CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE

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SIPDIS

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SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE
WEEK ENDING MARCH 23

This is CWC-29-07.

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REVCON PREPARATORY MEETING
--------------


1. (U) Ambassador Parker (UK) chaired a meeting of the
open-ended working group for the Second Review Conference on
March 23. The meeting covered the modalities for a possible
meeting of States Parties and NGOs (discussion continued from
the February 20 meeting),as well as activities not
prohibited under the Convention (Article VI). Parker had
scheduled the morning and afternoon for consultations, but
the consultation wrapped up after the morning session.
Having said that, the statements by various delegations were
much more robust than February's discussion on destruction.

NGO Meeting


2. (U) In his various interventions, Parker led delegates
toward a November date for the NGO meeting. He also
suggested that discussions on possible funding (from
voluntary contributions) be discussed with the Bureau and
then again at a later date, once the details have been worked
out so that SPs can react. He also explained that the
starting list for NGO invitations would be the list of who
participated in the First RevCon event, adding in new NGOs
who have shown interest in or contacted the OPCW. And he
encouraged delegations to help identify new NGOs.


3. (U) Parker proposed that the TS do the initial
data-gathering on invitations, that the Bureau discuss this
plan and its timing in its next meeting, and that the OEWG
plan to reach its decisions before the summer break. He
expressed some concern using "UN lists" of NGOs, as some NGOs
might be too specialized to make these lists. Parker also
stated that regional groups would receive invitations so they
could help ensure complete coverage. He also emphasized the
point that the envisioned presentation by the Scientific
Advisory Board, as part of its "forward-looking role", would
be to indicate progress since the First RevCon, rather than
to present a laundry list of recommendation they have made to
the TS which have not been picked up.


4. (U) The Indian ambassador expressed their willingness to
be flexible on a late-2007 date for the NGO meeting, although
their original preference was for something later. She also
expressed their discomfort with the SAB/NGO interface, not
wanting this session to turn into a chance for the NGOs to
find fault with the TS by focusing on those SAB
recommendations that are not picked up by the TS.


5. (U) The Cuban ambassador made a statement on behalf of
the NAM and China, stressing a full discussion of
participation of NGOs, encouraging a wide geographic
representation that focused on developing countries,
requesting an initial list of NGOs to be invited, and
ensuring that the issues to be discussed with NGOs be vetted.
Cuba later expressed support for the Chair's views on NGO
identification, invitation, etc., and shared India's concern
on the SAB portion of the meeting and the Chair's thoughts on
this.


6. (U) South Africa associated itself with the NAM statement,
and pointed to November 19 as a good date for the NGO
meeting. Sweden expressed a preference for the November 19
date for the NGO meeting. Mexico supported the possibility
of a stand-alone NGO meeting in November or December,
allowing more time for preparation. He also discussed the
need for equitable geographic distribution of the
participating NGOs and proposed preparing a financial plan to
allow this participation.


7. (U) Canada encouraged the widest possible participation
by NGOs, pointing to the value of this type of event to
educate NGOs on the OPCW, in addition to the OPCW learning
from the NGOs. In that light, he saw the SAB presentation as
useful in this education process and encouraged a broad

presentation, perhaps focusing on problem areas.


8. (U) Russia felt that too broad of representation by NGOs
would be unworkable and expressed support for the Chair's
original proposal. Tunisia proposed the creation of a
special fund from voluntary contributions to support
participation of representatives from developing countries.
Turkey thought a more general introduction to the aims of the
CWC might be helpful to begin the discussions with the NGOs.

Article VI


9. (U) To being these discussions, Parker reminded delegates
that his list of possible topics for the discussion was meant
only to spur thoughts and not meant to be exclusive. He also
introduced a summary prepared by the TS (dated 23 March 2007)
entitled "Working Group for the Preparation of the Second
Review Conference: List of Issues Formally Open."


10. (U) Del deployed guidance on this topic, introducing the
non-paper, which was distributed to delegations. In his
statement on behalf of the NAM and China, the Cuban
ambassador encouraged discussions on frequency of
inspections, OCPF site selection, and transfers.


11. (U) The German ambassador suggested that the Second
RevCon avoid carrying a long list of issues that perhaps are
no longer relevant, but that the list be prioritized for
consideration. They proposed that the top priorities be
implementation, timely and accurate declarations, inspection
frequency, OCPF site selection, and verification as a tool to
confidence-building.


12. (U) The Netherlands ambassador made a somewhat
philosophical statement on a number of topics: Article VI
implementation as a shared responsibility of National
Authorities and the TS; importance of NA interaction with
industry to assess relevance to the object and purpose of the
CWC; the role and value of sampling and analysis activities;
the role of the verification regime in nonproliferation;
encouraging SPs to assess their national implementation
measures and provide voluntary feedback to the TS; the
concern of "wasting" inspections by carrying them out at
sites that are no longer inspectable or of less relevance;
and looking to industry as our global partner, working to
improve contacts with them and proposing an industry advisory
board to the TS.


13. (U) The UK focused on developments in science and
technology and how this effects verification. He also
mentioned inspection numbers and the need to focus on OCPFs,
including resources for these and a selection methodology,
welcoming the DG's announcement during EC-48. He also
expressed a need for "better" information in OCPF
declarations to allow better inspection selections and to
avoid "wasted" inspections. He also referenced Jonathan
Tucker's paper on CWC verification "holes". (Note: The Chair
mentioned that the TS was making the Tucker paper available
on the external server.) He also mentioned the importance of
timely and complete declarations.


14. (U) Canada made a rather strong intervention on this
topic. They pointed to Articles VI, X, and XI as the
post-destruction focus of the CWC. He stated that the Second
RevCon should do better than the First in addressing industry
issues. He proposed the possibility of ad hoc working
groups, with support of experts, to address various industry
issues (e.g., change of ownership of plant sites). He also
mentioned: disappointment in our inability to agree to low
concentration levels for 2A/2A* chemicals; desire that we
find an OCPF site selection methodology that incorporates all
elements; need for more specific information on technical
characteristics of OCPF plant sites; need for wide use of
electronic declarations, taking into account sufficient
confidentiality; and the importance of Article VII

SIPDIS
implementation in strengthening Article VI.


15. (U) Mexico expressed his opinion that verification

should be based on concerns, made reference to the DG's EC-48
announcement regarding the OCPF site selection methodology
and concerns with the current methodology, and referenced the
upcoming TS documents about inspection frequency. (Note: In
subsequent discussions with the Mexican delegate, del rep
learned that Mexico's earlier offer to draft some thoughts on
inspection frequency resulted in a list of documents they are
requesting that the TS prepare on a number of related topics.)


16. (U) Japan expressed a desire to see progress made on
many of the topics on the Chair's list, including OCPF site
selection, sampling and analysis, and declarations. She also
noted the low overall inspection rate of industry sites and
the importance of risk assessment to valuable verification.
She also mentioned the importance of how confidential
information is handled to avoid unnecessary criticism of the
chemical industry.


17. (U) South Africa stated their preference that
verification issues that remain unresolved should flow
naturally into the RevCon. He also mentioned the importance
of equitable geographical distribution of inspections, the
need to improve the quality of verification along with
quantity, and the impact of verification on industry in
developing SPs. He also said that lessons learned from
"wasted" inspections should be used to improve declarations
in general.


18. (U) The Indian ambassador noted positively that the most
heavily-industrialized SPs have legislation and other
implementation measures and that progress has been made on
initial declarations. She encouraged continued TS support of
SPs on initial declarations. She encouraged continued
progress on Industry Cluster issues, with unresolved issues
spilling over to the RevCon. She said that further TS input
is needed on increases in OCPF inspections and developments
in science and technology. She has concerns that the
increases in OCPF inspections and supporting information be
tied together, and emphasized that the idea of risk from
OCPFs is not defined in the CWC, as it is clearly done for
Scheduled chemicals.


19. (U) Iran expressed his opinion that there is a clear
link between Articles VI and XI and that ways need to be
explored where developing SPs can be helped within Article
VI. He stated that the primary focus of the CWC is
destruction, followed by the peaceful uses within industry.
He finds the balance hard to make when SPs are lagging in
their destruction. He also mentioned the need to address
Schedule 3 transfers during the RevCon.


20. (U) The Chinese ambassador stated that she sees a need
to address in the RevCon the balance in the CWC around
verification. She also felt a need to discuss in the RevCon:
timely and accurate declarations; assistance and cooperation
for developing SPs; careful review of data provided; review
of inspection experience to date; risk and relevance to the
CWC; inspection frequency; role of the EC in overseeing the
verification regime; and outstanding issues (e.g., OCPF site
selection, 2A/2A*).


21. (U) Russia stated that declarations must be improved.
He also talked about the impact of advances in science and
technology and the balance of OCPF inspection numbers with
destruction through 2012.

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POSSIBLE REORGANIZATION WITHIN THE TS
--------------


22. (SBU) Gary Mallard (Head, OPCW Laboratory) visited the
Del to discuss a possible reorganization within the TS that
is of some concern. He said there was discussion within the
TS of the possibility of moving the OPCW Equipment Store from

SIPDIS
under Technical Support Branch (TSB) to the Operations and
Planning Branch (OPB) within the Inspectorate. The Store
would stay physically at the facility in Rijswijk, but the
Manager would be moved to the main OPCW building.

