CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): ACHIEVING U.S.

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001018

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR LEDDY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): ACHIEVING U.S.
GOALS (AND AVOIDING IRAN)

This is CWC-45-07.


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: It has become increasingly apparent that
most formal consultations at the OPCW are of marginal value
in meeting U.S. goals and objectives, and there are much more
productive ways of achieving progress. On certain subjects
(budget, Article VII),they are obviously unavoidable.
However, consultations are usually of more value to Iran in
attempting to stymie work at the OPCW. There is a need to
deal with the overarching issue of countering Iranian efforts
to block progress, particularly at Executive Council
sessions. However, it appears the best way to achieve
progress on what Washington wants is not to hold fruitless
consultations, but to find alternative ways to get work done,
such as through work with the Technical Secretariat, or
prompting efforts by other States Parties. End Summary.


2. (U) Late Declarations: Two events this year have affected
the perceptions of the delegation (and most other dels) on
how to proceed with work at the OPCW. The first was Iran's
performance at the March EC which led to a conclusion of the
session at 23:00 on Friday evening, with all the blame
squarely on Iran's shoulders. The second incident was the
latest consultations on late declarations, where Iran
(admittedly supported by South Africa) set work back to
square one by asking for papers and clarifications from the
TS. Unfortunately, it is necessary to have some type of EC

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blessing on this particular issue, so it will be important to
find some way of regaining ground in the consultation.
However, there is a considerable risk that Iran will block
any work in formal consultations.


3. (U) Article VII: Work on this topic provides a good
example of how to get what Washington wants by focusing on
the work of the TS, not consultations. After continuously
repeating the mantra that the TS needs to do substantially
more technical assistance visits to promote full national
implementation, the Del believes that message has sunk in.
It is apparent that under the direction of Legal Advisor
Onate, there has been a considerable increase in the quantity
and quality of TS performance. They are scheduling more
targeted visits, and have reduced substantially the number of
workshops and conferences. The TS provided a lengthy report
on its activities at the May 22 consultation (which will be
sent back to Washington once it has been distributed by the
TS).

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4. (U) Indeed, the concern in the Delegation was that
holding the consultation would give Iran the opportunity to
raise questions about TS activities and throw a spanner in
the works. Fortunately, that did not happen. But it is a
clear indication that consultations now generate more concern
about how they might blow up, rather than how they can
generate progress. There has been significant progress
achieved on Article VII. To the extent that can be
attributed to the TS, it is due to the pressure exerted by
the U.S. and other delegations in individual discussions with
the DG, Onate and TS staff. It clearly is not the result of
the consultation mechanism.


5. (U) The Delegation recognizes there will need to be
consultations at various points to address key issues (report
language, particularly on continued TS efforts). However,
there is every expectation that Iran will be difficult and
uncooperative, and that the final agreement will come down to
discussions with Iran at the EC or CSP. If that prediction
is correct, then there is no benefit in having numerous
consultations before the EC/CSP, and only the detriment that
Iran could use the discussion to disrupt TS work.


6. (U) Challenge Inspections: Once again, substantial
progress has been made in improving the ability of the TS to
conduct a challenge inspection, and this has nothing to do
with the frequency of consultations. The TS held a
successful table-top exercise a few weeks ago, and Germany
hosted a CI exercise last year, the results of which it
shared with delegations in an informal briefing later in the
year. The Netherlands will host an exercise in September,

and is extending an invitation to all EC members to observe.
The current discussion is on how to utilize the event so that
the EC can exercise its role in the CI process.


7. (U) All of this is achieving the U.S. goal in this area:
improving TS capabilities to conduct a CI. There is no
facilitator for the CI issue, and no one could care less.
Should a facilitator be found, it would simply lead to a
repeat of the fruitless consultations in which Iran and
like-minded delegations seek to resolve "unresolved issues"
and question the TS mandate to maintain any capability to
conduct a CI, while the U.S. and like-minded delegations
object and ask the TS to focus on capabilities. Delegations
and TS staff alike agree that more harm than good tended to
result from this particular facilitation. While the
performance of the last facilitator always made this an
entertaining consultation, it certainly did not produce a
productive result, and there is no reason that his successor
will be able to produce one either. Instead, the immediate
task is to ensure that the Netherlands exercise in September
is utilized to maximum benefit. That will mean overcoming
objections from Iran, Russia and other delegations. That
certainly will not be achieved in a consultation.


8. (SBU) OCPF Site Selection: This may well be the prime
example of the need to find methods other than consultations
to resolve an issue. After three years of fruitless
consultations in which it was increasingly apparent that
diplomats are hopeless at mathematics, the U.S. asked the
Director General to have the TS take unilateral action to
improve an important part of the OCPF site selection
mechanism. Admittedly, this does not totally resolve the
issue or meet all of Washington's objectives. However, it is
1) a significant improvement in the current mechanism, 2)
supported by almost all delegations, and 3) actually
achievable.


9. (SBU) The TS publication of its paper on site selection
highlights the readiness of the DG and the TS in general to
work with the U.S. to find solutions and move things forward.
Admittedly, there were process problems and the TS forgot
its pledge to consult with the delegation and Washington
before publishing the paper. And certainly the TS will not
always be in sync with U.S. views on how to move forward.
That, however, does not diminish the fact that the TS

generally is supportive of efforts to move ahead on practical
ways to make progress.


10. (U) Article X: To reiterate, the delegation is not
arguing that all consultations are fruitless. As in most
other cases, the question is the objective to be achieved and
the role consultations can play in reaching that objective.
The new facilitator (Jitka Brodska, Czech Republic) informed
del rep that the reason she took on the facilitation was due
to the frustration with TS performance. In discussing her
plans for her upcoming consultation, Brodska flatly said that
her goal is to use the consultation mechanism to spark
greater activity by the TS. Whether that will require
continued consultations remains to be seen, and ultimately,
will depend on how the TS responds. (Note: Brodska said she
wanted to have discussions with the delegation on how best to
avoid Iranian complications at her facilitation.)


11. (U) Risk Assessment: As another example of useful
discussions, the TS is finalizing its paper on risk
assessment for consideration by the DG, and CSP Chair
Ambassador Dastis (Spain) is ready to hold the third
discussion on the topic once the paper is distributed. The
risk assessment issue provides a good example of when an item
on the OPCW calendar is truly useful: several key delegations
(China, Mexico, etc.) had expressed great concern on this
matter last year, and it is essential that there be a
thorough discussion of this topic before engaging on the 2008
budget consultations. However, the effectiveness of the
efforts by the DG and Dastis has nothing to do with frequency
of meetings. Instead, the key is to give the TS sufficient
time to come up with solid answers and analysis for
delegations.



12. (SBU) Comment: The point which is being emphasized is
that the OPCW calendar of events is not/not the best gauge of
whether U.S. goals and objectives are being met at the OPCW.
The test should simply be whether the desired outcomes are
being achieved. In many cases, that can be accomplished by
working with the TS and spurring them to action. In other
cases, it can be by working with other delegations to
encourage them to take the initiative. Consultations are
sometimes unavoidable and may or may not be helpful for the
U.S. However, in view of the obstructionist Iranian behavior
at the OPCW, the calculus on consultations is simple: do they
provide more opportunities to assist the U.S., or provide
more opportunities for Iran?


13. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL