CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000313

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR LEDDY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE
WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 16

This is CWC-16-07.

--------------
UNIVERSALITY - P-5 AMBASSADORS MEETING
--------------


1. (SBU) On February 12, the P-5 Ambassadors met to discuss
universality efforts. Following welcoming remarks by Amb.
Javits, DG Pfirter provided an update on universality
efforts. On the three Caribbean non-SPs, the DG said he had
specifically mentioned the Bahamas, Barbados and the
Dominican Republic in UN discussions last year. Barbados and
Bahamas provided a written response indicating that they are
moving forward. Barbados said the decision to accede is
completed, and they need an assessment on implementation
requirements. The DG noted that the Technical Secretariat
has offered to send a technical assistance team. A TS team
would also be sent to the Bahamas.


2. (SBU) As for the Dominican Republic, the DG noted that
they have signed the CWC, and Amb. Javits has been contacting
senior individuals to get them to complete the accession
process. The DG indicated he would make a personal approach
if that were needed, however, he thought action by the DR
might not be until the second half of the year. Pfirter
noted that he has also used the OAS meeting in Washington
last December to press these non-SPs, and the OAS Secretary
General had committed to assist in pressing these states.


3. (SBU) On Africa, the DG noted that Somalia clearly is not
in a position to take any decisions. On Guinea-Bissau,
France has helped apply pressure, and Portugal has also said
it will provide help. The DG then noted that Angola may be
the least promising non-SP in this region, and they have sent
mixed signals on their willingness to accede. On the Middle
East, the DG noted that he was in Jerusalem in 2006 and was
not ready to say that there are no prospects for progress
concerning Israel. Pressure and contacts should be
maintained on all states in the region. The CWC should not
be held up by other unsolved regional issues, not should it
be held in abeyance until all WMD issues are resolved (as has
been argued by Egypt).


4. (SBU) Lebanon has taken the legislative step and is now
waiting for a Foreign Minister to send the instruments of
accession. The DG noted that it was critical that all
parties in Lebanon supported this action. The DG noted that
Egypt had sent observers to the December Conference of States
Parties, and that he will be visiting Egypt in April under an
invitation from a foreign policy council. He will also have
meetings at the Egyptian MFA, which hopefully indicates Egypt
has made the decision to continue contacts. On Syria, the DG
saw no glimmer of hope. There had been a meeting in New
York, at which Syria merely restated its old position,
linking all WMD issues. And while Syria sent someone to the
Rome universality workshop, it did not send an observer to
the CSP.


5. (SBU) On the Rome event, the DG noted that it was a
success, and there should be similar meetings in the future
to press non-SPs, and to show the OPCW commitment to
universality. The next workshop would be in the second half
of 2007 and planning is under way. Possible venues would be
France, Spain or Turkey. The DG broached the idea of
possibly organizing it in a North African state, but the
question is whether one could be found that would invite
Israel. The DG added that whatever the venue, he would be
looking for the P-5 to provide support in pressing non-SPs to
attend. The DG concluded his statement by addressing North
Korea, commenting that while the UNSC resolution addressed
all WMD programs in the DPRK, he recognized that the nuclear
issue would have to be resolved before any other issues could
be addressed.


6. (SBU) The discussion then turned to the universality
action plan, which technically ends at the November CSP. UK
Amb. Parker noted that it would be "sterile" to roll over the
action plan. Returning to the DG's comments, the UK thought

it might be optimal to work out a lobbying strategy from the
TS, or address the Directors General of relevant regional and

SIPDIS
other organizations. The UK suggested that after Lebanon
completes accession, it might be best to focus on Egypt, as
it may be necessary to further isolate Syria. More
generally, the UK noted that one possibility is somehow
connecting and utilizing the 10th anniversary commemorations,
the CSP and the 2008 Review Conference together to rededicate
SPs to the goal of achieving universality.


7. (SBU) The DG then noted that in October, there will be an
item in the First Committee on the 10th anniversary. Poland
and the Netherlands will lead this effort, and there is
consideration of a two-hour high-level meeting to highlight
universality. There might be a symbolic statement in which
the UN Secretary General might assist, and the DG noted that
the SYG had been invited to the 10th anniversary events.
Pfirter went on to state that UNSCR 1540 might be another
hook that could be utilized as well as resolutions condemning
terrorism.


