CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000223

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR LEDDY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE
WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 2


This is CWC-11-07.

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RECENT MEDIA COVERAGE OF U.S. CW DESTRUCTION
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1. (U) In response to inquiries over the past several weeks,
del rep briefed WEOG on recent press articles concerning the
U.S. chemical weapons destruction program. With respect to
Dupont's recent decision not to treat the VX hydrolysate from
Newport, del rep explained that the program impact was still
being assessed, alternative options were being explored, and
that it is possible that the incineration sites may be able
to make up Newport's relatively small contribution to the 45%
milestone. Del rep also addressed articles generated by the
Nunn/McCurdy submission to Congress, which indicate
completion of destruction at the two sites remaining to be
constructed could be delayed until 2020 and 2023.


2. (U) Del rep offered a brief explanation of the
Nunn/McCurdy process to address questions delegations are
likely to have about the timing of release of this new
information, and why the figures are so different from those
submitted with the U.S. extension request. Del rep also
indicated that questions exist as to whether additional
funding now might significantly accelerate progress, and that
this issue of funding is to be distinguished from statements
made last year, which still hold true, that the U.S.
inability to complete destruction by 2012 cannot be altered
by increasing the program budget. Delegations had no
immediate questions, although the German representative later
indicated his hope that this was a political ploy to increase
program funding.

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ALBANIA CW DESTRUCTION
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3. (U) Although destruction operations at the Qaf-Molla CWDF
officially began February 1, due to significant program
delays, Albania has already missed its first two intermediate
deadlines (approved during CSP-11),and will miss its third
intermediate deadline and the final deadline, April 29, 2007,
established by the Convention for complete elimination of its
CW stockpile. Del rep met with the Albanian delegation and
senior members of the Verification division to discuss a
sensible, transparent way forward. There have been an
increasing number of questions concerning Albania's inability
to meet its recently established deadlines, and, regardless
of the relatively small scope of operations in Albania, it
seems unwise to set the precedent that further extensions of
intermediate deadlines are not required.


4. (U) A letter explaining the general nature of the delays,
and the fact that several weeks of operations will be
required before new deadlines can be credibly established,
will be submitted to the Technical Secretariat, along with a
request to make this information available to member states.
Del will work with the Albanian delegation and Washington to
ensure an extension request for the 45% and 100% deadlines is
submitted as soon as possible, and that maximum transparency
is provided in the interim.

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END POINT OF DESTRUCTION
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5. (U) Delegations are demonstrating an increasing interest
in returning to the issue of defining the End Point of
Destruction. Del rep, in discussions with the UK and WEOG
Coordinator Christer Ahlstrom, has recommended any discussion
of the topic in WEOG be preceded by a briefing from the TS on
current operations at the Maradykovsky CWDF, particularly in
light of the fact that the Russian Federation has yet to
table a draft facility agreement or verification plan for
this facility. Internal opinions at the TS as to the nature
of operations at this particular site range from serious
concern about the adequacy of measures being used to mutilate
the munitions, to a fairly high comfort level that reaction

mass and metal parts mutilation are being handled
appropriately.


6. (U) One thing is certain; the TS is not inclined to make
any political judgments as to whether or not the VX will be
considered destroyed after the first stage of treatment, and
simply intends to present a factual accounting, leaving the
politics of EPOD to the member states. The TS is, however,
drafting a paper on the topic for the DG, and some TS members
have indicated their belief that it might be appropriate to
return to the definition in light of current and future
practices and technologies to be used.


7. (U) Del rep will follow up with Ahlstrom and members of
the TS to encourage that a briefing be provided by the end of
the month. Del rep will also reassure States Party that the
U.S. does not intend to change its definition of EPOD, and
will claim destruction credit only after the second stage of
treatment. WEOG delegations, most notably the UK and
Germany, are likely to take a firm position supporting the
U.S. definition, given the uncertainty as to precisely what
technologies and secondary treatment methods will be employed
at future Russian facilities. While this issue may not be
specifically addressed at the March Executive Council, it
will certainly receive increasing attention as the Russian
20% deadline of April 29, 2007 approaches.

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90-DAY REPORTING REQUIREMENT
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8. (U) Delegation has now on several occasions been
approached by the TS regarding the U.S. intent to comply with
the 90-day reporting requirement stipulated in the Convention
as a condition for granting of an extension of the final
deadline for CW destruction. Most recently, Ambassador
Khodakov (Secretary of the Policy Making Organs) noted that
many important decisions regarding deadlines were taken
during CSP-11, and so he expects that the possessor states
will submit updates as required. Although it was assumed
earlier in the process that the destruction updates offered
during the destruction informal sessions preceding EC
meetings would likely suffice, this no longer appears to be
the case.


9. (U) Given the sometimes lengthy gaps between EC sessions,
and the general atmospherics surrounding not only the
granting of the extension request, but also recent news that
the U.S. is unlikely to complete destruction before 2023,
delegations are likely to expect strict compliance with this
reporting requirement. Del will quietly query the Russian
del, who has stated that provision of this information should
not be a problem for Moscow, to gauge the level of detail
Russia intends to provide. Del recommends Washington
consider what format and depth might be most appropriate and
be prepared to submit the first update before the end of
July.


10. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL