CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): U.S.-CHINA

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001413

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL CH CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): U.S.-CHINA
BILATERAL DISCUSSION ON COMPLIANCE ON THE MARGINS OF THE
49TH SESSION OF THE OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

REF: STATE 88012

Classified By: Pete Ito, Deputy Permanent Representative to the Organiz
ation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Reasons: 1.4 (B, D).

This is CWC-67-07.

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SUMMARY
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1. (S) On June 25 and 28, chemical weapons (CW) experts from
the United States and China held bilateral discussions on
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) compliance issues on the
margins of the 49th Session of the Organization for
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council in
The Hague. The U.S. delegation was led by Ambassador Eric
Javits, U.S. Permanent Representative to the OPCW. The
Chinese team was led by Chen Kai, Director of the Chemical
and Biological Weapons Division of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The meetings are part of an ongoing exchange in
which the U.S. has sought additional information to assess
China's compliance with, and understand China's
implementation of, the CWC. This exchange, which began in
1998, resulted in a productive bilateral meeting in October
2002 and was re-energized last December following China's
request to engage with the U.S. on a wider range of CWC
issues. The overall atmosphere was constructive and
positive, although the Chinese team was clearly
uncomfortable with the level of detail sought by the U.S.
side on some questions. The Chinese engaged in dialogue to
clarify their April 2007 responses to USG questions (provided
in November 2006). In answering some of the USG's specific
declaration and compliance questions, the Chinese delegation
stressed that the level of detail and transparency it has
provided to the U.S. relating to the CWC is unprecedented.


2. (S) The discussions on June 25 began with Ambassador
Javits drawing from the general talking points contained in
reftel and following up with reftel questions to clarify
China's previous responses to USG questions. As part of the
ongoing compliance dialogue, the U.S. envisions visiting one
or more Chinese CW-related sites in the future and used this
opportunity to lay the groundwork before submitting a more
formal request. Accordingly, del proposed continuing the
overall CWC dialogue in Beijing this Fall, and expressed
interest in visiting one or more Chinese sites. The Chinese
side did not respond to these proposals. On June 28, a
smaller group of CW experts from both side met to discuss
several follow-up questions that resulted from the earlier
meeting, which were subsequently handed over in written form.
The discussions answered some, though not all, remaining
U.S. questions. It is not clear that Beijing is able or
willing to provide the level of detail we have requested in
all cases. Overall, however, the USG met the three objectives
laid out in reftel to further the U.S. - China compliance
dialogue. Delegation lists are contained in paragraphs
15-16. End Summary

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JUNE 25 MEETING
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3. (S) On June 25 the U.S. asked a number of follow-up
questions drawing on reftel. Below are the Chinese responses.

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Declarations of Past Transfers
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4. (S) The Chinese team reaffirmed that China did not use
Form CW 1.0 to report transfers of agent to Albania (and does
not plan to do so) due to a lack of sufficient documentation
to support completion of the form. Instead, China provided a
narrative description of the mustard (HD) transfer based on
"the memories of concerned persons". (Note: The narrative
description was not included in the redacted version of


China's 1997 CWC declaration that the OPCW Technical
Secretariat provided to States Parties including the U.S.

SIPDIS
The Technical Secretariat made a unilateral decision to not
include the information since the narrative stated that the
amount of HD transferred was very small.) Chen Kai explained
that for the same reason, China did not use Form CWT 1.0 -
CWT 2.7, and currently has no intention to do so.


5. (S) China was not clear on whether it will amend its 1997
declaration to reflect the 0.97 MT of Lewisite declared by
Albania. Although China has oral reports by former workers
suggesting the Lewisite came from China, it was not able to
find sufficient documentation to show that a transfer
occurred, according to Chen. He acknowledged that the
quantity of Lewisite (L) transferred may be above the
Convention's limit for a declaration of a transfer based on
the information provided by former CW workers. He also said
that China should make a declaration of the amount and that
China did transfer a small amount of Lewisite; however, this
statement seemed to indicate Chen Kai's personal reflection
rather that China's intent to declare the transfer.


