Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07THEHAGUE1979
2007-11-09 15:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: NORWEGIAN "NO"

Tags:  PGOV PREL NATO AF NL 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0669
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2720
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0326
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0118
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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001979 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

STATE FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/WE, SCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: NORWEGIAN "NO"
COMPLICATES EXTENSION PLANS

Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001979

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

STATE FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/WE, SCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: NORWEGIAN "NO"
COMPLICATES EXTENSION PLANS

Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: The GONL was disappointed -- but not
surprised -- by the Norwegian Government's decision not to
deploy to Uruzgan province as part of an extended Dutch
mission. A French-Norwegian combination was viewed by many
Dutch interlocutors as the only way to ensure quick Dutch
Cabinet and parliamentary approval. Now, the GONL will
attempt to make the case that contributions from Slovakia,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and -- most importantly --
France will be enough to warrant an extension. While many
GONL officials expect a fierce debate with parliament, they
are confident the Dutch will extend in some capacity. The
key question will be for how long: PM Balkenende's Christian
Democrats and Defense Minister van Middelkoop's Christian
Union favor an open-extended extension. However, the third
coalition member -- the Labor Party (PvdA) -- will argue the
Dutch did not receive the support they requested, while
reconstruction progress continues to lag and many of the
additional contributions will require substantial Dutch
training and financial support. Labor will likely push for a
fixed extension with an exit strategy; the Labor
parliamentary faction has already announced publicly it will
only support an 18-month extension with a "drop-dead"
departure date. As a result, the November 9 Cabinet meeting
is expected to be contentious as Christian Democrat and Labor
ministers go head-to-head over the baseline time period for
an extension. Linkages to other domestic political issues --
such as negotiations over a new dismissal law -- may give PM
Balkenende leverage over Labor to ask for a longer extension,
but that remains to be seen. The decision timeline continues
to slide as a result -- the GONL hopes to make an extension
decision public by the end of November, followed by a debate
in parliament before the winter recess begins on December 20.
However, GONL officials acknowledge the debate could slip to

the new year -- allowing both proponents and critics the
opportunity to prepare for the debate. Dutch officials point
to President Karzai's visit to The Hague in December as an
opportunity to influence those sitting on the fence. End
summary.

Defense Minister Remains Confident
--------------


2. (C) Van Middelkoop told Amb. Arnall on November 6 that he
was still confident of a Dutch mission extension in Uruzgan
despite the recent news from Oslo that the Norwegians will
not join the Dutch in the south. He said the Dutch Cabinet
is almost ready to make an extension decision public, but
subsequently expected a fierce debate with the Dutch
Parliament. Van Middelkoop described the NATO informal
defense ministerial as having gone "very well," especially
with the French decision to deploy an Operational and
Mentoring Liaison Team (OMLT) to Uruzgan. He said the French
contribution will give any Dutch extension "political
weight," but added that France and Norway together would have
presented an even stronger case to parliament regarding an
extension.


3. (C) Van Middelkoop expected a Dutch Cabinet decision by
the end of November, with the hope that parliament could
conclude its debate prior to Christmas. He said the
extension decision could be wrapped up prior to the end of
the year, but also acknowledged that the parliamentary debate
could slip to January 2008. In addition to the political
commitments by several Allies to assist in Uruzgan, van
Middelkoop planned to make the argument to parliament that
the situation in Uruzgan is changing for the better. He
noted that Operation Spin Ghar has gone very well, primarily
due to the arrival of several hundred Afghan National Army
(ANA) troops. He reminded that the Dutch had been promised
1,200 ANA troops in Uruzgan when they initially deployed.
Van Middelkoop hoped to build the case that in addition to
the contributions from Allies, a Dutch extension will benefit
from the "final" arrival of ANA troops, as well as a new
governor and police chief.


