NETHERLANDS: SCENESETTER -- DEFENSE MINISTER VAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001647

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SECRETARY RICE
DEFENSE FOR SECRETARY GATES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF MOPS NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: SCENESETTER -- DEFENSE MINISTER VAN
MIDDELKOOP'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

REF: THE HAGUE 1625

Classified By: CDA Michael Gallagher, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Madame Secretary/Mr. Secretary:


1. (C) Dutch Defense Minister Eimert van Middelkoop heads to
Washington during a turbulent period for the Dutch Ministry
of Defense. The Dutch are deployed to a challenging area of
Afghanistan as part of ISAF, filling a vital hole in the
Alliance's efforts in the south. The GONL is looking hard at
extending, but needs help from some other NATO Allies and
friends -- discussions at NATO and in capitals are beginning
to bear fruit regarding possible contributions that might
allow the Dutch to extend as lead nation beyond their July
31, 2008 mission mandate. But more contributions will likely
be required in order to overcome a volatile domestic
political situation. Meanwhile, the current mission in
Afghanistan has proven far more expensive than originally
anticipated, affecting defense projects across the board.
The GONL appreciates our "low-profile" approach to the Dutch
extension question. But van Middelkoop will come asking for
help, whether it be "arm twisting" at NATO and capitals to
answer the Dutch plea for help, to looking for creative ways
to resolve issues dealing with the C-17 strategic airlift
initiative or restrictions related to the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations.


2. (SBU) This will be van Middelkoop's first trip to
Washington as Defense Minister. Following a stopover in New
York to meet with UN SYG Ban Ki Moon and other senior UN
officials, van Middelkoop arrives in Washington on September
12 to meet with Secretary Gates, Deputy Secretary of State
England, and Under Secretary of Defense Chu. He ends the day
at an Armed Forced Day Reception at the Dutch Embassy. On
September 13, Van Middelkoop meets with DHS Deputy Secretary
Jackson in the morning, followed by a luncheon focusing on
Africa at the National Defense University. Following lunch,
van Middelkoop meets with Secretary Rice and NSC Special
Advisor Jeffrey. To end the day, van Middelkoop gives a
press brief to Dutch correspondents and then flies to Key
West for later programs at the Joint Interagency Task Force
South (JIATF-S). He later flies to Tampa for a meeting with
Admiral Fallon at USCENTCOM.


3. (C) Van Middelkoop hails from the most junior member of
the coalition government, the Christian Union (CU). While
this is the first time for the CU and van Middelkoop in the
government, van Middelkoop has vast foreign and security
policy experience as a member in the first and second
chambers of parliament. He is widely recognized as the
author of the Dutch policy requiring the government to seek
parliamentary acceptance of military deployments overseas --
a result of the Dutch failure to prevent the massacre at the
Muslim enclave of Srebrnica in 1995. Experienced on defense
issues, Van Middelkoop is cautious by nature and considered a
bit green on politicking -- he has not been as influential as
his predecessor Henk Kamp. Most policy on Afghanistan, for
example, is dictated by Foreign Minister Verhagen or
Development Minister Koenders.

Afghanistan
--------------


4. (C) Afghanistan will be the main focus of Defense Minister
van Middelkoop's trip to Washington; all defense issues can
be viewed through the Afghanistan prism as the Dutch
deployment affects these issues in some fashion. Partnering
with the Australians, the Dutch are currently the ISAF lead
in Uruzgan province -- their mission mandate ends July 31,

2008. Per reftel, the Dutch Cabinet has delayed making a
decision until early October in the hopes of further
solidifying the case in favor of extending. Most key members
of the cabinet favor an extension, albeit in a reduced role.


5. (C) As a result, the Dutch have been pressing NATO and
other Allies for contributions. Discussions at NATO and the
Dutch bilateral blitz in several Allied capitals are
beginning to bear fruit -- the Slovaks and Danes appear ready
to answer the Dutch call, while the Australians are looking
to increase their troop contributions and perhaps bring in an
additional country to the mix. Finally, Norway is taking a
hard look at teaming with the Dutch, although leaks to the

press have made the Dutch request vulnerable to domestic
Norwegian politics.


6. (C) Even with these contributions, however, the Dutch feel
they need more to obtain approval for an extension. The GONL
faces a volatile political situation that in no way
guarantees an extension. Five of the six key decision-makers
in Cabinet -- including van Middelkoop -- tentatively support
an extension. Finance Minister and Labor Party leader Wouter
Bos, however, faces tremendous pressure from his party's
rank-and-file to end the mission. That puts him in the
unenviable position of either upsetting his party if he
supports an extension, or isolating himself within the
Cabinet if he opposes it. The strong belief that Bos will
soon lose the party chairman position leaves him vulnerable
to further attacks from the left.


7. (C) Leftist opposition parties for the most part have been
relatively restrained in their criticism of the mission, but
still clamor for a Dutch withdrawal in August 2008 -- they
claim reconstruction is impossible given the security
situation. Public support for extending remains below fifty
percent, although Dutch casualties -- ten thus far -- have
not swayed public opinion to the extent that we had feared.


8. (C) Several other factors could derail any extension
possibilities. The GONL initially sold the Uruzgan mission
to its parliament based on the belief that the Dutch could
make significant reconstruction progress. Demonstrating such
progress, therefore, is crucial, and Development Minister
Koenders will soon be traveling to Uruzgan "looking for
evidence" to build his case. Budget woes also are a factor
-- the Uruzgan mission has become much more expensive than
initially anticipated. GONL officials claim they have the
money -- or can find a way -- to make any extension work, but
most likely at the expense of other military projects (see
below).


9. (C) The results of a COMISAF investigation into civilian
casualties associated with Dutch heavy fighting in Chora also
could harm any extension plans. COMISAF determined that the
Dutch Task Force Uruzgan commander "violated the Law of Armed
Conflict." The Dutch are contesting the results, and have
asked SACEUR to weigh in -- Dutch officials are concerned
that opposition parliamentarians could use COMISAF's findings
to argue that the Dutch are involved in fighting above their
capabilities. Finally, counternarcotics strategy continues
to prove problematic. The Dutch do not support poppy
eradication without alternatives. Any decision favoring
ground-spraying would send "negative shockwaves" throughout
The Hague.


10. (C) The GONL is acutely aware of the upcoming
redeployment of U.S. helicopters from southern Afghanistan at
the end of January 2008. Dutch officials claim to have
pressed Allies for helicopter support during their bilateral
consultations. Yet, they also acknowledge the hope that NATO
can "fix" this problem, while the Dutch focus on "the other
pieces" to a possible extension mission. Van Middelkoop
expects to hear from Washington interlocutors on the
potential helicopter shortfall.

U.S. Role on Extension Question
--------------


11. (C) GONL officials at all levels have greatly appreciated
Washington's "low-profile" on the extension question. Any
public statement by USG officials, no matter how benign, is
spun by the Dutch press and political opposition into
evidence of American interference and pressure. Van
Middelkoop will no doubt ask Washington to "keep up" the low
profile, but also may ask for some behind-the-scenes "arm
twisting" assistance in Allied capitals and at NATO in order
to obtain more contributions toward an extended mission.

NATO
--------------


12. (C) The Dutch experience in Afghanistan has influenced
how they see NATO and its future. Dutch officials are
disappointed that other Allies have yet to step up and
contribute troops in the challenging south. They believe it
is NATO's responsibility to find the right combination of

troops in Uruzgan to continue the ISAF mission, but readily
admit that the Netherlands is part of NATO -- as such, they
will do all they can to stay in Uruzgan as the lead nation,
albeit in a reduced role.


13. (C) Per reftel, there is a growing perception here that
NATO was slow to respond to the Netherlands' request for
assistance to find new potential partners. The Dutch
parliament has picked up on this -- "we have done our share"
-- and has made clear that NATO must demonstrate it has made
a concerted effort to address Dutch burden-sharing concerns
prior to any parliamentary extension approval. The lack of
progress on the burden-sharing front has led some Dutch
officials, including senior Dutch military officers, to
suggest those countries in the southern Afghanistan focus
their efforts on resolving troop shortfalls amongst
themselves, instead of relying on "fair weather" members of
the Alliance.


14. (C) From an existential standpoint, Dutch concerns over
NATO dated prior to the Riga Summit -- and for the most part,
these "whither NATO" concerns will carry over to the 2008
summit in Bucharest. The Dutch supported the global
partnership initiative at Riga -- and have benefited from
their Australian partnership in Uruzgan. However, key Dutch
officials have questioned where NATO is heading. They
support NATO's "out of area operations," but have real
concerns regarding force generation for the NATO Response
Force and the future composition of the alliance. Gaining
Dutch support on membership or extending membership action
plan (MAP) offers will be difficult.

Dutch Defense Transformation
--------------


15. (C) Under van Middelkoop's predecessor, the Dutch
military launched an ambitious transformation process in the
attempt to become leaner and more expeditionary, while at the
same time significantly reducing personnel via an MOD
reorganization. The reorganization is almost complete, but
many big ticket items planned for the Dutch military -- such
as tactical tomahawks and unmanned aerial vehicles -- have
been postponed or abandoned to preserve priorities like the
Joint Strike Fighter. The MOD has been spared from
government-wide budget cuts, but the unexpected cost of the
Uruzgan mission has certainly complicated the defense budget,
and poor management and oversight also have played
contributing roles. Other recent cuts have included an F-16
squadron and two tank squadrons, as well as abandoning
participation in the NATO Air Ground Surveillance program.
The GONL will present the national budget next week, and
other defense projects may be abandoned, such as the C-17
initiative.