6. (S) Chen Kai stated that Chinese experts conducted one
bilateral visit to Albania and were given access to the
Albanian CWSF but did not find documentation to support the
transfer. He stated that he was not a part of the visit and
could not provide additional details. Chen Kai stated that
the CW agents were transferred between governments and did
not involve a third party. He further stated that the
Albanian government initiated the request for CW agents from
China. Chen Kai also said that the Lewisite information is
not sufficient to support a declaration of a transfer and
noted that the information China has collected is too
sketchy.


7. (S) Chen Kai noted that he had no information on the
transfer of mustard/Lewisite mixture but agreed to confer
with the Chinese experts that visited Albania on several
follow-up questions that were later provided to the Chinese
on June 28. The U.S. also learned that China was trying to
find logbooks of the runs made at its chemical weapons
production facility, which China considers as experimental
records; At the same time, Chen Kai has stated that China's
production records did not show records of transfer and
confirmed that all of the mustard was made at a single
facility. Chen Kai opined that at this late date it is
difficult to find records of such transfer of agents to
Albania within China.

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Chemical Plant Accident Involving Nitrogen Mustard
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8. (S) The U.S. sought clarification of China's answers about
an accident that occurred at a chemical plant in 2000
involving nitrogen mustard (HN2). Chen Kai stated that that
the plant only produces an intermediate for a pneumonia drug
in which nitrogen mustard salt is made in a captive use
scenario. He stated that following the accident in 2000 the
Chinese National Authority immediately sent a team of experts
to investigate. The team learned that the accident occurred
due to operator error. The plant is still in operation. He
explained the process is two steps: in step one three
chemicals are reacted to form the nitrogen mustard salt
(methylbenzene, N-methyl diethanolamine and thionyl
chloride); in step two, the nitrogen mustard salt is
reacted with hydrochloric acid (HCl) in the presence of a
catalyst, followed by an addition of sodium hydroxide (NaOH)
to make the intermediate. Chen Kai said that the accident
occurred between steps 1 and 2. He claimed that one operator
did not add the HCl following step 1 and a plant shift change
occurred. A second operator, incorrectly assuming the first
operator had completed the first stage, added the sodium
hydroxide to the nitrogen mustard salt, resulting in the
formation of HN2. (NOTE: This track with the process
chemistry reported in the Chinese Journal of Industrial
Hygiene and Occupational Diseases, but clarifies that


ordinarily, the mustard salt reacts with HCL prior to the
introduction of the sodium hydroxide, thus avoiding wholesale
conversion into HN2). He noted that there is no CWC
declaration requirement for the salt of a CW agent, and that
China therefore does not consider this facility declarable.
The U.S. was gently rebuffed when it requested additional
information on the chemistry. Chen Kai explained that based
on Chinese investigations, no other similar incident has
occurred in China where HN2 was accidentally produced, nor
are there any other similar facilities in China.


9. (S) After conferring with U.S. chemists, additional
questions were provided to Chen Kai on June 28 about
chemistry of the operations, including details of process
conditions. The central issue raised by U.S. experts was
that, granting that the facility aims to produce nitrogen
mustard salt, rather than the base, as an intermediate
product, it is nevertheless the case that the process
described would lead to the formation of HN2 as well as the
salt after the first stage; they are "equilibrium products"
and a mixture of both is always created. How much is in each
form (hydrochloric salt and free HN2) will depend on the
conditions used in the production process. It is quite
possible that they sometimes exceed the 100 gram limit in a
reactor of hundreds, or a few thousand, liters - depending on
the pH and other operating conditions. Baed on this
explanation, he agreed to inquire furher with Chinese
experts.

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Chemical Weapons Precursor nd Schedule 1
Chemical for Protective Purposes -------------- --------------


10. () The U.S. informed Chen Kai that it is generally
satisfied with China's answers relating to CW precrsors and
schedule 1 chemical for protective puroses and thanked China
for providing further claity in these areas. To wrap-up
our discussion he U.S. asked a clarification question in
each aea. In response to the U.S. question as to when
hina's single small scale facility (SSSF) began oprations,
we were told in 1997 and that the chemial weapons precursor
methylphosphonyl dichloride(DC) was transferred to the SSSF
before entry ino force of the Convention. The U.S. also
asked f China would consider declassifying the structure of
Vs, since the inforation is already in the public domain.
Chen Kai informed us that China does not plan to declassifythe Vs chemical structure and it considers the infrmation
highly classified.

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Historical CW Program
--------------


11. (S) China continues to hedge in its responses on its CW
recordkeeping. Chen Kai stated that ecordkeeping is
somewhat limited, China was alsoto ascertain that its
laboratory records made nomention of transfers of CW agents
to Albania. I response to U.S. questions about the 6th
Institute of the Chemical Defense Academy of the Chinese PA,
he stated that production at the facility wassporadic and
not continuous and also stated that it is his understanding
that production facility meant a continuously operating
facility. Chen Kai further explained that China's facility
was not even pilot scale; all work was done in the laboratory
and not with industrial equipment. The CW agents were
produced using glass equipment at its research site. He
explained that China did not have a chemical weapons storage
facility and once CW agents were produced they were sent to
the testing site. Chen Kai did acknowledge, however, that
China did have a temporary storage site (at the testing
area?). When the del subsequently asked for information on
the capacity of the glassware and other details of
production, Chen Kai referred back to Chinese responses from
2002, which he said were adequate, and complained about the
intrusiveness and detail of U.S. questioning.


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Riot Control Agents
--------------


12. (S) Chen Kai stated that China did not produce the riot
control agent dibenz-(b,f)-1,4-oxazepine (CR),CAS registry
number 257-07-8) that was identified on a Chinese website.
He said that the website was inaccurate and stated that China
has many such websites containing inaccurate information.
Chen Kai said the China has no plans for amending its riot
control agent declaration. The U.S. delegation also asked
the Chinese delegation if Chinese National Authority
officials monitored companies' advertised production of
scheduled chemicals to insure consistency with their
declaration. Chen Kai responded that the number of companies
is much too vast to do this, and in any case, many times the
advertisements are overestimates and are inaccurate. He
specifically mentioned that in one instance, the government
officials noticed advertisements for production by a company,
and when the officials investigated the company, they found
that it had not been built.

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JUNE 28 MEETING
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13. (S) The meeting was led by USDel member Astrid Lewis and
supported by members of the U.S. Delegation. Chen Kai was
supported by Mr. Xu Li, and Mr. Yu Bianjiang. This meeting
was less formal than the June 25 meeting and it allowed the
participants to freely ask questions and express themselves
in a more open manner. The U.S. shared with Chen Kai a list
of additional questions which resulted from the June 25
meeting. Several of the questions, which were technical in
nature, were discussed and while the U.S. did not receive
answers, the participants were able to explain the context of
the questions and the underlying reasons for pursuing a
response. Chen Kai explained that from his "personal
perspective" the level of detail went beyond the CWC
requirement. The U.S. side explained the reasons for
pursuing compliance and the role of the VCI bureau and the
Congressional mandate to report to the President and
Congress. When the Chinese side explained that they were
concerned about sharing national information with another
country and that China has already provided detailed
information to the OPCW Technical Secretariat, the U.S.
countered that not all information a State Party provides to
the TS is shared when a request is made to obtain any State
Party's declaration. The U.S. side explained that the
information received from declaration helps, but engaging in
dialogues between States Parties further helps each other
build a better picture of what has happen in the past. At
the end of the hour long discussion both sides agreed that
having face-to-face dialogues such as this helps us to better
understand each other. Chen Kai agreed to take the questions
back to Beijing so that Chinese experts can provide the U.S.
with additional details. The U.S. presented the final list
of questions on June 29 to Mr. Li Hong, Counselor, Deputy
Permanent Representative of China to the OPCW.


14. (S/Rel China) U.S. Follow-up Questions of China's
Declaration and Compliance Issues resulting from the June 25
Meeting:

Begin text


I. DECLARATION OF PAST TRANSFERS

During our dialogue on Monday, June 25 China agreed to
further ask Chinese experts that visited Albania's CW storage
facilities the following questions:


1. Could China's CW experts that visited Albania ascertain
whether Lewisite bulk agent containers at the Albania storage
facility were of Chinese origins, by using distinguishing
features such as configuration, size and markings?



2. Could China's CW experts that visited Albania ascertain
whether mustard/Lewisite agent containers at the Albania
storage facility were of Chinese origins by using
distinguishing features such as configuration, size and
markings?


3. Did Chinese CW experts take photographs of the bulk
containers during their visit to the Albanian storage
facility? Did China show the photographs to the former CW
workers at its laboratory facilities to verify from the
distinguishing features such as size, configuration and
markings on the containers whether they were of Chinese
origins?

II. CHEMICAL PLANT ACCIDENT INVOLVING NITROGEN MUSTARD HN2

Based on our June 25 discussion, we understand that, in the
two stage production process used at the plant was making an
intermediate for the pneumonia drug that the formation of
nitrogen mustard gas (free base) occurred when an operator
failed to add hydrochloric acid (HCl) and during the shift
change another operator instead added sodium hydroxide
(NaOH). We have checked with our chemists and have some
follow up questions.


1. Was there a spill of nitrogen mustard from the reactor
as a result of adding NaOH without the HCl or was the
nitrogen mustard contained in the reactor?


2. What were the circumstances at the factory that led to
the workers exposure?


3. How did China determine whether (a) the workers were
exposed to nitrogen mustard or, (b) were workers exposed to
sulfur dioxide, which is another product that would form upon
addition of NaOH?


4. Based on discussions with our chemists, our understanding
of the two stage reaction as described on Monday is that the
results after the first stage is the formation of the
nitrogen mustard salt but also there is the formation of some
nitrogen mustard present whenever there is salt. There is
always a chemical equilibrium between the two. How much is
in each form (hydrochloric salt and free HN-2) will depend on
the conditions used in the production process. It is quite
possible that they sometimes exceed the 100 gram limit in a
reactor of hundreds, or a few thousand, liters - depending on
the pH and other operating conditions. Can China provide
additional details about the operating conditions at the
facility to include pH, content in the reactor, amounts of
chemicals added, temperature, pressure, sequence of
processing steps, and etc.


5. It is possible that the small amounts of nitrogen mustard
(free base) formed in the reactor over the course of a year
could exceed the Convention requirement triggering a
declaration. Does the amount of nitrogen mustard produced
each year at the facility, even for captive use, require a
declaration?


6. The accident was due to the quantity of HN-2 formed
during the process, which we would expect based on the
information we have seen, likely exceeded the Schedule 1A
limit although it was on an accidental basis. Can the Chinese
National Authority explain why, after it investigated the
accident, it did not report the incident to the OPCW?


7. What is the name of the facility and where is it located?


8. What steps were implemented at the company to prevent
this accident from occurring again in the future?

III. HISTORICAL CW PROGRAM

China stated that they did not have a 'full-up production
facility', but, based on China's declaration was able to
produce a significant quantity of agent using laboratory size


equipment. In order to better understand more about the
laboratory size equipment that was used to produce China's CW
agents, we seek clarification to the following:


1. What was the capacity of the glass equipment used to make
China's CW agents?


2. How many production batches were necessary to produce
China's declared quantity of mustard?


3. How many production batches did it take to make the
amount of the 13.7 metric tones (MT) of mustard and how many
batches would have been necessary to make 0.97 MT of Lewisite
and possibly .4 MT of mustard/Lewisite agents -- using the
laboratory size equipment as was declared by Albania?

End text.


15. (U) Chinese participants: Mr. Chen Kai and Mr. Xu Li of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fang Chuanhan and Mr.
Yan Li of the Ministry of Defense and Mr. Li Hong, Mr. Yu
Bianjiang and Mr. Gao Huijun of the Chinese Delegation to the
OPCW, The Hague.


16. (U) U.S. participants: Ambassador Eric Javits; Pete Ito,
Elizabeth Sanders, and Larry Denyer (USDEL/OPCW); Astrid
Lewis, Robert Mikulak, Christopher Park (July 28 only),Mary
Reeves, and Louis Alvarado (State); and Sarah Nett and Thomas
Cataldo (OSD).


17. (U) Ito sends.
GALLAGHER