4. (C) On the Georgian offer, van Middelkoop acknowledged the
Dutch were taking a "cautious approach" in the effort to
determine whether Georgian troops possess the level of

professionalism necessary to participate in a NATO mission.
Amb. Arnall noted the strong performance by Georgian troops
in Iraq, and asked if there were any political concerns
regarding a Georgian contribution. Van Middelkoop said FM
Verhagen has strong reservations due to Tbilisi's NATO
Membership Action Plan (MAP) aspirations; if the Dutch
accepted the Georgian offer, pressure would mount on the GONL
to accept MAP for Georgia at the NATO summit in Bucharest.
Van Middelkoop espoused a more pragmatic approach -- if the
Georgians are found to be professional and a role could be
found for them in a Dutch extension mission, then he would be
willing to take their contribution up with Verhagen.
Whatever the results of the Dutch review of Georgian
capabilities, van Middelkoop said he doubted the Georgian
offer would inspire confidence in the Dutch parliament.
(Note: It is not clear how subsequent events in Georgia,
including the setting of new elections, may affect the status
of the Georgian offer and/or Dutch willingness to accept it.
End note.)

MOD Working Level Expects Tough Fight
--------------


5. (C) In a separate conversation, MOD Senior Advisor for
Afghanistan Matthijs Veenendaal told OSD Netherlands Desk
Officer LTC Nate Lucas and polmiloff November 7 that the
Norwegian "no" had been a "big disappointment" -- but not
entirely unexpected, given the internal domestic situation in
Oslo. While not dismissing the offers from other Allies,
Veenendaal boiled potential assistance down to one French
OMLT -- "politically important, but will it be enough to
convince parliament?" he questioned.


6. (C) Within the government, Veenendaal noted that the
Christian Democrats and the Christian Union favor an
open-ended mandate for any extension. The third coalition
member -- the Labor Party (PvdA) -- is "not too keen" on an
extension, and wants to see significant progress on
reconstruction. As such, Veenendaal speculated the Labor
Party will try to limit the extension to one-year or less
based on the argument that the Dutch did not receive the
support for which it had asked, while reconstruction progress
has been limited. Veenendaal acknowledged that several
domestic issues, such as negotiations over a new dismissal
law, should be taken into consideration with the extension
question. For example, if the Labor Party gets what it wants
on the dismissal law, PM Balkenende might have further
leverage to demand more from Labor in terms of a longer
extension in Uruzgan. Veenendaal said these issues will play
out over the next month.


7. (C) Veenendaal said the GONL expects no further
contributions after approaching 18 different nations -- "what
we see is what we will get." He acknowledged that the Czech
offer came only as a result of U.S. pressure -- the GONL
greatly appreciates USG assistance in that regard.
Veenendaal said the USG could further assist the Dutch by
agreeing to maintain the helicopter bridge in RC-South, but
understood our helicopters will be transferred under OEF and
be available to ISAF when needed.


8. (C) Regarding an eventual successor to the Dutch,
Veenendaal suggested Australia might be most appropriate,
given their experience in Uruzgan and the lack of willingness
among NATO Allies. He said the Dutch expect the Australian
opposition party to win upcoming elections, and follow
through with the promise to withdraw Australian troops from
Iraq for deployment in Afghanistan. Veenendaal said Canberra
remains reluctant to take over lead nation status in Uruzgan,
despite Dutch encouragement -- USG pressure will be required
to persuade the Australians to step up to lead status.


9. (C) Veenendaal was not sure how Georgian troops could be
used, but added that the Dutch will "remain pragmatic"
regarding Tbilisi's offer. He acknowledged that the
Australians have complained that bringing in these
contributors will complicate command and control issues. He
suggested such additional forces may be limited in what they
can do, while more complex missions will continue to be done
by the Dutch and Australians.



10. (C) Veenendaal also pointed to the recent arrival of 600
ANA troops, and the expected arrival of an additional 100 ANA
troops, as signs of progress. He noted that the Dutch had
signed up for Uruzgan duty with the understanding that 1,200
ANA troops would be present in the province. The Dutch are
still hoping for the promised 1,200 ANA troops, but noted
that 600-800 ANA soldiers was a vast improvement over the
less than 300 ANA troops the Dutch have been working with
thus far in Uruzgan.


