NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: ZEROING IN ON THIRD

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001856

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, SCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: ZEROING IN ON THIRD
PARTNERS

Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Coalition, Peacekeeping, and Multinational Cooperation Debra
Cagan visited The Hague October 2 to discuss potential GONL
extension plans regarding its ISAF mission in Uruzgan
province, Afghanistan. In a series of productive meetings,
Cagan inquired what public statements the GONL required from
potential third country partners prior to making any
extension decision. GONL officials across the board
acknowledged difficult domestic political situations in
potential partners -- as such, no public statement from these
partners would be required at this time. What is more
important are firm political commitments from partners that
the GONL could rely upon in order to comfortably forward a
positive extension decision to parliament, preferably prior
to the NATO Informal Defense Ministerial in Noordwijk on
October 24-25. While the Dutch plan to keep the identity of
any potential partners notional at this time, they had hoped
to specify what functions these partners might undertake in
Uruzgan. Cagan advised less specificity and more flexibility
in this regard, thus allowing military planners to identify
appropriate tasks for their military contributions.


2. (C) Summary cont.: Cagan and Dutch officials reviewed the
list of seven modules the Dutch have identified as areas that
potential partners could help fill. GONL interlocutors
acknowledged that a small contribution from France -- filling
an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT),for example
-- would give them significant political coverage with the
Dutch parliament. Any further contributions from the French,
perhaps toward the Battlegroup company, would be a coup.
Other promising potential partners included Norway, Slovakia
and Latvia, but Cagan stressed that obtaining such assistance
would require Dutch PM Balkenende's direct intervention.
Dutch officials greatly appreciated USG support, noting that
U.S. efforts to find third partners were helping reverse
several weeks of negative trends on the extension question.


3. (C) Summary cont.: In addition to these potential
contributors, DASD Cagan's subsequent visit to Prague
determined that the Czechs might be willing to contribute up
to an infantry company for deployment in Uruzgan, provided
the request be "properly handled" by the Dutch. Also, a
Bulgarian positive response to the Dutch request for
assistance appears to be quite possible, provided the Dutch
request be formally sent via letter from Dutch CHOD Gen.
Berlijn to Bulgarian CHOD Gen. Stoikov. During a phone
conversation between Gen. Berlijn, Ambassador Arnall, and
DASD Cagan on October 5, Gen. Berlijn agreed to send a letter
to Gen. Stoikov, and recommend to PM Balkenende that he call
Czech PM Topolanek. End summary.


4. (SBU) During a series of meetings on October 2, DASD Cagan
met with Dutch CHOD Gen. Berlijn and Director of Operations
Gen. Eikelboom, MOD Director of General Policy Lo Casteleijn,
MFA Deputy Political Director Wim Geerts and Task Force
Uruzgan Coordinator Pieter-Jan Kleiweg, and finally with
Advisor to the Prime Minister on National Security Affairs
Karel van Oosterom.

So, What Do You Need?
--------------


5. (C) DASD Cagan asked two fundamental questions regarding
Dutch requirements in obtaining a positive GONL decision to
extend: 1) Does the GONL need to say anything specifically to
the Dutch parliament or public in order to "get over the
first hump" on the extension question; and 2) What does the
GONL need in terms of public statements from potential third
partners prior to the GONL making a positive decision? Dutch
interlocutors across the board stated that nothing needed to
be made public prior to a decision. Geerts and van Oosterom

acknowledged that many third partner offers were contingent
on difficult domestic political situations, and public
statements might not be possible or even backfire. What is
more important are firm political commitments in principle
from partners that the GONL can rely upon in order to
comfortably forward a positive extension decision to
Parliament. Casteleijn reiterated that, ideally, the Dutch
would like to forward a decision to Parliament prior to the
NATO Informal Defense Ministerial in Noordwijk on October
24-25, but MFA officials acknowledged a decision could slip
to the first week in November when the foreign affairs budget
must be finalized.


6. (C) Instead of a public statement from potential partners,
GONL interlocutors planned to treat any partner much along
the lines of their initial deployment to Uruzgan. Casteleijn
and Geerts reminded that the GONL had referred to Australia
as "country X" prior to the parliamentary debate on the
deployment -- instead of naming their partner, the Dutch
focused on what that partner would bring to the table. Cagan
advised caution on naming specific roles that any potential
partner might fulfill -- better to be flexible and allow
military planners to identify appropriate tasks for their
military contributions. Geerts and van Oosterom took this on
board, and Geerts was confident that the GONL could formulate
language that would inspire confidence in the partnership,
while still giving an indication of the roles that partner
might fulfill without going into details.

