Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07THEHAGUE1091
2007-06-08 08:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:
NEW DUTCH DEVELOPMENT MINISTER ON WORLD BANK
how-toVZCZCXRO9478 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHTC #1091/01 1590842 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 080842Z JUN 07 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9401 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0491 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASH DC PRIORITY RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001091
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/UBI, EUR/ERA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2017
TAGS: EAID ECON EFIN IBRD PINR AF NL
SUBJECT: NEW DUTCH DEVELOPMENT MINISTER ON WORLD BANK
PRESIDENT, AFGHANISTAN
REF: A. STATE 73691
B. THE HAGUE 325
Classified by Ambassador Roland Arnall.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001091
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/UBI, EUR/ERA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2017
TAGS: EAID ECON EFIN IBRD PINR AF NL
SUBJECT: NEW DUTCH DEVELOPMENT MINISTER ON WORLD BANK
PRESIDENT, AFGHANISTAN
REF: A. STATE 73691
B. THE HAGUE 325
Classified by Ambassador Roland Arnall.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY. In a meeting with Ambassador Arnall, new
Development Cooperation Minister Koenders said Robert
Zoellick was a credible World Bank presidential candidate but
that future nominations should be open to candidates
worldwide. He said NATO should remain in Afghanistan,
despite mixed results to date. Improving the situation on
the ground required a common approach to Afghan President
Karzai and Pakistan as well as a careful balancing of the
risks and rewards related to counter-terrorism efforts. With
extensive previous experience in development and Africa,
Koenders can be expected to increase Dutch development
efforts on that continent. He will also remain an active
voice in the Afghanistan debate. END SUMMARY.
-------------- --------------
Zoellick a Credible Candidate for World Bank Leadership...
-------------- --------------
2. (C) Ambassador Arnall used a May 31 introductory meeting
to deliver ref A points to Albert Gerard (Bert) Koenders, who
took up his position in February as Minister for Development
Cooperation in the center-left Balkenende IV cabinet (ref B).
Koenders said Robert Zoellick was an interesting and
credible candidate whose background in trade and Africa
improved his chances of becoming World Bank President. With
Wolfowitz's early departure, he added, it was "not illogical"
that his replacement be an American. Although pressed by
Ambassador Arnall, Koenders stopped short of offering GONL
public support for Zoellick's nomination.
-------------- --
...but Future Nomination Process Should be Open
-------------- --
3. (C) Koenders said future presidencies should be opened to
candidates from all countries, as the World Bank was a global
institution. The world situation had changed since the
institution was created in 1944, he noted. If countries with
large trade and aid flows were excluded, the Bank risked
becoming "irrelevant," he argued. This had already happened
to the IMF, whose structure did not reflect the emerging
economies of Asia and Latin America. The World Bank and IMF
were "key institutions," Koenders added, and their management
structure needed to account for the rise of India and China.
4. (C) Ambassador Arnall expressed concern that opening the
nomination process might subject it to political pressure.
Koenders replied that any future nomination process would
require broad support from the international community and
World Bank and IMF staff. To avoid politicizing the process,
each country could have a voice weighted by the size of its
economy, he added.
-------------- --------------
NATO Should Stay in Afghanistan, but Results Mixed
-------------- --------------
5. (C) On Afghanistan, the Dutch military presence was
playing a positive stabilizing role in the country and
increased levels of U.S. aid were starting to improve
economic conditions. These were indicators NATO should stay,
Koenders said. While the future was unclear, he said the
Dutch had a clear consensus to intervene. He agreed that
Afghanistan should not have been left alone during the
crucial years of 2002-2003. The resulting void was filled by
the Taliban, Koenders noted, and it would be a "mistake" if
NATO left now. The Dutch, he added, were trying to work with
the Canadians, Australians, and Germans to move forward in
Afghanistan. Koenders said the Germans were likely to
increase funding, but that involvement in Afghanistan was an
"uneasy" debate in Germany. Meanwhile, the absence of the UN
or EU was "a shame," he said.
6. (C) On the ground, Afghanistan was a "mixed bag" with
some limited improvements, Koenders said. He added it was
important to look at tangible results -- rather than just
intentions -- when judging success.
THE HAGUE 00001091 002 OF 003
--------------
Afghanistan's Drug Economy a Problem
--------------
7. (C) Afghanistan had a drug economy, Koenders said, and
NATO needed to act now to address it, as drug consuming
countries were also responsible for the problem. He
suggested the right approach would include working with
Pakistan and helping the Afghan police with counter-drug
intelligence. The wrong approach, he said, was increasing
eradication and targeting small farmers. This would simply
lose "hearts and minds" while increasing support for the
"guys we want to fight." NATO should also stop working with
warlords who contribute to the drug problem, Koenders said,
although he acknowledged some of the same warlords also
contributed to general security.
--------------
As is the Lack of Consensus within NATO
--------------
8. (C) In many ways, Afghanistan was "a test" for NATO,
which was divided on three key issues, Koenders said. First,
NATO should send one, clear political signal to Pakistan.
Second, Afghan President Karzai should receive a consistent
message regarding concerns over warlords and drugs. Third,
NATO required a common approach that balanced
counter-terrorism efforts with the risk that these same
efforts might facilitate terrorist recruitment. The risk,
Koenders said, was that Afghanistan would become another Iraq.
-------------- --------------
Comment/Bio Info: Koenders Likely to Emphasize Africa...
-------------- --------------
9. (C) Koenders (49) is no stranger to development issues.
As a political advisor to the Special Representative of the
Secretary General of the UN, he worked in Mozambique, South
SIPDIS
Africa, and Mexico. He is also a former member of the
Governing Council of the Society for International
Development, Chair of the Board of the Parliamentary Network
of the World Bank, and Chair of the Board of the Netherlands
Atlantic Association. A gifted speaker (both in English and
Dutch),he has a degree in political and social sciences from
the University of Amsterdam and also graduated from the Johns
Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies
in Bologna, Italy, and Washington, D.C., specializing in
international economics and international relations. He
later served as a visiting professor at the Johns Hopkins
University School of Advanced International Studies in
Bologna. Meanwhile, his service as the Principal
Administrator for the policy planning staff at the European
Commission's Directorate-General for external relations,
conflict prevention, and EU enlargement should make him
friendly toward working through multilateral channels.
10. (C) Traditionally in the Netherlands, the Minister for
Development Cooperation becomes the de facto Minister for
Africa. An advocate for preventive action and diplomacy as a
means to prevent conflict and humanitarian crises, Koenders
is likely to make Africa a higher priority than his
predecessor, Ardenne van der Hoeven. While Koenders has yet
to announce any significant changes in Dutch development
policy, he has already taken steps to end efforts -- began
under van der Hoeven -- to include funding for security
sector reform in the definition of official development
assistance.
-------------- --------------
...and Remain a Central Figure in the Afghanistan Debate
-------------- --------------
11. (C) As the Foreign Affairs spokesman for the PvdA (Labor
Party) prior to the 2006 elections, Koenders is credited with
convincing then-Party leader Wouter Bos to support the Dutch
deployment to Uruzgan -- support that was critical in
building the necessary Parliamentary majority for the
mission. Many rank-and-file members of the PvdA, however,
believe this decision was a mistake which cost the PvdA at
the polls. Both Koenders and Bos (now Minister for Finance
and Deputy Prime Minister in the coalition government) are
under pressure from within their party to oppose an extension
of the mission past July, 2008. Demonstrable success on the
development front in Uruzgan, however, could help Koenders
THE HAGUE 00001091 003 OF 003
build a justification supporting extension.
ARNALL
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/UBI, EUR/ERA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2017
TAGS: EAID ECON EFIN IBRD PINR AF NL
SUBJECT: NEW DUTCH DEVELOPMENT MINISTER ON WORLD BANK
PRESIDENT, AFGHANISTAN
REF: A. STATE 73691
B. THE HAGUE 325
Classified by Ambassador Roland Arnall.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY. In a meeting with Ambassador Arnall, new
Development Cooperation Minister Koenders said Robert
Zoellick was a credible World Bank presidential candidate but
that future nominations should be open to candidates
worldwide. He said NATO should remain in Afghanistan,
despite mixed results to date. Improving the situation on
the ground required a common approach to Afghan President
Karzai and Pakistan as well as a careful balancing of the
risks and rewards related to counter-terrorism efforts. With
extensive previous experience in development and Africa,
Koenders can be expected to increase Dutch development
efforts on that continent. He will also remain an active
voice in the Afghanistan debate. END SUMMARY.
-------------- --------------
Zoellick a Credible Candidate for World Bank Leadership...
-------------- --------------
2. (C) Ambassador Arnall used a May 31 introductory meeting
to deliver ref A points to Albert Gerard (Bert) Koenders, who
took up his position in February as Minister for Development
Cooperation in the center-left Balkenende IV cabinet (ref B).
Koenders said Robert Zoellick was an interesting and
credible candidate whose background in trade and Africa
improved his chances of becoming World Bank President. With
Wolfowitz's early departure, he added, it was "not illogical"
that his replacement be an American. Although pressed by
Ambassador Arnall, Koenders stopped short of offering GONL
public support for Zoellick's nomination.
-------------- --
...but Future Nomination Process Should be Open
-------------- --
3. (C) Koenders said future presidencies should be opened to
candidates from all countries, as the World Bank was a global
institution. The world situation had changed since the
institution was created in 1944, he noted. If countries with
large trade and aid flows were excluded, the Bank risked
becoming "irrelevant," he argued. This had already happened
to the IMF, whose structure did not reflect the emerging
economies of Asia and Latin America. The World Bank and IMF
were "key institutions," Koenders added, and their management
structure needed to account for the rise of India and China.