8. (SBU) The UK asked whether the UN resolution,
traditionally submitted by Poland, could be sharpened.
Russian Amb. Gevorgian commented that it is difficult to
change the text that has been passed routinely for many
years. French Amb. Gaussot and Chinese Amb. Xue agreed with
Russia on the difficulty of getting new, sharper text. The
French then noted that it really does not seem possible to do
anything on Syria right now. The Chinese commented that
bilateral or regional efforts would be most productive to
continue dialogue and engagement, and supported TS workshops.


9. (SBU) Pfirter opined that setting a target of 4-5 new SPs
in 2007 might be reasonable. The target was six in 2006, and
that had been met. Amb. Javits noted that a general
statement can be made at the CSP and possibly commentary on
some specific countries. For the RevCon, the decision has to
be taken on whether a target should be named.


10. (SBU) Finally, Russia asked that the P-5 return to the
issue of a joint demarche, which had last been discussed
quite a while ago. It would be necessary to assess if the
timing is right and if the format is acceptable. The UK
noted that everyone agreed in 2006 that the timing was not
right. China flatly said that it doubts the wisdom of a
common demarche. They specifically questioned the
desirability of such an approach regarding Syria, Israel and
North Korea. Instead, China is pleased with the way the DG
is handling this matter. France also said that it doubted
that this is the right time for a common demarche in the
Middle East. This would not be as efficient as bilateral
discussions. Amb. Javits added that it is important to have
complete agreement before proceeding with something as
weighty as a common demarche. As such, it might be best to
be patient and be sure it is appropriate for such action.


11. (SBU) Russia responded that the Chinese comments show
why P-5 meetings are needed. The UK offered to hold the next
meeting, and there was consensus to try to schedule it around
April 16, before the DG makes his trip to Egypt.

-------------- --------------
INDUSTRY CLUSTER - OCPF SITE SELECTION METHODOLOGY
-------------- --------------


12. (U) Facilitator Luis Garcia (Spain) held consultations on
February 13 and 14 to further discuss his proposal and draft
decision documents. First, Garcia summarized the
developments in the consultations under his leadership.
Next, the Technical Secretariat presented the results of its
latest round of computations, done at the request of India.
Using the total number of 118 OCPF inspections from the
approved 2007 budget and the OCPF database as of January 2007
(73 states declared a total of 4957 OCPFs),the TS computed
the results for four scenarios (e-mailed to ISN/CB) and
interpreted the four outcomes.


13. (U) Delegations reacted strongly to the presentation,

noticing for the first time the significant impact the high
A14 values of their facilities had on their expected
inspection numbers. For example, South Africa had the same
expected number of inspections (about two) as did another SP
with 150 facilities, purely a result of the differing A14
values. China began by protesting the latest round of
calculations, noting a number of problems: the expected
number of Schedule 3 inspections was not included, the
treaty-mandated cap on Schedule 3 and OCPF inspections was
not included, and the latest OCPF numbers were not used
(Note: China privately told del rep that the number of
Chinese OCPFs was about 400 facilities too high).


14. (U) Some delegations began to publicly question the
proposed methodology. Austria noted that because three of
its six facilities were PSF pesticide plants, its expected
number of inspections jumped significantly, consistent with
the expected numbers of a number of states with much larger
OCPF industries. Finally, China, Mexico and New Zealand
stressed the urgency of completing our work as soon as
possible, to ease the disproportionate burden on states with
smaller industries.


15. (U) Next, the facilitator led a discussion of the
operative section of his draft decision document.
Delegations generally cleaned up the text, eliminating
duplications (OP1 and OP3) and considering how best to
clarify a confusing paragraph instructing SPs how to make
their proposals. Finally, delegations discussed potential
deadlines and how best to ensure a consensus decision would
be implemented as soon as possible.


16. (U) Delegations only made it to the second item on the
agenda for the February 14 consultation: what elements should
be included in the anonymous list of plant sites. Garcia
began by stating that, in his personal opinion, the list
should not contain anything not mandated by the CWC, i.e., no
A14 values and no production range codes. The TS supported
this view. Germany also supported the facilitator, stating
that the alleged anonymity was just that - alleged. If the
A14 were provided, National Authorities soon could determine
which facilities were in which countries. France asked if
the TS planned to randomize the facility identification codes
every year, in order to protect their identities. Other
delegations protested, wondering what this might mean for the
element which allowed states' proposals to remain in effect
until modified. Brazil, India, Iran, France and South Africa
supported the view that additional information could not be
provided.