11. (C) Veenendaal also expected a Cabinet decision by the
end of November, followed by parliamentary debate. He said
the debate could slip until January, and that the GONL is
already thinking of potential visitors -- such as President
Karzai, Gen. van Loon, and British officials -- to help frame
the debate. He appreciated any assistance the USG could
provide in helping set up potential visitors. Veenendaal
also expected the Dutch performance in Chora and subsequent
civilian casualties to resurface. He said at least one
journalist from the Dutch newspaper Volkskrant has questioned
COMISAF and Gen. Pace on Chora, and that the GONL expects a
corresponding article when it could "potentially do the most
damage" to any extension possibility, i.e., most likely
immediately prior to the parliamentary debate.

MFA: Confident But Concerned
--------------


12. (C) Dutch MFA Political Director Pieter de Gooijer told
Amb. Arnall November 7 that prior to the Norwegian
announcement regarding its Afghanistan contributions for
2008, he had been "confident" Dutch CHOD Gen. Berlijn could
prepare a "good task force" in Afghanistan with a
contribution from Oslo. The Norwegians would have made an
easier case militarily and politically, given Norway's
capabilities and previous joint British-Dutch-Norwegian naval
exercises. However, following Norway's decision against
teaming with the Dutch in Uruzgan, Defense Minister van
Middelkoop and Gen. Berlijn must now make the case to cabinet
emphasizing the 50 French troops and political solidarity
within NATO.


13. (C) Although he remains "on balance confident," de
Gooijer emphasized the challenges to reaching a positive
decision. The number of additional Allied troops in Uruzgan
will be about 400 instead of the 500 for which they had
hoped. The contributions from France, Georgia, Hungary,
Slovakia, and the Czech Republic will not be replacements for
the Dutch, so the "notion of a reduction (in the Dutch
deployment) is evaporating." Moreover, with the exception of
the French, all other contributors are requesting training
and equipment from the Dutch -- it appears unlikely Dutch
costs will drop significantly. De Gooijer said Canberra was
concerned over so many new partners, and quoted Australian FM
Downer as saying: "It is good news that we are asking for
other contributions, but the Slovaks?" Finally, the Dutch
understand the USG believes Georgian troops are "up to
standard," but remain cautious and want to verify Georgian
readiness during Dutch-Georgian consultations this week.


14. (C) De Gooijer repeated several times that the Dutch are
"very appreciative" of U.S. and Allied efforts to find
support, and that the Dutch "value" the proposed Allied
contributions. At the same time, it will take "mental
agility" to make the case for an extension. Domestically,
the Labor Party wants to limit the Dutch deployment with a
fixed deadline prior to the elections in 2011. The Christian
Democrats (CDA) would prefer to base the Dutch deployment
decision on NATO's needs. The cabinet's formal decision, in
the form of the Article 100 letter to parliament, will use
careful language to bridge these two views.


15. (C) Regarding a timeline for a Dutch extension decision,
de Gooijer noted that the "hexagon" (PM Balkenende, Defense
Minister van Middelkoop, FM Verhagen, Deputy Prime Ministers
Bos and Rouvoet, and Development Minister Koenders) will
review the matter on November 9. The full cabinet could make
an informal decision either November 16 or 23, followed by an
Article 100 letter to parliament on November 23 or 30. An

earlier notification to parliament would strengthen chances
that parliament could take a decision by the end of the year.
If the notification slips until November 30, however, then
parliament will probably wait until after the holidays to
make a decision. De Gooijer commented that a delayed
decision is not necessarily a bad thing, especially as
President Karzai will visit The Hague prior to the winter
holidays, and can engage Dutch politicians, the press, and
the public.


16. (C) MFA Director for Security Affairs Robert de Groot was
more categorical when he spoke to Polcouns in a separate
conversation on November 7. Following the news that Norway
would not team with the Dutch in Uruzgan, de Groot described
the GONL as "very worried," and acknowledged that the
parliamentary debate could slip until January. He described
the French contribution as significant, but additional
contributions from Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and
possibly Georgia will require additional training, equipment,
and financial support from the Dutch. As a result, the Dutch
effort in Uruzgan may cost more with these partners than if
the Dutch decided to stay in Uruzgan alone, or with just
France. De Groot feared the Labor Party may try to make the
argument that the added costs of the additional contributions
make them more trouble than they are worth, thereby
strengthening the argument in favor of reducing the extension
to the point in which it was "no longer serious."


17. (C) De Gooijer said he was "positive about the
developments" in Uruzgan. The Dutch are working well with
the locals, finding weapons, and peeling off non-core Taliban
fighters from the fight. Although the stories do not always
reach the press, there has been a "substantial improvement"
in the past year. At the same time, there have been
setbacks. De Gooijer added that "intensifying
reconstruction" and getting people "out of camps" was vital.


18. (C) In terms of the future, de Gooijer reviewed his
proposal from the November 2 RC-South political directors'
meeting in London: NATO/ISAF should claim victory in 2010,
and if NATO is still involved in Afghanistan, there should be
a new training-focused mission. De Gooijer quoted his
British counterpart as saying that if NATO is still fighting
in Afghanistan in 2010, "we have done something wrong." De
Gooijer suggested a new training-oriented approach is
possible by 2010, based on the progress he has seen in the
past 14 months. But key Dutch cabinet members "will not buy
ISAF under a new name."

Labor Party Parliamentary Faction Shows Its Cards
-------------- --------------


19. (SBU) The Dutch newspaper Volkskrant reported front page
on November 8 that a majority of the Labor parliamentary
faction is prepared to support an 18-month extension in
Uruzgan. Such an extension would be final, with no potential
to extend further -- a "one-off." A minority felt a
six-month extension was more appropriate, while an even
smaller group pushed for an immediate withdrawal. According
to the article, several Labor parliamentarians stressed that
the faction's position was not yet final, primarily because
it had yet to receive information from the GONL on such
issues as who will succeed the Dutch in Uruzgan. However,
the article notes the general feeling within the faction that
the Dutch mission should be phased out in a "responsible
manner."


20. (C) De Groot told Polcouns November 8 that the Labor
Party's public announcement regarding the length of the
extension puts the MFA bureaucracy in a tight spot. De Groot
said he took a phone call from Development Minister (and
Labor Party member) Koenders directing him to write talking
points for the November 9 Cabinet meeting stressing that any
extension should not last any longer than 18 months. Not
more than five minutes later, de Groot said FM (and Christian
Democrat) Verhagen called and directed him to write points
proposing an "open ended" extension of no less than 30 months
duration. Working for both ministers, de Groot lamented his
unenviable position, and suggested the November 9 Cabinet
meeting will be contentious and unlikely to produce a clear

result.

COMMENT
--------------


21. (C) The extension question roller coaster ride continues
with a dive following the NATO defense ministerial high and
Norway taking a pass on Uruzgan duty. Dutch contacts are
questioning more and more the point of including so many
different contributors, speculating that command and control
issues and financial costs for supporting these disparate
contributions will be more trouble than they are worth, i.e.,
be careful what you ask for! The good news is that the
debate has shifted from "will we extend?" to "how long?" At
a minimum, an 18-month extension is better than a withdrawal,
and puts the Dutch firmly in Uruzgan through January 2010 --
coincidentally, the same time period that de Gooijer referred
to as a "make or break" period for NATO to declare victory
and look at possibly re-branding the NATO role as primarily a
training mission.


22. (C) Our best guess at this point is that the GONL will
leave the extension time period initially vague to allow
Balkenende and the Labor Party to trade political deals on
the extension and the dismissal law. Getting the Dutch to
commit to Uruzgan until 2010 -- perhaps with the promise that
they will look at additional duty elsewhere in Afghanistan --
may be the best possible outcome at this point. Amb. Arnall
meets with PM Balkenende on November 14, and will take this
up further.
Arnall