4. (C) Ambassador Arnall expressed concern that opening the
nomination process might subject it to political pressure.
Koenders replied that any future nomination process would
require broad support from the international community and
World Bank and IMF staff. To avoid politicizing the process,
each country could have a voice weighted by the size of its
economy, he added.
-------------- --------------
NATO Should Stay in Afghanistan, but Results Mixed
-------------- --------------
5. (C) On Afghanistan, the Dutch military presence was
playing a positive stabilizing role in the country and
increased levels of U.S. aid were starting to improve
economic conditions. These were indicators NATO should stay,
Koenders said. While the future was unclear, he said the
Dutch had a clear consensus to intervene. He agreed that
Afghanistan should not have been left alone during the
crucial years of 2002-2003. The resulting void was filled by
the Taliban, Koenders noted, and it would be a "mistake" if
NATO left now. The Dutch, he added, were trying to work with
the Canadians, Australians, and Germans to move forward in
Afghanistan. Koenders said the Germans were likely to
increase funding, but that involvement in Afghanistan was an
"uneasy" debate in Germany. Meanwhile, the absence of the UN
or EU was "a shame," he said.
6. (C) On the ground, Afghanistan was a "mixed bag" with
some limited improvements, Koenders said. He added it was
important to look at tangible results -- rather than just
intentions -- when judging success.
THE HAGUE 00001091 002 OF 003
--------------
Afghanistan's Drug Economy a Problem
--------------
7. (C) Afghanistan had a drug economy, Koenders said, and
NATO needed to act now to address it, as drug consuming
countries were also responsible for the problem. He
suggested the right approach would include working with
Pakistan and helping the Afghan police with counter-drug
intelligence. The wrong approach, he said, was increasing
eradication and targeting small farmers. This would simply
lose "hearts and minds" while increasing support for the
"guys we want to fight." NATO should also stop working with
warlords who contribute to the drug problem, Koenders said,
although he acknowledged some of the same warlords also
contributed to general security.
--------------
As is the Lack of Consensus within NATO
--------------
8. (C) In many ways, Afghanistan was "a test" for NATO,
which was divided on three key issues, Koenders said. First,
NATO should send one, clear political signal to Pakistan.
Second, Afghan President Karzai should receive a consistent
message regarding concerns over warlords and drugs. Third,
NATO required a common approach that balanced
counter-terrorism efforts with the risk that these same
efforts might facilitate terrorist recruitment. The risk,
Koenders said, was that Afghanistan would become another Iraq.
-------------- --------------
Comment/Bio Info: Koenders Likely to Emphasize Africa...
-------------- --------------
9. (C) Koenders (49) is no stranger to development issues.
As a political advisor to the Special Representative of the
Secretary General of the UN, he worked in Mozambique, South
SIPDIS
Africa, and Mexico. He is also a former member of the
Governing Council of the Society for International
Development, Chair of the Board of the Parliamentary Network
of the World Bank, and Chair of the Board of the Netherlands
Atlantic Association. A gifted speaker (both in English and
Dutch),he has a degree in political and social sciences from
the University of Amsterdam and also graduated from the Johns
Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies
in Bologna, Italy, and Washington, D.C., specializing in
international economics and international relations. He
later served as a visiting professor at the Johns Hopkins
University School of Advanced International Studies in
Bologna. Meanwhile, his service as the Principal
Administrator for the policy planning staff at the European
Commission's Directorate-General for external relations,
conflict prevention, and EU enlargement should make him
friendly toward working through multilateral channels.
10. (C) Traditionally in the Netherlands, the Minister for
Development Cooperation becomes the de facto Minister for
Africa. An advocate for preventive action and diplomacy as a
means to prevent conflict and humanitarian crises, Koenders
is likely to make Africa a higher priority than his
predecessor, Ardenne van der Hoeven. While Koenders has yet
to announce any significant changes in Dutch development
policy, he has already taken steps to end efforts -- began
under van der Hoeven -- to include funding for security
sector reform in the definition of official development
assistance.
-------------- --------------
...and Remain a Central Figure in the Afghanistan Debate
-------------- --------------
11. (C) As the Foreign Affairs spokesman for the PvdA (Labor
Party) prior to the 2006 elections, Koenders is credited with
convincing then-Party leader Wouter Bos to support the Dutch
deployment to Uruzgan -- support that was critical in
building the necessary Parliamentary majority for the
mission. Many rank-and-file members of the PvdA, however,
believe this decision was a mistake which cost the PvdA at
the polls. Both Koenders and Bos (now Minister for Finance
and Deputy Prime Minister in the coalition government) are
under pressure from within their party to oppose an extension
of the mission past July, 2008. Demonstrable success on the
development front in Uruzgan, however, could help Koenders
THE HAGUE 00001091 003 OF 003
build a justification supporting extension.
ARNALL