Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07THEHAGUE37
2007-01-09 16:13:00
SECRET
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

NETHERLANDS/IRAN: UPDATE ON AVIATION SERVICES

Tags:  PARM MTCRE PREL ETTC IR NL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0014
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0037/01 0091613
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 091613Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7808
INFO RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000037 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/MTR, EUR/UBI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2017
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL ETTC IR NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/IRAN: UPDATE ON AVIATION SERVICES
INTERNATIONAL CASE

REF: A. 05 STATE 145292

B. 05 STATE 164496

C. 05 STATE 229063

D. 05 THE HAGUE 03397

E. 06 THE HAGUE 00302

F. 06 STATE 159373

G. 06 THE HAGUE 02139

Classified By: CDA Chat Blakeman, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000037

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/MTR, EUR/UBI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2017
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL ETTC IR NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/IRAN: UPDATE ON AVIATION SERVICES
INTERNATIONAL CASE

REF: A. 05 STATE 145292

B. 05 STATE 164496

C. 05 STATE 229063

D. 05 THE HAGUE 03397

E. 06 THE HAGUE 00302

F. 06 STATE 159373

G. 06 THE HAGUE 02139

Classified By: CDA Chat Blakeman, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (S) Summary: The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs has
issued a new WMD-related "catch all" under the MTCR in
connection to Aviation Services International's attempts to
circumvent Dutch and EU export restrictions. However, Dutch
legislation does not prohibit conventional military sales to
Iran, which could be exploited as way to circumvent Dutch
WMD-related export controls. While the new catch-all
requires Dutch companies to apply for an export license for
conventional military sales, it will be very difficult to
justify denying such a license and will require the
concurrence of a judge should the exporting company appeal
the denial. Moreover, the GONL has opened Aviation Services
International crates currently suspended from export to Iran
and found U.S. conventional military equipment. MFA Senior
Advisor for Nuclear and Nonproliferation Affairs Ceta Noland
provided this update to polmiloff on January 5. End summary.

The Good News...
--------------


2. (S) Noland said the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MEA)
recently issued a new WMD-related "catch-all" under the MTCR,
primarily aimed at suspending exports from Aviation Services
International (ASI) to Iran. Per reftel, ASI has tried on
several occasions to export unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
technology to Iran. Noland noted that the new catch-all was
purposely written in broad terms to compel ASI to apply for a
license for any export. She said over 150 ASI exports to
Iran have subsequently been suspended, and that ASI has hired
a "very aggressive" lawyer to apply for licenses.

The Bad News...
--------------


3. (S) Even with the new catch-all, however, Noland
identified a potential loop-hole in preventing potential WMD
components from reaching Iran. She explained the new

catch-all compels companies to apply for an export license
for items that could be used in WMD-related equipment, such
as UAVs. But unlike the United States or the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands does not have legislation prohibiting
conventional military sales to Iran. Noland said the new
catch-all is general enough that companies such as ASI would
still need to apply for an export license on even
conventional military components. Yet denying a license for
such items would be difficult to justify under Dutch law as
theoretically they are intended for conventional military
purposes.


4. (S) Noland said the MEA could still deny a conventional
military export under the argument that the component could
be used for WMD purposes. However, the MEA must then rely on
a concurring judge's ruling -- by no means a given -- should
an export company appeal the MEA's decision. Noland said any
appeal will be risky -- the MFA and the MEA are not confident
the Dutch legal system as it currently stands will provide
fool-proof prevention of conventional military parts from
reaching Iran.

The Ugly?
--------------


5. (S) In addition, Noland said the MEA has opened crates of
ASI suspended exports to Iran. According to Noland, some of
the crates include U.S. conventional military equipment,
clearly stamped with warnings not to export to Iran. She
could not explain how the equipment had ended up with ASI,
especially given U.S. third-party transfer legislation --
perhaps ASI acquired the U.S. equipment through a number of
"middlemen" companies. Noland said ASI fully intends to
export this equipment to Iran -- close to bankruptcy, ASI
subsists entirely from its exports to Iran and has nothing to
lose. She noted that the MEA will deny ASI an export license
for this conventional military equipment, but it will be very
difficult to obtain a judge's concurrence, given the lack of
a Dutch conventional military sales embargo on Iran.


6. (S) Noland suggested the USG "must know" ASI has U.S.
conventional military equipment and intends to export it to
Iran, and questioned whether the USG was running an operation
to determine the equipment's end-user. At the very least,
she argued that the USG should be able to track the equipment
from ASI through various middlemen companies back to its
source of origin in the United States. She reiterated that
the Dutch do not possess legislation prohibiting conventional
military sales to Iran -- better the USG "nip the source at
the bud," she said, than rely on the flawed Dutch legal
system to prevent the export.

Comment
--------------


7. (S) Noland was unable to identify or provide tracking
numbers for the alleged U.S. conventional military equipment,
but we have no reason to doubt her claims. POL is working
with other agencies at post, which are attempting to verify
the claim and obtain equipment tracking numbers from Dutch
intelligence agencies.

BLAKEMAN