17. (U) Canada, supported by Australia, China, Italy, Mexico,
The Netherlands, and Pakistan, noted that Verification Annex
Section 9, paragraph 8 did not exclude distribution to SPs of
a plant's declared production range or whether the plant used
PSF. These variables should be provided as a basis for SPs
proposals. Finally, the UK noted that if variables were not
on the anonymous list, they could not be used to make
proposals, making the entire process silly. Switzerland made
an impassioned intervention, noting that it did not know
where the consultation was going. Were delegations working
to ensure that the most relevant sites would be inspected?
Or, were we working to remove, step-by-step, the very tools
needed to do so? The route at hand if approved would render
the entire exercise meaningless.


18. (U) Australia jumped in, noting that we are deadlocked,
and that the methodology at this juncture is at most
marginally better than the current system. Australia,
supported by Cuba, Iran, and the U.S., recommended that the
consultation "pause" for a time. Canada, supported by Iran,
reminded delegations that our mandate is to consider how to
implement paragraph 11(c),not the entire selection
methodology. Because delegations have expanded the mandate,
the consultation is getting bogged down. The facilitator,
supported by Mexico, noted that in his opinion, the
consultations should not take a break. We have a lot of work
remaining. The issue at hand is the anonymous list, and,
perhaps as a compromise, the A14 value should be provided.



19. (U) In response, New Zealand recommended that the TS
institute a temporary fix while the debate of how states
would make contributions to the selections continues. For
instance, New Zealand recommended that the first step be
modified to selection of OCPFs for each SP with probability
proportional to 1 1/2 sqrt (OCPFs) and the second step be
modified to selection of the facilities within the country
with probability proportional to 1 1/2 sqrt (A14).


20. (U) Germany reentered the fray by stating that all states
had agreed to the facilitator's proposal, and that the issue
at hand is the anonymous list. The U.S. responded that it
had agreed to discuss and consider the proposal, but the del
reps had never indicated that the U.S. supported the
proposal. Instead, the U.S. is becoming more convinced that
the facilitator's proposal is going down an unacceptable
path, making a pause to reflect on the goal of this exercise
critical.

--------------
INDUSTRY CLUSTER - TRANSFER DISCREPANCIES
--------------


21. (U) The February 13 consultation on this topic centered
on the definitions of import and export, as laid out in the
most recent co-facilitators' non-paper, dated 29 January

2007. One of the facilitators presented the details of the
non-paper, along with the various scenarios that were
presented therein.


22. (U) The discussion that followed highlighted the
complexity of the issue. There was considerable confusion
about the fact that this is intended to only affect Article
VI declarations and not meant to be an additional requirement
to existing national customs measures. The fact that was
pointed out, however, is that, even if this is meant to be
separate from customs, it certainly requires careful thought
about whether it should impact customs measures.


23. (U) India expressed its concern over the complexity of
the import/export issue, stating that this type of change
would require significant outreach efforts to industry and
traders to ensure that they understand their obligations.
The UK said that their recent discussions with industry show
favor for the current non-paper definitions, but they share
the same concerns as India about the ramifications of its
complexity.


24. (U) Switzerland and others pointed out that the resulting
data comes only from industry, and that customs only does
periodic spot-checks. Canada and other delegations were
quick to point out that such an action as proposed would not
limit discrepancies but, at best, reduce the number of
discrepancies. The facilitators acknowledged this point and
that this cannot be the goal of this consultation, as it is
an impossible task.


25. (U) Del rep reminded the delegates of the general support
expressed in an earlier consultation for the redefining of
what a discrepancy is - moving from a percent screen to one
based on corresponding treaty thresholds. The facilitators
said that, in light of the earlier, general support for the
redefinition, the TS had already put this into place, and
that the most recent round of clarification requests sent to
SPs were based on this new definition. There were several
delegations that were surprised by this, and Australia
expressed strong dissatisfaction that the TS had moved
forward unilaterally and so quickly.


26. (U) In closing, the facilitators asked that delegations
bring their proposals back to capitals to get reactions for
the next round of consultations.

--------------
INDUSTRY CLUSTER - LATE DECLARATIONS
--------------


27. (U) The focus of the February 14 consultation was: (1)
the November 3 draft decision language on "nil declarations"
prepared by the facilitator (Denyer, U.S.),and (2) example
reminder letters and notes verbale that SPs could use to make
"nil declarations."


28. (U) Several delegations gave minor editorial suggestions
to the text of the draft decision. Australia asked how the
decision might require SPs who are late submitting their
declarations (whether nil or otherwise) to provide the
reasons why. Options were discussed. Although supportive of
nil declarations, New Zealand expressed concern on the
success of small SPs in meeting these obligations. Others
also expressed concern about the potential "burden".
Switzerland suggested that, once a SP submitted a nil
declaration (or perhaps even a nil initial declaration),that
declaration could stand until amended. This would be
consistent with what is done for OCPF declarations. There
was also a suggestion by Turkey and others that the decision
be more specific as to what the TS should report and do with
the data gathered, including emphasis on future work to
address factors that contribute to late declarations.


29. (U) Although the discussion on the TS's example reminder
letters, etc. went well, there was some confusion about how
these documents would be used. The facilitator made it clear
that these documents were meant solely for helping the
delegations present understand options for putting a nil
declaration decision in place and that these documents would
not be annexes to or in any other way affect the decision
itself.


30. (U) The facilitator committed to making the minor
editorial changes requested, to try to address the more
general concerns expressed, and to try to distribute a
modified text fairly soon. Also, the facilitator will
provide a modified text to the TS in the upcoming days to
allow their comments, including the Legal Advisor's thoughts
on the requirement of "reasons."


31. (U) In a later meeting with the Japanese delegation, they
expressed concern about the burden of "nil declarations" on
small island states. The facilitator was able to address
some of his ideas for the next draft of the decision text and
how this dealt with their concerns.

-------------- --------------
INDUSTRY CLUSTER - ARTICLE VI RISK AND INSPECTION FREQUENCY
-------------- --------------


32. (U) As a result of the protracted debate on the 2007
program and budget, the Executive Council "decided to
undertake discussions, under the industry cluster, in 2007,
with the assistance of relevant experts of the Secretariat
and States Parties, on the main issues related to the
implementation of the verification regime established by
Article VI of the Convention, including, inter alia, the
frequency of inspections of the different categories of the
facilities to be inspected as required by the Convention."
With this in mind, Ambassador Dastis (Spain) chaired a
meeting on February 15 to open a dialogue on this topic. The
meeting was attended by the DG and DDG.


33. (U) In his opening remarks, the DG noted the following:
work on the 2008 program and budget had already begun; the TS
was preparing (as highest priority) a paper on Schedule 2
facilities, including inspection experience to date; and the
need to receive early direction from SPs.


34. (U) Bill Kane (Industry Verification) made brief opening
remarks in which he summarized the rather limited work that
has been conducted on this topic to date, referencing: the
October 2000 TS paper on the relative risk of Schedule 2
facilities (which methodology is still in use); the Schedule
3 selection decision of 1999; the urgent need for an OCPF
site selection decision; and the fact that the "inclusion of
additional declaration information" could be useful in
improving OCPF site selection. India and others supported

the T sharing of inspection experiences.


35. (U) Seveal delegations (including South Africa and
Mexic) discussed the inequity of the TS's current OCPF ite
selection methodology. South Africa (suppored by India)
also noted the need to balance any uture increases in OCPF
inspections with a new seection methodology. (Of note,
South Africa quesioned rhetorically that, if the decision is
to reduce the number of Schedule 2 inspections, what would be
done with the exta inspections?) Mexico expressed a need to
retun to the Schedule 2 inspection frequency assumptios,
noting that the "3 times in 10 years" approac in place was
meant for the least-risky facilitie and that the others
might need to be inspected ore often. Iran also asked for
background inforation on the methodology used for Schedule 1
faclities.


36. (U) Iran, supported by others, requsted the preparation
of a background paper by theTS on this topic. Although
willing to have suchmaterials prepared, the DG insisted that
SPs disuss this carefully to decide exactly what was needd,
as he felt that existing documents, includingthose prepared
during the budget discussions of lst fall, might be
sufficient (and he was concernd about limited TS resources).
Ambassador Javit suggested the preparation of an annotated
bibligraphy of applicable documents from the past that ight
help delegations organize this work, along wth making the
relevant documents available on th external server
(currently, available documentsonly go back to 2003). This
was widely supported, and the TS committed to providing the
bibliography.


