Minister
Eisaksu Sato informed the U.S. Ambassador of Japan's
intention to go nuclear in response to China's first nuclear
test. At the time, Nukaga said that the U.S. government
urged Japan not to exercise the nuclear option and instead
invest in helping the U.S. win the space race with the Soviet
Union. Ultimately, the U.S. offered Japan access to rocket
technologies in exchange for dropping its nuclear plans.
Nukaga added, however, that the episode led Japan to embark
on its own indigenous rocket fuel development program and
spurred action on other bilateral issues, including Okinawa
reversion.

Shiozaki: Public Worried about 6PT, Not Extended Deterrence
-------------- --------------


10. (S/NF) In a separate meeting with P/DASD Shinn, Chief
Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki underscored the Japanese
government's deep unease about the direction of the current
Six-Party Talks and risk that Japan could be left exposed.
However, he said that so far at least, notions of extended
nuclear deterrence do not seem to have been grasped by the
general public. Shiozaki himself did not explicitly connect
extended deterrence with North Korea strategy.
SCHIEFFER