CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000804

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR LEDDY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE
WEEK ENDING APRIL 27

REF: THE HAGUE 741

This is CWC-39-07.

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P-5 Meeting on Universality
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1. (U) Status of efforts toward Middle East Universality: UK
Ambassador Parker opened the meeting with a briefing on the
recent meetings in Cairo. DG Pfirter met with Egyptian MFA
officials as well as members of the NGO Council on Foreign
Relations, but found no sign of movement towards adherence to
the Convention. In fact, the DG was surprised at the very
negative views expressed by the MFA and the actively hostile
response from the NGO.


2. (U) The UK next raised the recent exchange in The Hague
between the DG P5 other Ambassadors with an Israeli
delegation headed by Miriam Ziv (reftel). All of the P5
ambassadors agreed that the meeting was extremely useful, and
that the Israelis presented a surprisingly tough position.
The advantage of the "bilateral" exchange was that the
Israeli delegation presented its reasoning to the OPCW: the
view in 1993 was quite different, and Tel Aviv believed that
accession was possible. However, the landscape has changed
and currently there is no possibility for Israel to adhere to
the Convention any time soon. The Israelis asked what
assurances and protections could be provided by the OPCW.
The U.S. noted that A/S Rood will raise the issue with senior
Israeli officials when they visit Washington.


3. (U) In Lebanon, the P5 is waiting to see if the report
that Beirut is ready to adhere, but is awaiting the
appointment of a Foreign Minister, is merely a technical
problem or is a political problem. The P5 debated the impact
Syria might be having on the process, noting that it could go
either way. Syria might use the Lebanese experience as a
tool to learn how the OPCW works in preparation for its own
eventual adherence. Or Syria might be using its influence to
obstruct the move towards adherence. There was discussion of
the possibility that the DG might visit Beirut to meet with
Lebanese leaders to lobby for its accession and to influence
decision makers in the OPCW's favor. With respect to Iraqi
adherence, the MFA is lobbying the Iraqi Parliament to
consider adherence to the CWC, but there is much on its
agenda and more time is necessary.


4. (U) With the exception of Russia, the P5 ambassadors
agreed that now is not the time to make a common P5 demarche.
Rather, it would be better to continue bilateral efforts and
to share information during regular exchanges. The U.S. and
the UK responded that it would be better to let the DG visit
Damascus first, to lobby for accession. China noted that a
P5 demarche should be used only for a final push when
conditions are favorable for success. At this time, it is
more constructive to have the DG invite a delegation from the
Mideast capitals to an exchange with P5 members in The
Hague. Including states other than those in the P5 would
make it less stressful for the visiting delegation and would
encourage frank discussion of the issues preventing
adherence.


5. (U) The U.S. noted that workshops have limited value for
future efforts on universality. The other ambassadors
agreed, with China adding that the workshops serve to
increase awareness of the OPCW. Once the public is aware of
the work of the OPCW, it will increase pressure for states
outside to join. All agreed that the DG visits to capitals
in conjunction with exchanges in The Hague are far more
likely to bring success than yet another universality
workshop.


6. (U),Finally, Russia requested that the RevCon be added to
the next P-5 agenda. UK Ambassador Parker noted that this
could create a conflict of interest for him as the chair of
the RevCon Working Group (RCWG),but that he had no objection
to a discussion on the deputy level. The ambassadors of
China and France also agreed. The U.S. said that it would go

back to Washington to check, but that on an informal deputy
level it could make a positive contribution. (Note: After
the meeting, Parker remarked that with the staff turnover
this summer (U.S., UK),this venue would help bring new
members up to speed. It also would help the UK keep France
in line, and it could be useful to keep China more on "our"
side rather than the NAM side of the issues. End Note.)


7. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL