NETHERLANDS: SCENESETTER FOR PARLIAMENT VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001918

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DOD FOR TARA JONES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM NATO AF
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: SCENESETTER FOR PARLIAMENT VISIT TO
WASHINGTON, OCT 22-26

REF: A. THE HAGUE 1898 B. THE HAGUE 1856 C. THE HAGUE
1810 D. THE HAGUE 1785 E. THE HAGUE 1729

Classified By: Michael Gallagher, Charge D'Affaires, for reasons 1.4(b)
and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The upcoming visit of representatives of the
Dutch parliament,s Foreign Affairs Committee to Washington
October 22-26, 2007 provides a good opportunity to build the
necessary public support for sustaining a significant Dutch
military deployment in Uruzgan beyond 2008. Although visit
was initially scheduled for the purpose of reviewing U.S.
detention policy -- still a hot issue in the Netherlands --
subsequent developments (reftels) make the Afghanistan
deployment debate a higher priority for the USG.


2. (C) The Dutch Cabinet hopes to make a positive
recommendation to extend the Dutch mission to Parliament in
mid-November, but will only do so once sufficient third-party
troops have been secured to assure majority support.
Although the subsequent Parliamentary debate will be
contentious, ultimately the coalition parties -- along with
at least one opposition party -- should deliver enough votes
to ensure a clear majority, provided the proposed extension
&package8 has full support within cabinet. At the moment,
however, most opposition parties and the second-largest party
in the Coalition (PvdA) still have serious doubts regarding
the mission. (Note: Bios of all delegation members have been
forwarded separately to EUR/WE.)


3. (SBU) Post recommends that high-level USG interlocutors
use every opportunity to reinforce the message that:

- Dutch troops in Uruzgan are a vital component of the NATO
mission, and are contributing significantly to the
improvement of life in Afghanistan.
- Although it is a Dutch decision, the U.S. -- as a NATO ally
-- supports the work the Dutch are doing and hope it will
continue.
- Within the NATO context, the USG is actively supporting
Dutch requests for additional partner support in Uruzgan, and
hope these efforts will shortly bear fruit.
- The departure of Dutch troops would be a serious blow to
ISAF, to NATO, and, ultimately, to the people of Afghanistan.

END SUMMARY.

BACKGROUND:
--------------


4. (C) The Dutch cabinet is expected to announce its decision
on the Uruzgan deployment in mid-November. We are working
hard with the Dutch on a bilateral basis and through NATO to
try and find credible third partners who will give the Dutch
the political coverage necessary to extend their mission
beyond August 2008. Although the government is leaning
toward a positive extension decision, the Cabinet is divided
on the issue, with the Labor Party (PvdA) more skeptical than
either the Christian Democrats (CDA) or Christian Union (CU).
Prime Minister Balkenende (CDA) hopes eventually to build
consensus in favor of an limited extension in coordination
with a significant &third party8 troop contribution (as
previously reported by The Hague and USNATO),but this
process is still ongoing and will take until at least
mid-November.

5. (C) The Parliamentary dynamic, meanwhile, is even more
complicated than the situation inside the Cabinet. Any
overseas deployment requires approval by the Dutch
parliament. The initial Dutch mission to Uruzgan province
received overwhelming support across the political spectrum,
but only after a long, contentious debate lasting several
months. Since then, the deteriorating security situation in
Uruzgan and perceived lack of progress on the reconstruction
front has weakened public support for any extension, causing
some parties -- including the PvdA and the (now) opposition
Liberal Party (VVD) -- to question their earlier support.

COALITION PARTNERS:
--------------


6. (C) The governing coalition will be represented by five
members of the delegation: Karien van Gennip (CDA),Coskun
Coruz (CDA),Joel Voordewind (CU),Martijn van Dam (PvdA),

and Harm-Evert Waalkens (PvdA). Of these parties, the
Labor-Leftist PvdA is the most skeptical regarding an
extension, and faces the greatest opposition from its members
for lack of progress in Afghan reconstruction and for
continuing insecurity. Party Leader Wouter Bos -- currently
serving as Deputy PM and Finance Minister -- recently
reviewed the party,s concerns with Ambassador Arnall (REFTEL
A). More importantly, the PvdA leadership seeks to avoid a
split in the party on this issue, as it could potentially
force them out of government and into new elections they are
likely to lose. PvdA,s coalition partners -- CDA and CU --
face less open dissension, but their members are also
concerned about the toll of the deployment upon the Dutch
military and lack of public support for the mission. The
CDA, CU, and PvdA members will be looking on this trip for
reassurances that the Dutch contribution to Uruzgan is
meaningful and appreciated, and will be responsive to
arguments that put it in a broader NATO and
humanitarian/reconstruction context.

OPPOSITION PARTIES
--------------


7. (C) On the right, the opposition parties will be
represented by Hans van Baalen (Liberal Party, VVD) and Geert
Wilders (Party for Freedom, PVV). Both are personally
inclined to support a military mission in Afghanistan, but
are concerned by the perception that the Dutch are being
asked to &do more8 than other NATO allies. Van Baalen, in
particular, also suffers from splits within the VVD on the
issue. The former VVD Defense Minister Henk Kamp -- who set
the terms for the first Dutch deployment decision -- has
publicly opposed an extension on the grounds that &two years
is two years.8 Both will appreciate assurances that we take
seriously Dutch concerns about finding additional support and
burden sharing more generally.


8. (C) The opposition members on the left -- Harry van Bommel
(Socialists,SP) and Mariko Peters (Green-Left, GL) opposed
the original deployment to Uruzgan and are unlikely to ever
support extending the mission. While they do believe in
helping the Afghan people build a democratic society, they
are not convinced that ISAF is the appropriate method to do
so, and would rather give financial support directly to the
Afghan government. Our best bet is to neutralize the
opposition Socialists and Greens, and strengthen the PvdA,
with success stories on reconstruction.

SENDING THE RIGHT MESSAGE:
--------------


I. Thanking the Dutch
--------------


9. (C) The Dutch have deployed nearly 1700 personnel to
Uruzgan province, filling a critical hole in RC South. To
date, 11 Dutch soldiers have given their lives in
Afghanistan. The Dutch have teamed with Australia in
Uruzgan, and have employed a mature &ink blot8 strategy
linking secured zones with reconstruction projects. The
Dutch have emphasized winning &hearts and minds8 through
development assistance. However, they have not shied away
from combat missions when necessary. When talking to the
Dutch delegation, it will be important to note:

-- We greatly appreciate Dutch sacrifices in Afghanistan.
The deployment in Uruzgan is challenging, and the Dutch are
one of the few Allies in NATO risking their soldiers and
equipment on a daily basis in Regional Command South.

-- The Dutch are filling a critical role in the south;
without the Dutch, much of what we are accomplishing through
ISAGF would not be possible.

-- We value your sophisticated and mature approach
emphasizing reconstruction, and winning the hearts and minds
of the Afghan people. Your strong relationship with the
local populace attests to this strategy.

-- At the same time, we appreciate your willingness to fight
when necessary. Unfortunately, with the constantly changing
security situation in Afghanistan, it becomes necessary at
times to engage the enemy, and you have answered the call.



II. Supporting the Dutch Quest for Partners in Uruzgan
-------------- --------------


10. (C) The Dutch would like to extend in Uruzgan, but must
reduce its forces in order to gain domestic political
support. As such, the Dutch have asked NATO for assistance
in finding credible, third partners to bolster their
deployment in Uruzgan, thereby allowing them to reduce their
forces. At the same time, the Dutch have approached over 20
countries on a bilateral basis in the effort to find
additional contributions. The Dutch have made clear ) in
meetings with Secretaries Rice and Gates, among others )
that they need our help in finding third partners. We are
working closely with the Dutch in The Hague, Brussels, and in
Allied capitals in the effort to find additional
contributions. Providing the parliamentarian delegation with
specifics regarding our assistance is not recommended ) some
parties may negatively view out coordination. It is
important, however, to emphasize to the delegation that the
message is clear that they need additional assistance:

-- We share your concerns regarding burden-and risk-sharing
within the Alliance. More NATO Allies must do more to
support our collective efforts in Afghanistan ) that is what
we agreed to do at the Riga Summit, and it is time to follow
through on these promises.

-- Recent meetings between Foreign Minister Verhagen and
Secretary Rice, Defense Minister van Middelkoop and Secretary

SIPDIS
Gates, Assistant Secretary Fried and MFA Political Director
Pieter de Gooijer, and others have made clear that you need
help in your efforts to extend your mission in Uruzgan.

-- We are working hard at the highest levels )- in The
Hague, Brussels, Washington, and Allied capitals -- to help
you find credible third partners to bolster the chances of a
follow-on Dutch mission.


III. Rebuilding Afghanistan Together
--------------


11. (C) The Dutch rightfully take pride in their foreign
assistance programs. Rebuilding Afghanistan was a prominent
theme that helped win support for the first deployment to
Uruzgan. Critics of the mission argue that Dutch dreams for
Afghan development are unrealized due to the security
situation. In response, we should frankly acknowledge the
limitations on reconstruction, while thanking the Dutch for
their successes. We can emphasize that Dutch military
efforts in more dangerous southern Afghanistan permit the
Allies to boost development and reconstruction efforts
elsewhere.

-- We are grateful for your support for rebuilding
Afghanistan. We recognize your expertise in development and
your generosity.

-- Together the Allies have boosted access to health care
from for the population from 8% in 2001 to 80% in 2007.
We,ve trained more than 10,000 doctors, nurses and midwives.


-- Together, by reducing infant mortality, we are saving more
than 85,000 lives every year.

-- Together, we,ve boosted the number of girls in school
from zero in 2001 to more than 1.5 million today. The number
of boys has been raised from 900,000 in 2001 to more than 3.5
million today.


GUANTANAMO
--------------


12. (C) Although Afghanistan is our top concern for this
visit, we will improve the U.S. image in Europe with the
visit to Guantanamo and discussion of U.S. detention and
rendition policies. A number of our colleagues at the MFA
have absorbed and adopted Legal Adviser John Bellinger,s
premise: the international legal issues surrounding
detentions are complex and challenging, and the Allies should
address them together. Working with the Dutch MFA and
distinguished Washington visitors, we have cooled the
volatile debate in the Dutch parliament, but the topic is
still controversial. This visit to Washington will shore up
support for Mr. Bellinger,s forward-looking approach.
Gallagher