Apparently, this was tried in the past and was not
successful. There is some interface between the Store and
the Lab, and this would make that more difficult. Also, it
would be difficult for the Store Manager to execute his
responsibilities from afar.


23. (SBU) The speculation as to the reason behind this
possible move is that there is concern about keeping a
D-level position within the Inspectorate for Japan.
Apparently, there is significant concern that Japan will not
be able to come forth with a suitable candidate for the
Director of the Inspectorate upon Ichiro Akiyama's departure.
There may be somewhat more certainty in the possibility of
securing a Japanese replacement for Shigeyuki Urano (Head,
OPB) upon his departure. The thought is that, by moving the
Store and its staff under OPB, there would be enough
justification for making the Head of OPB a D-level position.


24. (SBU) Mallard came to the Del to make us aware of the
situation and to get advice on how to deal with it. He said
that he has been asked by his management to prepare a
counter-proposal to this change. Del reps replied that if
Japan is concerned about maintaining a suitable high-level TS
position, the more sensible solution is for Japan to find a
suitable candidate to replace Akiyama. The Rijswijk facility
seems to be operating very well, even under the new pressures
of supporting Schedule 2 inspections with sampling and
analysis, and the change under consideration is of very
questionable value.


25. (SBU) If the decision is made to pursue this change,
this would have to be part of a budget proposal, and would
likely generate a number of questions from delegations, for
which it did not appear the TS had good answers. At a
minimum, it would be likely that delegates would ask the
Office of Internal Oversight to assess the need for such a
change. Del reps advised Mallard that he might wish to
convey any of all of these observations as part of TS
deliberations of this proposed change.

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WEOG DISCUSSION ON IRAN
--------------


26. (U) At the March 20 WEOG, Ambassador Javits raised the
issue of how to deal more effectively with Iran's
obstructionist behavior, particularly in light of Iranian
behavior at the late night EC session of March 16. The
Ambassador's comments led to an extensive discussion of the
issue. He observed that after it was clear that all of the
delegations in the EC were on board with the EC report
language concerning Albanian destruction efforts, it would
have been helpful if some of our WEOG colleagues had
intervened to support the compromise language that Russia,
the U.S. and Albania had supported. The Ambassador stressed
that this would have reinforced Iran's isolation and possibly
led to a quicker resolution of the issue. It also probably
would have helped the Iranian del impress upon its minders
from Teheran the total and complete isolation of Iran.


27. (U) Several delegations including France and Germany
responded, rather defensively, that they had intervened
earlier in the debate. Others including Australia and
Ireland said that they would have been more inclined to have
intervened had they known more about the state of play of the
negotiations. Their point was that as they did not know the
exact state of play, they were unsure whether a particular
comment would have been a help or a hindrance. Canada said
that they felt that having more delegations speak up in
support of the consensus text might have been
counter-productive, as some NAM delegations that had not
supported Iran might have felt compelled to support Iran if
it was felt that WEOG was "ganging up" on a fellow NAM SP.


28. (U) The UK and Switzerland shared the U.S. view that it
would have been helpful if other delegations had spoken up,
at a minimum, to have expressed support for the
Russia/U.S./Albanian text. Switzerland observed that other

regional groups including the GRULAC and Eastern European
group were also very unhappy with Iran's obstructionism.


29. (U) Almost all of the WEOG delegations agreed that
greater efforts are needed to be made to keep delegations not
involved in negotiations on the margins of the EC up to date
with the state of play of the negotiations. This would make
it easier for delegations to offer support in the EC.
Christer Ahlstrom, the WEOG coordinator, was very supportive
of taking the initiative to work to keep WEOG dels informed.


30. (U) While a few delegations, most notably France, felt
that Ambassador Javits was being tough with other WEOG
delegations for their lack of vocal support, most delegates
told us that they believed the Ambassador's intervention was
timely and led to a frank yet very productive discussion.
Time will tell, but hopefully some delegations may be less
reluctant to speak up in the future. Past practice has
always been that delegations are upset at Iran's intransigent
behavior, but then do not take any action at subsequent
consultations or ECs. However, as last Friday's experience
was a new high (or low),perhaps there might be more of a
willingness to speak up. Del will also work harder to ensure
that other like-minded delegations are up to speed with
negotiations on the margins so as to facilitate their support
in the EC. Finally, as Russia is particularly upset with
Iran, del will stay in particularly close touch with them and
see if they can assist in restraining Iran.


31. (U) Javits sends.
BLAKEMAN