16. (C) Van Middelkoop has made a concerted effort to focus
more upon MOD personnel and morale. Such attention may be a
result in part of sexual harassment scandals rocking the
Dutch navy last year. But van Middelkoop appears genuine in
his concern. He leads an MOD facing for the first time in
over a decade post-combat challenges -- a number of
discipline incidents have occurred as a result of Dutch
troops returning from Afghanistan and interacting with
civilian life. Van Middelkoop plans to raise with Under
Secretary Chu such issues as mission preparedness, personnel

SIPDIS
readiness, mission rotation periods, civilian deployment in
combat zones, and post traumatic stress disorder.

C-17
--------------


17. (C) Strategic airlift is one of the Netherlands' most
pressing needs, and politically, the MOD, the MFA, and the
Finance Ministry agree the C-17 strategic airlift initiative
is a top priority. As a result, the Dutch indicated they
would be interested in reserving 500 hours -- third most --
in the initiative's first year. The Dutch also were under
the impression that the three or four C-17s could be leased.
The requirement to buy the planes up front has driven up the
program's cost, and the MFA and MOD have bitterly fought over
which ministry should foot the bill. Given the expanding
cost of the Afghanistan mission, GONL officials are not
optimistic that the initiative will be included when this
year's budget is presented to parliament on September 18.

The Dutch have actively engaged in discussions to reduce
costs, and also inquired whether extending the payment plan
is a possibility. It is not clear whether a Dutch pullout
would affect other countries' participation. Van Middelkoop
will raise the C-17 initiative with Deputy Secretary England,
asking for creative solutions that facilitate continued Dutch
participation.

JSF
---


18. (C) The Dutch are strong partners in the Join Strike
Fighter (JSF) program, signing the production, sustainment,
and follow-on MOU last year. The big question facing the
Dutch is how many JSFs they plan to purchase. The new
coalition agreement makes clear that any decision to purchase
the fighter be contingent on the results on an independent,
third party review of the program -- we expect that review to
take place in early 2008. The Dutch have pushed hard to be
included within the Operation Test and Evaluation (OT&E)
phase; MOD State Secretary van der Knaap had hoped to sign
the OT&E MOU when he visited Washington in July. We have
heard rumblings that due to defense budget limitations, the
Dutch may not be able to afford the two test planes that
would allow them to participate in OT&E -- but this has not
yet been confirmed. DM Middelkoop will raise JSF during his
meeting with Deputy Secretary England.

Africa
--------------


19. (C) The Dutch have been active members in various
peacekeeping, security sector reform, and training missions
in Africa, including UNMIS in Sudan, the EU security sector
reform mission in the Congo, and security sector reform in
Burundi, Mali, and Rwanda. Coalition member Labor has long
been interested in a more active role in Africa; Development
Minister and Labor member Koenders is pushing increased GONL
involvement. As a result, the GONL recently informed the
Dutch parliament that it was considering possible future
missions in Africa.


20. (C) Given the Christian Union's long-standing interest in
humanitarian assistance for Africa -- and van Middelkoop's
personal convictions -- van Middelkoop also is viewed as a
proponent of an increased Dutch military role on the
continent. The trick for van Middelkoop, however, is to
ensure that the Dutch remain engaged in Afghanistan -- any
mission to Africa cannot come at the expense of the Dutch
mission in Afghanistan. Many in the GONL believe any
substantial role for the Dutch in Africa will have to wait
until the Dutch have completed their mission in Afghanistan,
although most leftist opposition parties would support
shifting resources immediately from Afghanistan to Africa.


21. (C) Given their potentially expanded role in Africa, the
Dutch also are keenly interested in AFRICOM, and have
inquired whether it might be possible to imbed Dutch officers
within the command. Van Middelkoop plans to raise AFRICOM
during his meeting with Secretary Gates, and will participate
in a luncheon at NDU focused on Africa.

ITAR
--------------


22. (C) The GONL has real concerns regarding International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) restrictions and their
impact on Dutch ability to work within NATO. Dutch
constitutional provisions to protect their citizens' privacy
conflict with ITAR export control restrictions requiring
identification of dual-nationals and requirements for
non-disclosure agreements. As a result, the Dutch have been
unable to sign pending Technical Assistance Agreements (TAA)
relating to its ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The Dutch
understand these restrictions are not aimed specifically
against them, as many other NATO Allies are affected.
However, given the difficult debate regarding a possible
extension of the Dutch mission in Afghanistan, the Dutch will
argue that any possible arrangement to ease restrictions on
their dual-nationals will help bolster the case in favor of
extending. During his meeting with Secretary Rice, van
Middelkoop will likely propose as a possible solution that
Dutch personnel with access to U.S. military equipment

undergo security background checks made in consultation with
U.S. authorities.

Gallagher