37. (U) Canada noted that, given the long history of this
issue, our expectations on the outcome of these discussions
should be tempered. Even if common agreement could be found
on the "risky" characteristics of various facilities,
delegations would likely still have different ideas of what
characteristics should be of highest concern when making
inspection decisions. He encouraged this discussion to focus
not only on inspection frequency, but on the relative value
of subsequent inspections, given inspection experience.


38. (U) The meeting ended with Ambassador Dastis agreeing
that two more meetings would be held before the March EC.
The next meeting will be in two weeks, and the following
meeting will be during the first week of March, with details
on the discussions to be provided later.

-------------- --------------
MOST RECENT SCHEDULE 2 INSPECTION WITH S&A - THE UK
-------------- --------------


39. (U) During the February 13 WEOG meeting, the UK
delegation announced that they had recently completed a
Schedule 2 subsequent inspection that involved sampling and
analysis. The delegation said that things went fairly well,
noting the following points of interest:

- The inspection team left the analytical equipment running
until the very end of the inspection, just in case there was
a need to re-run an analysis. The result was a slight delay
in the end of the inspection, as they needed time to pack up
the analytical equipment.

- The host team did not run parallel analyses, but were
prepared to do so, if they felt they were needed. This
choice was made strictly because of the cost that would have
been involved.

- As was done during the Swiss and Chinese inspections, the
TS arranged in advance for the inspection equipment to be

SIPDIS
delivered directly to the site, where technical equipment
inspection was performed.

- Although this site has historically expressed serious
concerns regarding confidential business information (e.g.,
even the name of the plant site manager is "highly
protected"),the analyses were performed in open-mode.



40. (U) In further discussions with the UK delegation,
several other points were raised with del rep:

- The delegation was not certain exactly what arrangements
the TS had made to get the equipment to the site. They
speculated that the bulk of the equipment may have come by
truck through the Chunnel. However, given the Chunnel's
restrictions on compressed gases, these were flown into
Heathrow - not the normal point-of-entry.

- The delegation acknowledged that the TS arrangements
alleviated the National Authority's burden of having to
arrange transport of this equipment to the site. And, given
that the UK would be able to do that via truck, they
acknowledged that this would be much more difficult via air
transport in a State Party like the U.S.

--------------
GERMAN UNCERTAINTIES RESOLVED
--------------


41. (U) In a previous WEOG meeting, the German delegation
discussed a Schedule 2 inspection that had resulted in an
uncertainty because of the inspection team's inability to
"close the loop" on the material balance. In the February 13
WEOG meeting, the German delegation announced that this
uncertainty had been resolved.


42. (U) In further discussions with the German delegation,
del rep learned that the uncertainty was resolved by
follow-up "visit(s)" to the site by the TS, during which
additional records were provided. This was not done in the
way of another inspection, but rather some other arranged
visit. Clearly, this option was available to the TS, given
the relative nearness of the plant site. And the German
delegation seemed to feel that this was a satisfactory
solution. However, this could be seen as problematic as a
routine avenue for resolution of inspection uncertainties.

--------------
ARTICLE VII OUTREACH - THE PADILLA INITIATIVE
--------------


43. (U) On February 15, del reps (Sanders and Denyer) met
with a representative of the Japanese delegation (Kiwako
Tanaka) and a representative of the Japanese Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry (Takuya Igarashi),at their
request. The topics they wished to discuss were: (1)
Indonesia-Japan-Australia industry workshop on 26-27 February
in Jakarta; (2) U.S. initiatives to assist the "20-in-10"
States Parties; (3) assistance to East Asian States Parties;
and (4) assistance by means of promoting industry dialogue.


44. (U) The Japanese delegation expressed concern about the
size of Asia and their ability to tackle all of the SPs
therein. They said that they would only consider outreach
efforts for those SPs with national implementing legislation
(but where Article VII is not fully satisfied) in the
following order of priority: (1) East Asia - Indonesia, Laos,
Mongolia, the Philippines; (2) Central and South Asia -
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan; (3) West
Asia - Jordan, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates; and (4) small
island states - Fiji. Clearly, the Japanese focus is on East
Asia. When pressed, they said they were not likely to turn
their attention to their second priority - Central and South
Asia - until 2008. And, the expectation is that West Asia
and the small island states would not be addressed at all.


45. (U) After some discussion, the Japanese delegation said
that their Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered the
Philippines a promising target for assistance this year.
They have already talked about this with the Philippines, as
was reported in last week's cable. They did seem interested
in pursuing further discussions on joint assistance with the
U.S. and, potentially, Australia for efforts like this.