The Seven Modules
--------------


7. (C) All Dutch interlocutors expressed frustration with
NATO and SACEUR; one official commented that the force
generation process "appears broken," and that the bilateral
approach was making more headway. That said, the Dutch would
appreciate any assistance the USG could provide in terms of
pressuring NATO to do more. Dutch CHOD Gen. Berlijn provided
an updated list of the seven "modules" and a state-of-play
matrix regarding negotiations with potential third partners
on which the Dutch were seeking assistance: 1) Base
Protection; 2) 2 Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams
(OMLTs); 3) Role 2 Medical Facility; 4) PRT mission team; 5)
Company Battlegroup for force protection; 6) 2-4 F-16s; and
7) Additional Combat and Transport Rotary Wing. While all
seven modules were important, Gen. Berlijn indicated that the
OMLTs, company Battlegroup, and base protection elements were
most crucial to fill. Other GONL officials in later meetings
were less specific, pointing to the need for a credible third
partner.

-- Module 1 Base Protection: The Dutch have focused on
Slovakia as a potential partner on base protection. Geerts
and Kleiweg confirmed that the Slovaks made an initial
proposal of approximately 70 troops that could be used for
base security and an additional five personnel for OMLT air
operations/maintenance, but Kleiweg expected the Slovaks to
make an additional offer -- perhaps as high as 150 troops.
Cagan agreed that Slovakia could provide base protection,
provided such protection was for inner perimeter, fixed site
security only. She said the Dutch might need to train and
equip the Slovaks to a certain degree, as well. Cagan said
any formal U.S. intervention regarding Slovakia might
backfire, but we could help behind the scenes. Cagan
suggested Latvia provide the base protection element; Kleiweg
confirmed that the Dutch had approached the Latvian Foreign
and Defense Ministers regarding a partnership in Uruzgan, and
had been told "no." Cagan pushed back, noting that the
Latvians had just withdrew a combat company from Iraq -- they
have the capacity and capability, so the Dutch should not
take "no for an answer." She suggested PM Balkenende call
the Latvian President directly in order to "get the right
answer"; National Security Advisor van Oosterom agreed to

make that recommendation to his minister. (Note: Kleiweg told
polmioff October 3 that FM Verhagen called his Latvian
counterpart on teaming in Uruzgan, and was told Latvia might
reconsider if Norway agrees to team with the Dutch. Gen.
Berlijn conveyed the same message to DAO. End note.)

-- Module 2 Two OMLTs: The Dutch have identified France,
Australia, Slovakia, and Hungary as potential OMLT
contributors. Cagan said France has agreed to deploy two
OMLTs in the near term, and potentially up to four. Based on
an initial check with U.S. military officials in Afghanistan,
she said a French OMLT deployed to Uruzgan in August 2008
would be acceptable; the trick now would be persuading the
French to agree to deploy. GONL Interlocutors confirmed that
a high-level delegation will visit Paris October 5 for
further discussions regarding a French OMLT. They agreed
that getting French participation in Uruzgan would be a
tremendous coup, solving many of their concerns regarding a
credible third partner. Gen. Berlijn also mentioned the
Dutch were considering a trade with the French -- Dutch
support in Chad for French support in Afghanistan, but such
talks had not progressed. Cagan agreed to work with U.S.
Embassy Paris and U.S. military officials in Afghanistan to
make clear to the French that the USG supports a French OMLT
in Uruzgan, thereby assisting the Dutch delegation's visit on
October 5. Geerts also mentioned that Hungary offered an
OMLT in Uruzgan. Cagan suggested that any Hungarian OMLT be
in addition to their PRT in Pol-e Khomri, and noted that
Dutch training and equipping would be required, with the
understanding that interoperable equipment is key to command
and control.

-- Module 3 Role 2 Medical Facility: The Dutch have focused
on Singapore as a medical facility contributor, and have
deferred Australia's lead. Gen. Berlijn noted that if the
Netherlands could replace the field hospital in Uruzgan, the
GONL might deploy it to Darfur. (Note: The Australian
Ambassador to The Hague tells us Development Minister
Koenders returned from his regional trip to Africa stating
there was "no longer any interest" in a Dutch field hospital
in Darfur. It is not clear how this might affect Dutch plans
to remove the hospital from Uruzgan. End note.) Cagan also
suggested Croatia, Slovenia, and Armenia as potential field
hospital contributors -- given the upcoming election in
Croatia, however, such a request should be couched in
humanitarian terms and not as a military contribution.

-- Module 4-5 PRT Mission/Battlegroup Company: Cagan agreed
with Generals Berlijn and Eikelboom that the Norwegian
Telemark battalion was ideal for the PRT Mission and
Battlegroup Company. Dutch interlocutors noted that MOD
State Secretary van der Knaap would visit Oslo on October 3
for further discussions. Gen. Eikelboom suggested that
perhaps too much attention was being paid to requesting the
entire battalion when a company would suffice; Cagan agreed,
noting that a company would work from rotational standpoint.
Geerts, Kleiweg, and Casteleijn were quick to point out
Norwegian Socialist opposition to any deployment in southern
Afghanistan -- "it's too hard." Cagan suggested the Dutch
were quickly running out of time, and advised that PM
Balkenende make a direct appeal to PM Stoltenberg,
emphasizing that without Norwegian assistance, the Dutch
would not be able to extend and NATO's ISAF mission would be
jeopardized. Following this, Cagan suggested U.S. Embassy
Oslo could follow-up. Van Oosterom appreciated this
coordinated, two-pronged approach, and agreed to make that
recommendation PM Balkenende. (Note: Kleiweg told polmiloff
October 3 that PM Balkenende planned to call PM Stoltenberg
on October 5. End note.) Gen. Berlijn also said Paris "did
not say no" regarding a Battlegroup company; the Dutch plan
to raise this during their high-level visit on October 5.
Cagan suggested Bulgaria and Albania might have the
capability and capacity to provide the Battlegroup company.

She visits Sofia on October 5, and said she would raise this
with the Bulgarian PM.

-- Module 6 F-16 Support: GONL interlocutors and Cagan agreed
that Denmark was giving positive signals on F-16 support in
Kandahar. Gen. Berlijn noted that the Belgians had turned
down the Dutch request for F-16 support, which looks even
more final given the current caretaker government in
Brussels. But Casteleijn said Belgium should not be counted
out.

-- Module 7 Additional Combat and Rotary Wing: All GONL
interlocutors inquired if the USG might be willing to
maintain its helicopter bridge in RC-South; Cagan deferred to
Secretary Gates on that matter. The Dutch said they were

SIPDIS
considering asking UAE whether they might be willing to
provide Apache and F-16 support; Cagan offered to check with
CENTCOM on that possibility. (Note: Kleiweg told polmiloff
October 3 that the GONL approached Turkey at the Director
General level regarding helicopter support. Turkey appeared
willing to consider the Dutch request, Kleiweg said, but the
Dutch were not optimistic. End note.)

Other Potential Ideas
--------------


8. (C) Cagan also suggested several other options that GONL
officials agreed to consider. First, she suggested that if
Germany was reluctant to deploy troops to southern
Afghanistan, perhaps it might agreed to financially
underwrite the training necessary for some third country
partners. She noted that some NATO Allies deployed in the
north had no caveats regarding deployment in the south --
these Allies could be replaced by other, thereby freeing up
their potential assistance. Cagan noted that while
unfamiliar with the NATO process, she had been told by
certain MAP country officials that Albania, Croatia, and
Macedonia are required to take a battalion out of circulation
for a year for NATO certification purposes -- perhaps these
battalions might gain certification while deployed in
Afghanistan. Finally, she suggested the Dutch talk to the
Portuguese Guardia Nacionale regarding police training.

Czech Help?
--------------


9. (C) In formal discussions with Czech MOD Deputy Minister
Bartak, the Military General Staff, and MFA Deputy Minister
Pojar, DASD Cagan raised the possibility of the Czech
Republic contributing forces toward a Dutch extension mission
while visiting Prague on October 4. (Note: The Deputy
Ministers are the decision-makers in both Ministries. End
note.) According to Bartak and Pojar, the Czechs would
welcome a request by the Dutch to assist, provided such a
request was "properly handled," i.e., the request was made at
an appropriate level, such as PM Balkenende. Pojar added
that a Dutch request should not be a hard sell to the
Parliament because it highlights Czech assistance to an EU
partner. Bartak said the Czechs would be willing to
contribute up to an infantry company toward the effort, but
would need Dutch assistance for training and equipment
assistance. Ambassador Arnall relayed this information to
van Oosterom and Geerts for Dutch follow-up.

Bulgarians Receptive
--------------


10. (C) On October 5 in Sofia, DASD Cagan met with Bulgarian
CHOD Stoikov, the Military General Staff, MOD, MFA, and NSC
senior officials, and Nikola Kolev, the Bulgarian President's
Chief of Staff. After Cagan outlined the missions in Iraq
and Afghanistan and stressed the importance of the Dutch
request for Allied assistance, CHOD Stoikov agreed to

seriously discuss military assistance to the Dutch with
Bulgarian President Parvanov. Although hesitant at first,
Kolev understood the importance of the Dutch request and will
discuss it with his president, provided Dutch CHOD Gen.
Berlijn send an official request in writing to Bulgarian CHOD
Gen. Stoikov. In a later phone conversation on October 5
with Ambassador Arnall and Cagan, Dutch CHOD Gen. Berlijn
agreed to send the letter to Gen. Stoikov.

Comment
--------------

11. (C) The Dutch are once again energized after several
frustrating weeks of negative trends on the extension
question. They appear set to pursue this fully through
bilateral channels; in their view, NATO has done very little
to help them find partners. In that regard, GONL
interlocutors emphasized they appreciate any support the USG
can give. Dutch delegations are currently in Oslo and
Bratislava, with another high-level delegation heading to
Paris on October 5. PM Balkenende is engaged, planning to
call his Norwegian counterpart by the end of the week. The
message is clear: even a small contribution from France --
such as an OMLT -- would give the Dutch significant political
coverage. A Czech company would provide a crucial piece of
any Dutch extension mission. Contributions from Norway --
and possibly Latvia following suit -- would also be key, with
any additional contributions from Slovakia, Bulgaria, or
Hungary as added bonuses. High-level calls from Washington
to France or Norway on behalf of the Dutch might help tip the
scales in favor of a mission extension.


12. (U) DASD Cagan has cleared on this cable.
Arnall