OVERVIEW OF THE ALBANIAN INTELLIGENCE

S E C R E T TIRANA 001090

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

BELGRADE ALSO FOR PODGORICA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL AL
SUBJECT: OVERVIEW OF THE ALBANIAN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES

REF: TIRANA 949

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES STEPHEN A. CRISTINA
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(C) AND (D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (S) Albania's intelligence services, the
Military Intelligence Service (SHIU) and the Albanian
State Intelligence Service (SHISH),have improved
their capabilities and are close partners with the
USG. During the visit of President Bush, in the
support they provide for troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and in their close cooperation in the
Global War on Terrorism, Albania's intelligence
services have demonstrated their capabilities and
willingness to assist the USG in any way requested.
Despite progress, the intelligence services continue
to be hampered by drastic budget shortfalls and some
attempts at political manipulation. The USG
maintains a close and cooperative relationship with
both services who are excellent partners in pursuing
US intelligence objectives. END SUMMARY.

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The Services
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2. (S) SHIU: The SHIU is the military intelligence
branch that is responsible for battlefield
intelligence, analysis, and some basic foreign
intelligence gathering. SHIU uses military attaches
assigned to Albanian diplomatic missions as its
primary foreign intelligence gathering capability,
which is therefore limited as the attaches are not
trained in specific intelligence gathering functions.
The SHIU is not discussed in detail in this cable
because of its limited national-level intelligence
role and function.


3. (S) SHISH: The SHISH is the descendant of the
communist era intelligence service known as the
"sigurimi" that was the enforcement tool of the
communist regime. The SHISH has adapted well to the
post-communist world and has become a professional,
largely apolitical intelligence service. The SHISH
conducts both domestic and foreign intelligence
operations but is focused on the internal threat,
primarily related to organized crime, corruption, and
the like. SHISH personnel are well trained and are
assigned to five branches: Technical Operations,
Foreign Intelligence, Counter Espionage, Counter
Organized Crime, and Counter Terrorism. Although
senior management of the SHISH is generally
motivated, the institution as a whole is not highly
motivated and has little altruistic or patriotic zeal
for its work.

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Key Performance Measures
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4. (S) Organized crime: The SHISH has made
excellent progress against organized crime (OC)
targets but is hampered by legal constraints, chiefly
Albania's broad legal immunity for government
officials. The SHISH is aggressive in targeting
organized crime suspects, but many times mustt cease
investigations that are tied to officials with
immunity. (NOTE: All members of Parliament,

Ministers, Judges (trial, appellate, Constitutional,
and Supreme Courts),Central Election Commission
members, the People's Advocate, and the Chairman of
the High State Control (an independent body) enjoy
Constitutional immunity from prosecution for all
criminal offenses. END NOTE.) Because of this,
there is great incentive for OC figures to obtain
positions of power in government. SHISH is limited
to information gathering and has no arrest authority.
SHISH gathers and passes information on OC and
narcotics trafficking to the Albanian State Police
for further investigation and arrest.


5. (SBU) War Crimes: Albania has no known war
criminals, and has assisted in providing information
on wanted persons in Serbia and Bosnia when
information was available.


6. (S) Politicization: The senior ranks of the SHISH
understand the need to remain apolitical and in the
last few years have fought to maintain professional
independence. According to the Albanian Constitution,
the Director of SHISH is appointed by the President
of the Republic and is independent from the executive
branch (the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers).
Ensuring the independence of this position has,
however, proven difficult. After his election as
Prime Minister in 2005, Sali Berisha tried to replace
the current SHISH director with a political
supporter, which resulted in a lengthy battle between
the President, the PM, and the SHISH Director.
Direct USG intervention eventually ensured that the
Director (Bahri Shaqiri, a highly professional and
valuable contact) was allowed to remain. To this
date, Berisha has refused to meet with Director
Shaqiri, even in the context of official visits of
SHISH counterpart personnel.


7. (S) Known militants of the governing Democratic
Party (DP) with direct ties to the Prime Minister
were appointed as the current SHISH Chief of
Personnel and in the Office of Inspector General
(OIG). The Personnel Chief has orchestrated certain
appointments and hirings that do not meet SHISH's
professional development goals, although Director
Shaqiri theoretically has the final decision on all
hiring. On-going financial cuts, recently drastic in
nature, have inhibited SHISH's ability to conduct its
work and are perceived by some in the agency as an
attempt to influence its behavior. Despite these
challenges, there is little evidence that the
majority of SHISH personnel have succumbed to
specific political influence. The two overt
political appointees in SHISH (OIG and Personnel
Chief) do not have access to operational information.


8. (C) The Parliament has a limited role in
oversight of the SHISH through the Parliamentary
National Security Commission (NSC). There is some
public and private discourse in Parliament about
increasing this oversight role and establishing some
form of intelligence commission, but thus far it has
not materialized into any concrete plan. The
relationship between SHISH and the current NSC
appears to be cordial and cooperative across party
lines. Indeed, Albanian politicians outside the
executive branch appear to recognize and value the
agency's new apolitical and professional performance.


9. (S) Penetration: The SHISH and SHIU are not known
to have any high level penetrations, despite wide
public perception among Albanians that the SHISH is

"full" of members of the former communist
intelligence service (the "sigurimi") and OC figures.
From a USG perspective, there are few individuals
that have remained with the organization after the
end of the communist period, and those that have are
generally capable partners. There are several
incidents where investigations on OC have stalled due
to unknown circumstances or have not turned up
evidence that was suspected, suggesting that there
may be some low-level penetration of the SHISH by OC
elements, but we are unable to detect any suggestions
of this above low levels.


10. (S) Cooperation with USG: Both SHISH and SHIU
are excellent partners with the USG. There is close
cooperation on all intelligence activities including
OC, Kosovo and other issues of regional stability,
and on counterterrorism. As with the GOA across the
board, Albanian intelligence services go beyond the
normal call of duty to demonstrate loyalty and
partnership to the U.S. This was recently
demonstrated by the unwavering, all-out cooperation
in preparation for the June 10, 2007, visit by
President Bush, the first of any sitting U.S.
President and an event of a scale Albania had not
previously witnessed.

COMMENT


11. (S) New President Bamir Topi appears to support
the current SHISH director fully, which is
encouraging. Berisha's recent success in removing the
Prosecutor General (reftel) provokes the question
whether the PM will renew efforts to remove the SHISH
director. Seeing the SHISH retain its apolitical
stance is clearly a high priority and a key test of
Berisha's intentions, in terms of USG interests. As
long as SHISH's growing professionalism is not
undermined, we can count on a cooperative partner in
international intelligence operations for the
foreseeable future. Reinforcement from Washington
with high-level GOA contacts of the need for an
independent, professional, and adequately funded
intelligence service would assist us in maintaining
the integrity of this important partner.

CRISTINA