Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07THEHAGUE1348
2007-07-16 15:36:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): STATUS OF U.S.

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC 
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #1348/01 1971536
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 161536Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9824
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001348 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR LEDDY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): STATUS OF U.S.
PRIORITIES FOR 2007

This is CWC-65-07.

-------
SUMMARY
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UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001348

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR LEDDY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): STATUS OF U.S.
PRIORITIES FOR 2007

This is CWC-65-07.

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (U) At mid-year, a number of U.S. priorities at the OPCW
for 2007 have been achieved. An Executive Council chairman
very supportive of the U.S. was selected. The Director
General proposed a 2008 budget with zero nominal growth and
increased funding for inspector training. The Technical
Secretariat is quietly continuing to work on its ability to

SIPDIS
investigate allegations of CW use. Preparations for the
Second Review Conference have advanced at a steady pace, and
without problems.


2. (U) Some priorities will require extensive work if they
are to be achieved by the end of the year. The proposed 2008
budget has no increase in OCPF inspections, and China will
strongly oppose any substantial increase. Article VII
implementation is moving ahead smartly, but specific progress
toward achievement of "20 in 10" has been disappointing. Due
to objections from South Africa, New Zealand and Iran, an
agreement on nil declarations is just not in the cards.
Finally, the issue of whether Russia has completed
destruction of 20 per cent of its stockpile is still
unresolved (which may not be the worst outcome for either the
U.S. or Russia),although it is difficult to predict whether
this may change in the autumn, based on a number of factors,
including whether or not the second stage at Maradykovsky is
operational before the November Conference of States Parties.
End Summary.

--------------
EC CHAIR
--------------


3. (U) Iranian interest in becoming the EC Chair was firmly
but quietly deflected. Philippine Ambassador Arguelles, who
has worked well and closely with the U.S. delegation, was the
Asian Group candidate who was elected EC Chairman.

--------------
2008 BUDGET
--------------


4. (U) The recently released proposed 2008 budget from the
Director General has a number of elements which are critical
to the U.S. Most important, it proposes a third straight ZNG
budget. In addition, it provides an increase in funding for
inspector training. Budget co-facilitators Diana Gosens

(Netherlands) and Donggy Lee (South Korea) held an initial
consultation on July 4, and will resume meetings on August

29. In the intervening weeks, they and the TS fully expect a
series of detailed questions from the U.S. (and other
delegations) for which the TS can prepare answers so that the
autumn consultations can start up quickly and efficiently.


5. (U) The co-facilitators have publicly stated that their
goal is to reach agreement on the budget by EC-50 in
September. While commendable, there is reason for skepticism
that this can be achieved. While most of the budget does not
appear contentious, there always seems to be some topic which
provides last-minute complications. And at this time, there
already appears to be a dispute on the number of proposed
OCPF inspections. The proposed budget keeps the same overall
ceiling on industry inspections (200) as well as specific
numbers for Schedule 1, 2 and 3 and OCPF inspections. The
DG's rationale is that with the recently announced
modification of the OCPF site selection methodology, it would
be best to have a "pause" and see how the TS change will
affect these inspections.


6. (U) Del rep has already expressed in budget consultations
the U.S. desire for a continuation of the increase in OCPF
inspections, which was seconded by a number of WEOG
delegations and Japan. China has strongly opposed any
increase, with support from Iran and some NAM delegations.

Iran in particular has argued that there should be no
increase in OCPF inspections until the discussions on "risk
assessment" led by CSP Chairman Dastis (Spain) have
concluded. Many delegations and the Deputy DG have made
clear they do not accept such a linkage, and have firmly
asserted that the inspection numbers are decided in the
budget negotiations. While Dastis intends to have more
meetings in the autumn, there is no chance they will generate
consensus on the OCPF issue. And at this time, China seems
very firm in its opposition to any increase in OCPF
inspections. In short, at this point, agreement on the
budget on the margins of the November CSP would seem the most
likely outcome.

--------------
SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE
--------------


7. (U) The Chairman of the working group for the Second
RevCon (Amb. Lyn Parker, UK) has pursued an appropriately
measured pace of work. An excessive number of meetings and
drafting would only have resulted in documents to be
re-hashed and re-written this autumn or next year. However,
we share Parker's view that work in general will need to
intensify in the fall, and need to resume in mid-January

2008. The Chair certainly would welcome U.S. views on the
most efficient pace and program of work for the remainder of

2007.

--------------
ALLEGED USE OF CW
--------------


8. (U) The TS has continued to steadily pursue an increased
capability to investigate instances of alleged use of CW. As
the TS is already open to developing these capabilities, the
delegation strongly recommends a continuation of this
approach, rather than a more "political" effort, such as an
EC decision or high-profile item in the proposed budget,
which would generate questions and resistance from some
delegations.

--------------
ARTICLE VII
--------------


9. (U) The TS has also continued to maintain a steady,
efficient pace in promoting full national implementation of
Article VII obligations. Much work remains to be done, and
the delegation will continue to work with the TS and
interested delegations to do more. With regard to the
specific benchmark of "20 in 10" put forth by Commerce A/S
Padilla at the 2006 CSP, Japan and Australia have taken steps
in pursuit of this goal. However, there really has been
little work from others on this specific initiative.
Substantial achievement of this goal will require a major
effort in the second half of the year, and will require a
strong leadership effort by the U.S. and our allies. Absent
that kind of energetic activity, there will be minimal
progress to report on "20 in 10" at the November CSP.

--------------
NIL DECLARATIONS
--------------


10. (U) South Africa, New Zealand and Iran have made clear
they will not accept a decision to adopt nil declarations.
Del rep will continue to meet with key delegations to see if
there is any way forward. However, there is little reason to
expect that a decision implementing "nil declarations" can be
achieved. It is still the goal of the facilitator, however,
to achieve some manner of CSP decision on "late declarations"
to serve as a sign of life within the Industry Cluster, and
to show some progress on the long list of outstanding
industry issues from the First RevCon. The unresolved
aspects (like "nil declarations") would be referred to the
Second RevCon for consideration.

--------------
RUSSIAN DESTRUCTION
--------------


11. (SBU) It appears there is a stand-off on the specific
issue of whether Russia has completed destruction of 20 per
cent of its stockpile, and the larger issue of end-point of
destruction. The U.S. has made clear it is not ready to
approve the Maradykovsky facility agreement and verification
plan, particularly when the incinerator for second stage
destruction is not yet operational. (Note: Dominique Anelli
of the chem demil branch at the TS recently said that he
agreed the incinerator would not be operational before the
September EC, so he personally expects another deferral of
those documents. However, he thought it would be operational
before the November CSP.) In return, the Russians made clear
at EC-49 that they intend to hold all U.S. documents hostage.



12. (U) This is not a particularly pleasant situation, but
probably better than any alternative. The DG's statement at
EC-49 will remain the OPCW public line on Russian
destruction, and in view of the extensive caveats and
explanations, is not wholly unsatisfactory. U.S. objections
to giving Russia credit at this point have been made clear to
all, and most other delegations seem disinclined to take a
stand on the issue. Of the small group that ordinarily takes
a strong interest in CW destruction, France and Germany seem
to most closely share U.S. concerns. Bilateral discussions
with Russia during EC-49 made it quite clear that, despite
the DG's "understanding" with Russia, Russia itself does not
view second stage destruction as a treaty obligation, a fact
the U.S. has shared with WEOG.


13. (U) While the Russians will continue to try to get
"credit," it is not apparent they will make a big push on
this issue before EC-50 and again, it is doubtful that
delegations are ready to take definitive positions on this
question. However, should the incinerator become operational
before the CSP, del anticipates that this will again become a
key topic for discussion. It was also noteworthy during
EC-49 that Iran chose not to press the issue of whether or
not Russia had met its 20 per cent deadline; it is still
possible that even in the absence of an operational
incinerator, a simple legal question from one or more
delegations could easily spark further discussion. Based on
the fact that the second stage will be under TS verification,
the TS and most delegations are supportive of giving Russia
credit for destruction after first stage processing. Any
U.S. effort to deny that outcome would have to be backed up
by very cogent argumentation.

--------------
OCPF SITE SELECTION
--------------


14. (U) The DG's issuance of a TS note modifying certain
technical aspects of the OCPF site selection methodology
could have been handled more smoothly. While it provide an
improvement over the existing system, the way in which it was
announced generated questions from delegations and a
substantial amount of ill-will. And the way in which the
note was presented makes it very unlikely that someone will
step forward to serve as facilitator, to address the
outstanding issue of political nominations.


15. (U) In this case, such a "pause" would be the best
option, and the delegation strongly recommends not returning
to this issue until early 2008. This would allow memories to
fade somewhat regarding the manner in which the DG announced
this change, and humiliated the previous facilitator. In
addition, it would provide more time for the delegation to
get the views of other SPs and also have more extensive
discussions with the TS about the change, which will only
become operational in January. The U.S. urged the DG to take
this step, and while neither the timing of the announcement
nor the substance were what was anticipated, it would be best
for the U.S. to request a reconsideration of the change only

when it can argue that it is necessary to address the
concerns of a number of key delegations.

--------------
CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS
--------------


16. (U) The TS continues to make steady progress on
increasing its capabilities to conduct a CI. As with alleged
use, the more attention given to CI increases the likelihood
that certain delegations will try to slow or derail the
process, so it is probably advantageous that there remains no
CI facilitator. Instead, the TS is working the specific
technical issues, and individual States Parties are hosting
CI exercises. Indeed, the Dutch-hosted event in September is
an example of what happens when a CI-related issue shows up
on the radar screen of delegations. While the U.S. supported
what should have been the non-contentious idea of exercising
the EC role in a CI, concerns and objections raised by some
delegations killed this part of the exercise.

--------------
TENURE POLICY
--------------


17. (U) It will be important to continue monitoring the
number of departures (especially more experienced officials)
from the TS for the second-half of the year. The adoption in
2006 of the DG's modification of the tenure policy has not
had a major impact on the TS departures. Indeed, the 2008
budget requests additional funding for HR due to the
unexpectedly high personnel turnover. While it is not
politically feasible for the DG to propose another
modification of tenure this year, it may become a key
priority early in 2008 if the loss of personnel and expertise
is not staunched.

--------------
ARTICLE XI
--------------


18. (U) Newly-appointed facilitator Li Hong (PRC) held his
first set of consultations on July 12, and they were rather
predictable. The expected calls from Iran and some other NAM
delegations for an Article XI action plan were more rote than
heart-felt, and del rep merely needed to reiterate U.S.
objections to end the discussion. The bulk of Li's
facilitation focused on TS activity in the Article XI area,
which was not contentious. Should the consultations continue
in this manner, they may produce constructive results. And
if the NAM is satisfied with merely going through the motions
on pushing for an action plan, this will be a low-profile
issue that will heat up again in the run-up to the RevCon.


19. (U) Ito sends.
GALLAGHER