Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07THEHAGUE1963
2007-11-02 18:55:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP UP FOR THE

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0036
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #1963/01 3061855
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 021855Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0647
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001963 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S,
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR LEDDY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP UP FOR THE
TWO WEEKS ENDING NOVEMBER 2, 2007

This is CWC-87-07.


------------------------------------
INDUSTRY CLUSTER ) LATE DECLARATIONS
------------------------------------

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001963

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S,
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR LEDDY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP UP FOR THE
TWO WEEKS ENDING NOVEMBER 2, 2007

This is CWC-87-07.


--------------
INDUSTRY CLUSTER ) LATE DECLARATIONS
--------------


1. (U) During the October 19 consultation (at which Iran was
noticeably absent),significant progress was made on a draft
decision. As a result, the facilitator (Larry Denyer, Del)
prepared a new draft to reflect the general consensus
achieved during this most meeting. Based on subsequent
consultations with the TS, the facilitator, rather than
holding another consultation during which Iran would just
destroy the recently reached consensus, met with a member of
the staff of EC Vice-Chair for the Industry Cluster (Amb.
Dani, Algeria) to explain the current situation. The
Algerian rep expressed the willingness of his ambassador to
intervene with Iran if need be but suggested that, as a first
step, someone other the facilitator could show the Iranian
delegation a copy of the consensus text to see how they
reacted. If a meeting of the Executive Council is called
during the CSP, the Vice Chair should ask that this draft
decision be added to the agenda. If Iran has concerns, they
have the option of asking that the decision be deferred to a
later EC, a result not significantly different than if they
caused trouble during a new consultation.

--------------
UNIVERSALITY
--------------


2. (U) On October 26 and 29, Said Moussi (Algeria) chaired
consultations to work through draft decision text on
Universality. These meetings were followed by an informal
gathering of interested parties on October 31 to break
through the growing deadlock on a number of points. The
November 1 consultations saw a new approach adopted by a
number of delegations, including Iran. Noticeable progress
was made in agreeing on most operative paragraphs of the
text; however, the preambular language still will need work,
which could prolong negotiations on a final text.

--------------
ARTICLE VII
--------------


3. (U) On October 30 and November 1, Kimmo Laukkanen
(Finland) chaired consultations to draft decision text for
the upcoming CSP on Article VII. Rather than continue with

protracted arguments about preambular language, the decision
was made to focus on the operative paragraphs about the
specific recommendations (from the EC),after which
appropriate preambular language would be finalized. Albeit a
good plan, there are still significant differences between
delegations about what should be done. Iran has still not
agreed to the general assumption that a decision is needed
and has made it clear that they prefer report language only
that would roll-over the existing action plan.


4. (U) Of particular note and concern, during the October 30
consultation, Cuba made a general comment about their
national commitment to continuing this process and then
proceeded to read a prepared statement on behalf of the NAM
and China. (Del has forwarded a copy of the statement to
ISN.) This statement opposed the idea of &redress8 (see OP
2),encouraged sticking closely to the action plan and
C-10/DEC.16, and called for no distinction between States
Parties (SPs) regarding assistance. Iran and India
associated themselves with the NAM statement. Other
delegations (e.g., Mexico) expressed similar concerns (and
provided constructive text suggestions) but were careful not
to align themselves with the NAM statement.


5. (U) Several WEOG delegations, along with Russia, called
for a decision that was no weaker than previous decisions.
Russia was particularly insistent that they would not support
any language that implied that the Article VII situation had
improved significantly and as such warranted any lesser

effort or focus. This group also promoted the role of the EC
(and its Chair) in overseeing this effort alongside the DG,
but not the DG alone. Korea pointed to individual national
plans and called for SPs to set specific, realistic goals.


6. (U) India and Iran also discussed the relative priority of
the CWC in some SPs, given their large list of priorities
(e.g., poverty, health challenges, domestic volatility,
etc.),while pointing out the differences in legislative
processes and how focusing on draft legislation was
inappropriate. Del rep pointed to the prominent place draft
legislation has in TS reporting (based on EC requests) and
that this data is what we have to indicate progress and
propose next steps. Iran continued to insist that the budget
parameters be referenced in the text on assistance, obviously
laying the groundwork for decimating future budgets for
Article VII assistance (especially if a decision is not
reached) in deference to their priorities (e.g., Article XI).
Iran and India also questioned TS reporting methods
(particularly that maintained on the external server) and
whether they are necessary, a clear link to Iran's proposal
in Universality consultations for the TS to maintain a
progress report on Universality implementation.


7. (U) Prior to the November 1 consultations, the facilitator
distributed his new draft to some WEOG dels for consideration
and discussion. Del rep expressed concern to the facilitator
about circulating his text too soon, a view shared by the UK;
however, the facilitator made it clear that his intention was
to distribute the text to all delegations before the start of
the CSP.


8. (U) The November 1 consultations focused on what the
facilitator saw as the two most contentious operative
paragraphs: 2 and 6. With Iran absent from the beginning of
the meeting, Mexico was the only delegation to object to OP2
in its original form. Most other delegations were amenable
to it while having reservations on having a deadline. Many
also questioned what would need to be done by the deadline
(i.e., simply reporting back to the TS or actually doing
something more substantive).


9. (U) As promised by the facilitator, his clean text was
circulated on November 2; it noticeably did not take on board
any of the concerns or suggested changes noted by Del rep.

--------------
ARTICLE X
--------------


10. (U) On November 1, French delegate requested a Quad
working level meeting to discuss the Iranian effort to seek a
CSP decision on a &victims, assistance network8. The
facilitator for Article X, Jitka Brodska (Czech Republic) had
previously discussed the issue with Quad reps separately and
informed them the TS had confirmed that no new CSP agenda
items could be added at this time. According to the TS, the
only option for the Iranians would be to bring up the issue
during Any Other Business, despite the fact that substantive
issues are not normally brought up at that time. The
facilitator suggested that if any States Parties felt
strongly enough, an objection could be raised during the
adoption of the agenda (on the basis that it would be
inappropriate to leave a substantive issue to Any Other
Business). All Quad reps agreed that if such an objection
were to be raised, it would be better not to come from any
WEOG members. All four agreed that the proposed Iranian
language was vague and that the proper place for discussion
of any such proposal was in the ongoing Article X
consultations.


11. (U) Del rep spoke with facilitator Brodska following
Brodska,s discussion with the Russian Federation on this
issue. Brodska expressed resignation that we would indeed be
forced to discuss the Iranian proposal during the CSP under
Any Other Business.

--------------
ARTICLE XI

--------------


12. (U) On October 30 and November 2, Li Hong (China) chaired
consultations to draft decision text for the upcoming CSP on
Article XI. The October 30 meeting was replete with high
drama and posturing, but some progress was made during the
November 2 meeting.


13. (U) In the October 30 consultation, the discussion began
with the most controversial paragraph, OP 4, which refers to
an action plan, roadmap, etc. For the second time that day,
Cuba made a general comment about how we should not fear the
term &action plan8 and then proceeded to read a prepared
statement on behalf of the NAM and China. This statement
made vague reference to specific elements the NAM has
discussed (based on C-10/DEC.14) and that this approach
should be the same as was done for Article VII and
universality. This time, China, Iran, and Algeria associated
themselves with the NAM statement, while India was noticeably
absent. Several WEOG delegations insisted that they cannot
support an empty box labeled &action plan8, while the
NAM-leaning delegations wondered what everyone was so afraid
of. Cuba asked, at one point, how delegations would react if
a delegation were to put some specific elements on the table,
to which several delegations said they would be positively
inclined.


14. (U) A return to earlier operative paragraphs became more
strident, as many delegations (led by Canada and Germany)
pointed out the inappropriate and unbalanced approach of
referring to only specific elements from previous decisions
(see OP 1 language on the exchange of chemicals, equipment,
and scientific and technical information). The result was,
well into the third hour, that the facilitator concluded that
positions were still too divergent to work toward a decision
at next week,s CSP and that he would continue consultations
after that time. Of course, this resulted in general calls
for him to not give up hope. In the midst of this, Cuba
revealed that they in fact had specific elements they were
willing to put on the table, if it was generally felt that
productive work based on these could go forward. They were
careful to say that other items could be added by other
delegations. It was decided that this would serve as the
basis for an additional consultation later in the week.


15. (U) Cuba's draft action plan was released late on October
31 but barely featured in discussions during the November 2
consultations. Instead, the main focus was a new, clean
draft distributed by the facilitator. Aside from Iran, which
continued to table a number of proposed textual changes, all
dels present noted the text to be a step towards addressing
the positions of all sides. However, Japan and most WEOG dels
reiterated that inclusion of the term "Action Plan" was
unacceptable. Cuba tabled a proposal to replace "Action
Plan" with "programme of work". Again, aside from Iran, this
was met positively by both the NAM and WEOG/Japan.


16. (U) The facilitator promised to formulate and circulate a
new draft, and he plans to hold further consultations during
the CSP.

-------------- --------------
DELFT CHALLENGE INSPECTION EXERCISE LESSONS LEARNED
-------------- --------------


17. (U) On October 31, Amb. Richard Ryan (Ireland) chaired a
meeting of States Parties to hear and share feedback from the
challenge inspection exercise hosted September 10-14 in
Delft. The DG opened by noting that this is a useful step in
&de-demonizing8 the concept of the challenge inspection,
and that the CI is not only a tool for verification, but also
a valuable deterrent. He caveated his remarks by stating
that the expectation would, of course, be that States Parties
exhaust all other avenues of consultation and clarification
first.


18. (U) Delegations then viewed a short documentary on the
exercise, which provided a day by day recap of the inspection
activities and timeline. The documentary was followed by a

briefing from the Inspectorate point of view by Mr. David
Mohn (hard copy will be forwarded separately). Mohn reviewed
the inspectorate resources dedicated to this particular
exercise, the exercise scenario, and the findings, noting
that this particular site is actually a declared and
previously inspected facility. Lessons learned included the
fact that a challenge inspection requires a significantly
different mindset from a routine inspection, the need for
further refinement of perimeter monitoring procedures, the

communications challenges posed by increasing the inspection
team size, and the fact that sampling and analysis on
Schedule 2 inspections seems to be helping with overall
inspection team sampling procedures.


19. (U) From an OPCW perspective, Head of the Policy Review
Branch Per Runn stressed the importance of the exercise
itself and the Technical Secretariat (TS),s internal
evaluation in developing and maintaining the TS capability to
conduct a challenge inspection, adding that the possibility
to train at an industry versus a military facility was
particularly useful. Runn also emphasized the importance of
report writing, and the fact that at the conclusion of the
inspection anything omitted from the report (intentionally or
not) would not be part of the Executive Council,s
consideration.


20. (U) Amb Maarten Lak (Netherlands) gave a brief overview
of the Dutch perspective. He noted that the media were
likely to play a significant role in a challenge inspection,
and that this element was not developed enough in the
exercise. Responding to an earlier comment, he also noted
that the Dutch national approach was to be as accommodating
as possible of inspection team requests, and that even in a
real scenario, managed access may not have been necessary.
Representatives from DSM Delft added their views,
highlighting as a challenge the difficulty they had in
remembering that all information had to flow through the
national escorts, as opposed to directly to the inspection
team.


21. (U) The Chair then opened the meeting for questions and
comments. Several WEOG States Parties expressed confidence
that the TS was in fact prepared to conduct a real challenge
inspection if the need arose, and indicated an interest in
exercising the role of the EC. The UK also shared the Dutch
view that careful consideration would need to be given to the
role of the media, noting it had held a brainstorming session
on the same. South Africa recommended a wider geographical
distribution of observers (not only visitors),and expressed
an interest in seeing a report from the observers themselves.



22. (U) India, Pakistan, China and Iran all fell back to
traditional positions on the need to exhaust all other
options before calling for a challenge inspection, the
political cost of doing so, the need to address the issue of
abuse of a challenge inspection, and an implication that
resolution of the &unresolved issues8 (a list of issues
from the Preparatory Commission days that would in no way
prevent a real challenge inspection from moving forward),
perhaps in consultations, would be required before launching
a challenge inspection. India also expressed concern that in
this particular scenario the rights of the State Party (e.g.
managed access) did not seem to have been fully exercised.
U.S. del rep expressed appreciation for the unique
opportunity the Delft exercise offered to all regional
groups, and noted that despite previous discussions of
&unresolved issues,8 the CWC provides clear guidance that
is more than adequate to conduct a challenge inspection.

--------------
INDUSTRY AND PROTECTION FORUM
--------------


23. (U) In general, the Industry and Protection Forum
(November 1-2) was a success. In his opening statement, the
DG spoke on a wide range of issues, including a few of
interest: Tenth Anniversary events, important of national
implementation and universality, the progress made in

destruction, the recent challenge inspection exercise,
preparations to response to a use of CW, Article XI, ongoing
changes in the global chemical industry, the importance of
export controls, UNSC resolution 1540, and the modification
to the site selection methodology and intensification of OCPF
inspections. Rene van Sloten (CEFIC) spoke about industry,s
role in the development of the CWC and how Responsible Care
has become integral to how the vast majority of industry
meets all of their supply-chain obligations. Ana Gomez (EU)
spoke on EU support for the OPCW in general, but she also
made very pointed comments about her home country (Portugal)
) the &appalling situation8 that imports/exports are
happening without proper supervision; that she &hopes al
Qaeda has been too busy to go shopping in Portugal.8 K.
Paturej (TS Director of Special Projects) also opened the
Forum and announced that the various papers would be posted
on the website very soon. (Note: The abstracts that are part
of the agenda are already available on the website )
www.opcwipf.org ) and are generally quite detailed.)


24. (U) Workshop 1 focused on a number of practical aspects
of implementing the CWC, including sampling and analysis
(S&A). Pietro Fontana (Switzerland) gave an update on the
CEFIC-OPCW project regarding CAS Registry numbers, which is
focused on the six Schedule 2B families. Claudia Kurz
(Federation of German Chemical Manufacturers) spoke of the
generally smooth application of the CWC within their
industry, while called into question their experiences with
S&A and its value in the future given the burden on industry.
Hannu Vornamo (Chemical Industry Federation of Finland)
spoke about industry inspection experience within their
country, while expressing concern about balanced inspection
levels in the burgeoning industry in the East and taking
verbal potshots at Russian CW destruction. Per Runn (TS Head
of PRB) gave a general overview of the TS S&A preparations,
practices, and experiences. Gary Mallard (Head, OPCW Lab)
gave a very good explanation of the methods and software
tools (e.g., AMDIS) the TS implements to ensure protection of
CBI. Andrew Othieno (Inspector, and member of the upcoming
S&A inspection team in the U.S.) spoke generally about TS
logistical practices surrounding S&A. There were four
different presentations by NAs that had hosted Schedule 2
inspections that included S&A ) Switzerland, the UK, the
Netherlands, and Japan. The first three presentations
explained how they worked out the details in advance with the
TS, including modification of their usual practices (e.g.,

SIPDIS
shipment and inspection of equipment at a location other than
the POE, doing &on-site8 analysis at an off-site location),
to ensure a smooth inspection. Japan, however, was honest
about difficulties they experienced with import of equipment
and chemicals, difficulties locating and supporting the TS
lab, etc. Bill Kane (TS Head of IVB) spoke about the TS S&A
experience to date, including lessons learned, and future
plans (e.g., budget for S&A in 2008, technological and
timeline constraints to expanding S&A to Schedule 3 and OCPF).


25. (U) Workshop 2 focused on assistance and protection under
Article X of the Convention. The morning session was
comprised of presentations from members of the OPCW,s
International Cooperation and Assistance division. Afternoon
discussions centered on State Party experiences in the field
of assistance. Renato Carvalho (TS Head, IMB) shared TS
lessons learned from Joint Assistance 2005, the exercise held
in the Ukraine to evaluate TS readiness to conduct an
investigation of an alleged use of chemical weapons and to
respond to the subsequent request for assistance. In
response, Iran raised a series of questions focused on how
the OPCW would decide when its role had ended and whether
there was a specific checklist of activities to be completed
before this could occur. Carvalho noted that decisions such
as these (as well as overall responsibility) actually lie
with the National Authority.


26. (U) A representative from NATO,s Euro-Atlantic Disaster
Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) gave a more general
overview of NATO,s disaster response capability to natural
and other emergencies, which had been tested many times by
both real life and exercise scenarios. This presentation
raised several interesting questions from the audience about

the possibility of coordination between the OPCW and other
emergency response organizations. Gennadi Lutay (Head, APB)
presented the TS perspective on the future of Assistance and
Protection, noting that Article X is a core objective of the
CWC and that assistance and protection will remain a
fundamental benefit as long as we lack universal adherence to
the Convention and the threat of chemical weapons use by
non-state actors still exists.


27. (U) A representative of the National Authority of
Croatia gave a surprisingly gloomy view of the utility of
assistance and protection under Article X, focusing on a
scenario in which a conventional munition attack targets a
declared industrial facility, releasing toxic chemicals. The
convener, Hassan Masshadi, later summarized a rather heated
discussion on the topic by noting that it seemed some States
Parties believed that declarations under Article VI made them
more vulnerable to terrorist attack and would therefore
desire a widening of the scope of Article X. TS
representative Patrice Palanque also noted that perhaps
national legislation could be used to address such concerns.


28. (U) A representative from the Swiss MOD gave an overview
of training courses Switzerland has offered in chemical
protection and emergency field laboratory procedures, noting
that Switzerland has used a regional approach in Central Asia
that could perhaps be effective in future efforts in Africa.
An audience member from Malaysia asked whether the OPCW had
considered regional training centers; the TS responded that
while it welcomed regional initiatives it needed to stay
within its limited financial and human resources. South
Africa also presented its assistance efforts in the form of
training courses designed to provide an overview of the
assistance available under Article X, an introduction to
protective equipment, methodologies for assembling an
emergency response team, and establishment of basic
protective capabilities for the civilian population. Iran,
picking up on earlier remarks, recommended that the OPCW
focus on a framework of regional capacity building, to
include assessing specific regional shortfalls and
encouraging assistance from donors to target these
shortfalls. In an informal conversation with Del rep later,
the Iranian representative continued to express a strong
interest in this type of regionally focused capacity
building.


29. (U) District Commander of the Fire Service, Piet Aantjes,
gave a presentation that described the integrated approach to
emergency situations in the Rotterdam Rijnmond area, which
involves the police, fire, ambulance and port and civil
authorities as well as a partnership with private industry,
including the Rotterdam harbor and petrochemical industry.
Professor Jiri Matousek, a toxicology chemist from the Czech
Republic gave a presentation which outlined the equipment
provided to the OPCW (much of which was developed in the
Czech Republic) as well as the many training courses which
have been provided.


30. (U) Workshop 3 focused on the roles of chemical safety
and security in the age of terrorism and how each one is (or
can be) supportive of the other. Presentations from industry
representatives (Dow, Chemtura, and Merck) focused on
Responsible Care as a mechanism to incorporate chemical
security into the corporate business model in the chemical
industry. Europol provided a look at the expanding terrorist
threat in Europe but conceded that the threat of terrorist
actually using chemicals in their attacks remains unlikely.
The Ukraine provided an interesting case study of a rail
accident (July 16, 2007) involving 750 MT of yellow
phosphorous, 300 MT of which burned. Croatia shared
experiences of the Balkans War which showed that warring
factions often targeted chemical facilities, yielding results
one might expect from a terrorist attack. The session ended
with a presentation by K. Paturej (Head, Special Projects),
who stressed that, while the OPCW did not have an
anti-terrorism mandate, it should cooperate with
international bodies to develop contacts and provide training
when needed. The U.S. made a brief presentation on the
Chemical Security Engagement Program and the recent meeting

in Kuala Lumpur on chemical security.


31. (U) In the closing plenary session, which was a joint
session with the opening of the annual meeting of National
Authorities, the DG hit many of the topics he addressed the
previous day, with a stronger Article VII (particularly
legislation) message. Jack Gerard (President and CEO of ACC,
Secretary of ICCA) made an excellent presentation on a number

SIPDIS
of issues: that the OPCW needs to cast a wider inspection
net, the importance of universality and full national
implementation, the implications of a rapidly changing
industry (globalization, growth in countries without the type
of support infrastructure the OPCW would expect),the
importance of outreach to the product quality chain, capacity
building to allow all to comply.


32. (U) Each Workshop convener made a brief summary of their
Workshop outcomes. The conveners for Workshops 1 (Ralf
Trapp) and 2 (Hassan Mashadi) were well-done and received.
The reaction to the report from the convener for Workshop 3
(Sergey Batsanov) met with apparent displeasure from some
industry representatives who attended, although they said
privately that the content of the Workshop was fine. In the
Q&A session that followed, a representative of the Indian
chemical association expressed concern over the burden of the
CWC on industry (particularly new start-up and young
scientists),claiming that this was &stifling8 growth in a
similar way to what large industrialized countries do to
stifle development. The Iranian delegation also took the
opportunity to play to the industry in their calls for a CW
victims network, pointing to the value to industry in the
event of a terrorist attack on a chemical plant site.


33. JAVITS SENDS.
Gallagher