NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: ENCOURAGED BY POTENTIAL

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001625

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, SCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: ENCOURAGED BY POTENTIAL
CONTRIBUTIONS, BUT NOT ENOUGH

Classified By: CDA Michael Gallagher, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: While initially upset by a perceived delayed
response by NATO to their call for assistance, the Dutch
acknowledge the search for further contributions toward a
Dutch-led ISAF mission extension in Uruzgan is beginning to
bear fruit. According to Dutch officials, potential
contributors include the Danes and Slovaks, and possibly the
Norwegians. Australia also will increase its contribution to
the mission, and could help find an additional partner.
While these potential contributions are encouraging, the GONL
is quick to note that more help is required to overcome the
problematic domestic political situation in favor of an
extension. For that reason, the GONL has delayed making a
decision until October in the hopes of further solidifying
the case in favor of extending. The GONL appreciates
Washington's patience and low-profile, and would be grateful
for "arm-twisting" assistance in capitals and at NATO. End
summary.

Timeline
--------------


2. (C) On August 30, the GONL informed the Dutch Parliament
via letter that the government was still considering the
Uruzgan extension question. The letter notes that the
Cabinet will not make any decision before the end of the
summer. MFA Deputy Political Director Wim Geerts told
Polcouns August 29 that the Dutch want to wrap up the
extension issue prior to the NATO Defense Ministerial in
Noordwijk at the end of October. Task Force Uruzgan
Coordinator Pieter-Jan Kleiweg told polmiloff August 31 that
the GONL is stressing "quality over speed" in its
decision-making process. Kleiweg said the Dutch traditionally
view September 21 as the end of summer, and a Cabinet
decision will not occur until after this date -- most likely
the first week of October. The parliamentary debate will
take place immediately after the decision. Kleiweg kidded
that "Indian Summers often occur in October," but reiterated
that the Dutch MFA and MOD want the Cabinet to make the right
decision to extend in Uruzgan -- they need the extra time to
ensure that happens.

Need for a Third Partner
--------------


3. (C) The main reason for the delay, explained Kleiweg, was
the lack of progress in finding a third partner to assist the
Dutch-led mission with the Australians. He reiterated that
it is NATO's responsibility to fill the ISAF mission in
Uruzgan -- this means helping the Dutch find a third partner.
He noted that until very recently, the Dutch had not seen
much progress at NATO, despite a delegation by Dutch CHOD
Gen. Berlijn and Geerts to NATO HQ to plead the Dutch case,
and FM Verhagen challenging NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer during
a private conversation to do more to help the Dutch or risk
losing the Dutch altogether. Kleiweg described a perception
in The Hague -- whether accurate or not -- that NATO has not
been very helpful regarding the search for a third partner,
and the Dutch Parliament has picked up on it. Demonstrating
to Parliament that NATO has exhausted every potential partner
will prove crucial in the subsequent debate on extending,
Kleiweg said.


4. (C) That said, Kleiweg and Geerts acknowledged summer
vacation plans may have delayed some from answering the Dutch
call for help, and confirmed the search for further
contributions is beginning to bear fruit. Kleiweg said
SACEUR sent a letter to ten Allies -- based on potential
positive political will and lack of a contribution in the
south -- requesting they consider teaming with the Dutch in
Uruzgan. The Dutch targeted these ten countries as potential
partners and initiated a "bilateral blitz" on capitals.
Geerts and Kleiweg said the Dutch received "positive
feedback" from the Slovaks, although it appears internal
Slovak politics will prevent the Slovak FM from making any
announcement in that regard when he visits The Hague on
September 13. Geerts and Kleiweg also confirmed that the
Danes appear ready to deploy F-16s to Kandahar to assist
RC-South. Finally, Geerts said Australia was looking to
increase the size of its military contribution, and possibly

bring in yet another partner. (Note: Geerts declined to
comment, but several reports suggest the Australians might be
trying to persuade New Zealand, Singapore, or Indonesia to
contribute. End note.)


5. (C) Kleiweg confirmed Oslo was seriously considering a
contribution, but declined to give specifics. He referred to
Dutch and Norwegian press reports, and accused disparate
factions within the Norwegian government of leaking the
possible partnership. Kleiweg said the Dutch have been very
careful to keep any partnership under wraps, and are not
pleased that the "serious Dutch plea for assistance is
falling victim to Norwegian domestic politics." Geerts
confirmed several high-ranking delegations to Berlin to plead
the case for German military contributions, but to no avail.
Kleiweg said a German NGO will likely opt to work in Uruzgan
on development projects, but a German security contribution
was unlikely.


