NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: DUTCH VIEWS LEADING UP TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000125

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA, EUR/UBI, EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: NATO PINS PREL MARR MOPS AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: DUTCH VIEWS LEADING UP TO
NATO MINISTERIALS

REF: A. STATE 4834

B. STATE 7434

Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: The GONL for the most part agrees with our
NATO foreign and defense ministerial goals for Afghanistan.
Dutch officials expressed both support and concern regarding
the USG-proposed "Comprehensive Approach," and hoped we will
continue to balance kinetic and development operations. On
increased reconstruction funding, the Dutch agree more should
be done through the UN, but the UN should do more in the
southern provinces. They also are looking at reconstruction
projects along the Pakistan border. On counter-narcotics,
the Dutch plan to announce at the foreign ministerial
approval of Afghan local government-led eradication efforts
in Uruzgan, contingent on a list of conditions. The GONL
supports increasing the visibility of the Joint Coordination
and Monitoring Board (JCMB),and have requested to be
included in future G-8 Afghanistan-related discussions. On
public diplomacy, the Dutch agree more needs to be done by
Allies to convince their publics, but also suggested the USG
do more to increase European public awareness of USG
reconstruction efforts. The GONL will support SACEUR's call
to fill Combined Joint Statement of Requirement (CJSOR)
shortfalls, but is skeptical of success and limited in its
ability to contribute additional forces. They are reviewing
an assistance package to bolster the Afghan National Police;
however, domestic sentiment limits their ability to provide
Afghan National Security Forces with arms or ammunition.
Internally, the GONL is reviewing options for possibly
extending its deployment in some capacity, and will make a
decision on extending by the end of the year. However, much
depends on the current situation on-the-ground, as well as
on-going coalition formation negotiations. End summary.


2. (U) Ambassador Arnall discussed reftel foreign and defense
ministerial goals on Afghanistan with MOD Director for
General Policy Affairs Lo Casteleijn on January 19, and with
Dutch CHOD Gen. Berlijn on January 19 and 22. MFA Uruzgan
Task Force Coordinator Pieter-Jan Kleiweg de Zwaan discussed
foreign ministerial goals with polmiloff on January 18 and 23.

Comprehensive Strategy
--------------


3. (C) Dutch officials at various levels have expressed both
support and concern for the USG-proposed "Comprehensive
Approach" on Afghanistan. Casteleijn said any "comprehensive
approach" should be all-encompassing, to include Afghan
security and local government elements. Dutch CHOD Gen.
Berlijn echoed these sentiments January 19, suggesting it was
important to define what exactly is meant by "comprehensive
strategy." He said some might perceive it as meaning more
kinetic operations and "dealing the Taliban a final military
blow" -- if that is what is meant, Berlijn said, then the
Dutch will have problems.

Increased Reconstruction Funding
--------------


4. (C) Kleiweg said the GONL fully supports working through
the GOA and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
on reconstruction funding, but is critical of the UN's
reluctance to work in the southern provinces. Kleiweg noted
that ISAF has a UN mandate, but new UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-moon neglected to mention Afghanistan as a UN priority.
Kleiweg also stressed the importance of assistance from the
EU and international NGOs; EU projects on police and rule of
law were steps in the right direction, but much more needs to
be done. Kleiweg also said the Dutch would be interested in
possibly funding a project related to the GOA's
reconciliation Program Takhim-e-Solh (PTS),and were actively
looking for a concrete proposal in that regard.

Bolster Commitment to Counter-Narcotics
--------------


5. (C) On counter-narcotics, Kleiweg acknowledged that the
GONL was re-examining its position on eradication.
Previously, the Dutch opposed eradication without providing a
viable alternative to poppy farming. Kleiweg said, however,
that the "on-the-ground reality" suggests steps need to be
taken now on counter-narcotics so that farmers understand

poppy cultivation carries economic risks, and Uruzgan
Governor Monib favors eradication efforts.


6. (C) Kleiweg said the GONL plans to announce during the
NATO Foreign Ministerial that it is prepared to accept
Monib-led eradication efforts, contingent on a list of
conditions. For example, eradication should not be carried
out near large markets or target small farmers. In addition,
the Dutch will push Gov. Monib to carry out balanced,
"tribally neutral" eradication efforts to avoid the
perception that one tribe in particular was being punished.
Kleiweg added that additional "cash for work" projects would
be initiated in eradicated areas to provide a short-term
economic alternative. Longer term, Kleiweg said the Dutch
will continue to look at alternatives and possibly subsidies,
although he expressed concern subsidies might send the wrong
message by rewarding bad behavior.

Support Civilian Cooperation Framework
--------------


7. (C) Kleiweg said the Dutch fully support improving
existing structures by increasing the visibility of the Joint
Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) with meetings at the
Political Director level. Kleiweg noted that the French
proposal from the NATO Riga Summit for an Afghanistan
"Contact Group" was dead, and that civilian cooperation
efforts should be coordinated by the JCMB. He said the Dutch
will participate in the JCMB Political Directors meeting in
Berlin on January 30, and expressed interest in subsequent
G-8 discussions on Afghanistan. Given the level of their
involvement in Afghanistan, the Dutch argue they should be
included in G-8 Afghanistan deliberations, and have demarched
both Berlin and London about the possibility of sitting in,
Kleiweg said.

Public Diplomacy Campaign
--------------


8. (C) Dutch officials at all levels supported the need for
better public diplomacy campaigns regarding Afghanistan.
Kleiweg agreed with the need to enhance public diplomacy
campaigns at home, and also stated support for better public
relations by Karzai, including especially in the southern
provinces. Kleiweg noted that a number of GOA officials have
roots in Uruzgan, but rarely come to visit -- this does not
help instill confidence in the national government at the
local level.


9. (C) Gen. Berlijn stressed January 22 the need for the USG
to better explain its reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.
He noted that despite the fact that the USG leads investment
efforts in Afghanistan -- and is spending "a lot of money in
Uruzgan" -- the European public still believes the United
States values kinetic operations over development. Berlijn
acknowledged that the press certainly is part of the problem,
as it tends to focus more on military operations and "body
counts" -- that sells newspapers. But if the USG could
better explain its own reconstruction efforts and present the
kinetic/development balance in Afghanistan, Berlijn argued,
then perhaps other Allies might be inclined to contribute
more toward ISAF.

Shortfalls and Caveats
--------------


10. (C) Dutch officials at all levels note that Dutch forces
are overstretched in Afghanistan, and are therefore unlikely
to contribute additional forces in answer to shortfalls
identified by the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements
(CJSOR) review. That said, FM Bot will support SACEUR's call
for more contributions at the foreign ministerial. Kleiweg
was pessimistic on chances of filling CJSOR shortfalls, and
said countries like Norway that have expressed some interest
in contributing more will face considerable pressure. He was
curious "what the USG would be bringing to the table"
regarding contributing more forces. The GONL rescinded its
national caveats pertaining to operations -- but not
detainees -- prior to the Riga Summit.

Training/Equipping ANSF
--------------


11. (C) Kleiweg said domestic opposition effectively prevents

the GONL from contributing equipment such as arms and
ammunition to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).
However, the GONL was currently working on a five million
Euro package aimed at bolstering Afghan National Police
strongholds at the local level, and consisting of cars and
trucks, ambulances, and possibly even basic support like
computer equipment for administrative purposes. Kleiweg said
the Dutch want to ensure the money and donations are managed
carefully, especially given the level of corruption in
Afghanistan.

Keeping the Heat on Pakistan
--------------


12. (C) Kleiweg noted reftel B reference to increasing Allied
awareness and support for efforts with Pakistan to disrupt
Taliban and other extremist use of Pakistani territory for
cross-border activities. Kleiweg said the Dutch also will
highlight this issue at the foreign ministerial, pushing
Pakistan to do more in these efforts, especially regarding
removing Taliban leadership in Quetta.

Extension Possibilities?
--------------


13. (C) Kleiweg said the MFA fully understands NATO's mission
in Afghanistan will take longer than two years to be
successful, and will likely support an extension of Dutch
forces in Afghanistan beyond 2008. The key question, Kleiweg
said, will be in what capacity -- either continued in Uruzgan
with perhaps anothercountry in the lead, or in another
location. Heanticipated stiff opposition in Parliament,
especally as some parties want to do more in Africa, an
operating in both Africa and Afghanistan would e "out of the
question." At the very least, Kleweg said the MFA will push
hard to keep the optin of extending open as government
coalition formaion negotiations proceed -- but a decision
must e made by the end of the year for logistical reasos.


14. (C) Casteleijn also acknowledged that reonstruction
efforts will take longer than the tw years to which the
Dutch have committed. He sugested that Labor Party (PvdA)
leadership be aske the same question publicly; he suspected
PvdA arees the mission requires more time, but has been
reluctant to voice that opinion because it may beat odds
with their party's rank-and-file. Castelijn said that if
the Dutch deployment is extende, the Dutch will most likely
reduce troop number and look for another ally in addition to
Austraia with which to partner, perhaps Norway. He adde
that the Norwegian FM was impressed with Dutch eforts to
balance kinetic and development operatins during a recent
visit to Uruzgan.


15. (C) erlijn also said an extension was possible, but
uggested demonstrating short-term success to the Dtch
public was vital. A difficult spring offensie leading to an
imbalance of kinetic over reconsruction efforts would build
cynicism in the Nethrlands and contribute to the belief that
the Duth should honor their two-year commitment "to theletter" with no extension. If, however, the Dutch an
demonstrate short-term reconstruction successs and rising
Afghan confidence in Dutch efforts - coupled with requisite
combat operations -- then chances were good the Dutch
Parliament and public could be convinced tha the Dutch
should stay longer in Afghanistan, Belijn said.

ARNALL