46. (U) The Japanese delegation was very interested in how

the APEC Chemical Dialogue might be used to forward Article
VII goals. Their only concern is whether the right people
would attend the Dialogue, noting that environmental and
safety personnel might not also handle CWC issues. Del rep
shared the U.S. experience during inspections, that often a
single representative at a site handles all regulatory
issues, including environmental and CWC concerns, but
conceded this might not always be the case at a corporate
level.


47. (U) The Japanese delegation also shared that South Korea
has expressed an interest in assisting other SPs in their
Article VII efforts. We concluded that future discussions
about Asia should probably include Australia and Korea.

--------------
EXTERNAL AUDITOR AND OIO REPORTS
--------------


48. (U) Facilitator Rick Snelsire (U.S.) called a meeting on
February 12 to discuss OPCW documents EC-47/S/4 on
Implementation of Recommendations of the External Auditor and
EC-47/DG.4 on Implementation of the 2005 Report of the Office
of Internal Oversight. The facilitator went through both
reports, and while acknowledging that the documents had
already been noted in the CSP report, said he wanted to
reinforce the precedent of holding consultations to discuss
all such reports.


49. (U) EC-47/S/4 -- The facilitator asked the TS to discuss
the progress of Results Based Budgeting (RBB). Budget chief
Rick Martin noted the TS has asked program managers to review
RBB and said they are adding their suggestions to the coming
year's budget. This is an effort to make the budget more
transparent. India asked if they will use the
performance-scorecard approach to targets, and the TS
indicated it will continue a narrative approach. Iran
questioned if the suggestion under the Travel Office to have
an in-house contracted travel agency with a comprehensive
agreement has been implemented. Martin said it had started
in January 2007, and in response to a question by Italy said
they are currently reviewing travel policies to make certain
their system is cost effective and efficient. In response to
a question from the facilitator, Martin said the next report
of the External Auditor will be out on March 15.


50. (U) EC-47/DG.4 -- There was little comment here. Iran
and India questioned whether the Dutch Accreditation Council
should be certifying that the OPCW, and in particular the
lab, are in compliance with ISO standards. The TS said this
certification was primarily focused on the lab. The next OIO
report will be issued in May. The facilitator noted there
will be another meeting soon after the next relevant report
is issued.

--------------
DONORS MEETING/GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
--------------


51. (U) Konstantin Gavrilov, the Russian Deputy PermRep,
invited delegations from the donors group to a February 16
meeting at the Russian Embassy. Ostensibly it was to brief
on the results of the January 23 meeting in Berlin of the
Working Group on Global Partnership. In fact, it turned out
to be a request for donors contributing to Russian CW
destruction efforts to bring an enhanced group of experts to
the March 12 donors meeting. However, Gavrilov undercut the
importance Russia attaches to this meeting by conceding that
it will be the usual working-level team from Moscow, and
not/not senior officials, such as deputy head of the Russian
Federal Agency for Industry, Viktor Kholstov.


52. (U) Noting that he had attended the Berlin meeting,
Gavrilov said there had been a general agreement for more
intense activity by the G-8 plus the larger group of donors.
He emphasized that 2007-2008 was important for Russia with
regard to getting destruction facilities up and running, and
commented that there were extensive discussions in Berlin on

CW destruction. Gavrilov then went through the numbers for
how much Russia has shelled out, and how much the donors have
promised and actually provided. He said the total amount
pledged was 45 million pounds and 9.7 million pounds had been
received. With regard to the U.S. number, he commented that
Parsons is estimated to get $20 million annually "just to be
the U.S. sub-contractor."


53. (U) Gavrilov then made the point to New Zealand, Italy
and others that the Russian view is that it would be better
to have bilateral agreements, rather than have them
"piggy-back" onto U.S. and other programs. He added that the
report from Moscow is that an agreement on a bilateral with
Italy is close. Annie Marie (France) reported that French
ratification of the bilateral agreement apparently could be
completed by the end of the month. Gavrilov said he
understood Russia had already ratified the bilateral with
France.


54. (U) Gavrilov closed by stressing that the Russian del is
ready to assist if any of the donors had questions or
encountered difficulties, and, if nothing else, would convey
the query to Moscow and try to get a response. Attendees
were Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, FRG, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, UK, and the U.S.


55. (U) Javits sends.
BLAKEMAN