6. (C) Geerts described these potential contributions as
"good news," but probably not enough for a positive extension
decision. Kleiweg also pointed to budgetary limitations and
the need to demonstrate progress on development as key
extension factors. He confirmed that the Dutch are pushing
hard on other Allies to solve the shortfall in RC-South
created by the redeployment of U.S. helicopters in January
2008, but also acknowledged the hope that NATO will "solve
that problem" as the Dutch struggle to find the right
combination of contributions to extend.

Problematic Domestic Political Situation
--------------


8. (S) According to Geerts, the volatile Dutch domestic
political situation and divisions within the governing
coalition could still create serious obstacles to an
extension. So far, there is tentative agreement among five
of the six relevant Cabinet ministers to support an extension
-- PM and CDA party leader Balkenende, FM Verhagen, Minister
for Youth and Family Affairs and CU party leader Rouvoet, DM
van Middelkoop, and -- with serious reservations --
Development Minister Koenders. Geerts said Koenders supports
the mission, but is under tremendous pressure from his party
PvdA (Labor),whose rank-and-file oppose an extension. He
said Koenders is secretly traveling to Afghanistan in early
September, and will be "looking for evidence" for progress on
reconstruction to help bolster his case.


9. (S) The wildcard remains Finance Minister and Labor Party
leader Bos, who remains unconvinced regarding an extension
but has thus far kept quiet in public. A majority of Labor
opposes extending, and the party leadership is up for grabs
in early October. At the moment, former UN Mission in Sudan
Head of Mission Jan Pronk appears a near-certain choice to
become the new Labor Party chairman, a position from which he
will be able to influence Bos and Labor Party policies.
Pronk has, so far, kept his views on an extension quiet and
may have mixed feelings; although he is widely viewed to be
more "left" than Bos, the former Development Minister is also
a confirmed internationalist whose son recently served as
Dutch POLAD. Nevertheless, Bos is in the unenviable
situation of either upsetting his party's rank-and file if he
supports an extension, or isolating himself within the
Cabinet if he opposes.


10. (C) For the most part, opposition parties have behaved in
a restrained manner on the extension debate, despite the
recent tenth Dutch military casualty in Uruzgan. Opposition
party members included in a recent parliamentary committee
trip to Uruzgan returned "still skeptical, but much less
skeptical" regarding a potential extension. Surprisingly,
left-of-center Green Left has been impressed with the
development progress the Dutch are making in Uruzgan. The
right-of-center VVD (Liberal Party),on the other hand,
continues to push for more burden-sharing within NATO -- and
has promised to make this an issue during any extension
debate. That said, VVD party leader Mark Rutte recently
visited Afghanistan with SACEUR, and returned notably
impressed with Dutch efforts.

Other Obstacles

--------------


11. (C) Kleiweg pointed to several other potential obstacles
that could derail the extension question. First and foremost
was poppy eradication -- Kleiweg said the GONL understands
that counter-narcotics strategy is determined by the Afghan
government, but does not support eradication without
alternatives. Any decision made next year favoring
ground-spraying would "send negative shockwaves through The
Hague," he said, and could undercut Koenders' support for an
extension. Kleiweg also pointed to expected governor and
police chief appointments by President Karzai. He said
Karzai was considering appointing Matiullah as police chief
of Uruzgan, which would also harm Dutch extension efforts.
Kleiweg expressed appreciation for Amb. Wood's intervention
in Kabul opposing Matiullah's nomination, and hoped the USG
would continue such opposition. Finally, Dutch public
support for any extension still remains low. According to a
poll published on August 31, 54 percent of respondents
opposed any extension -- Kleiweg said the GONL still has its
work cut out in explaining to the Dutch public why an
extension is "the right thing to do."

Bottom Line
--------------


12. (C) Geerts described the extension situation as in better
shape than a few weeks ago, namely due to potential
contributions from the Slovaks, Danes, and Australians. The
Dutch are clearly not yet out of the woods, however,
especially as the Dutch require one more serious partner,
while the domestic political scene is still turbulent.
Geerts appreciated the "low USG profile" and urged Washington
to keep it up. That said, Geerts appreciated any "arm
twisting" we might be able to provide in capitals and with
NATO in urging others to answer the Dutch calls for
additional assistance.

Gallagher