Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TELAVIV846
2007-03-19 13:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

EU-BAM REQUESTS USG ASSISTANCE FOR RAFAH

Tags:  PREL KWBG ECON KPAL PBTS EG IS 
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OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #0846/01 0781342
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O 191342Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0080
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS BE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 000846 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2017
TAGS: PREL KWBG ECON KPAL PBTS EG IS
SUBJECT: EU-BAM REQUESTS USG ASSISTANCE FOR RAFAH
NORMALIZATION


Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones: Reasons 1.4 (B and D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 000846

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2017
TAGS: PREL KWBG ECON KPAL PBTS EG IS
SUBJECT: EU-BAM REQUESTS USG ASSISTANCE FOR RAFAH
NORMALIZATION


Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones: Reasons 1.4 (B and D).


1. (C) Summary/comment: In a March 17 meeting with the
Ambassador, EU-BAM Commander LTG Pietro Pistolese requested
USG assistance for the EU's efforts to return to normalized
operation of the Rafah Crossing Point. Pistolese said that
Israel's continued failure to sign the Customs Protocol was
keeping Kerem Shalom from being operated as the intended
alternative to Rafah and strongly recommended that we
redouble our efforts to persuade the GOI to complete this
process. As an alternative to exports from Rafah, Pistolese
recommended that we turn our attention to opening the Gaza
Airport for cargo exports only. Helping the Palestinians
secure GOI agreement to Pistolese's recommendations could
have a significant impact on the Gaza economy, and
orchestrating their announcement in a way which attributed
the success to President Abbas could help strengthen him and
contribute to a more favorable political environment in Gaza
for Fatah by the fall. In this regard, we may wish to: (1)
continue to support EU/BAM efforts to normalize Rafah
operations, including raising the issue in the Secretary's
upcoming meetings with Olmert and Peretz; (2) push for GOI
signature of the Customs Protocol as soon as possible,
including in the Secretary's meetings with Olmert and Livni;
(3) once the Customs Protocol is signed, begin efforts to
persuade Egypt to route oversized goods and large amounts of
cash through Kerem Shalom instead of Rafah; and (4) once the
Customs Protocol is signed, begin raising the possibility of
direct cargo exports from Gaza in discussions with PA and GOI
officials, which could be accomplished by exports via Rafah
or the Gaza airport -- though opening the airport would be a
tough sell with the GOI at present. End Comment and Summary.

-------------- -
EU/BAM Mandate Renewal Hinges on Normalization
-------------- -


2. (SBU) The Ambassador met with EU/BAM Commander LTG Pietro

Pistolese on March 17 for a review of the current state of
play prior to Pistolese's return to Europe for consultations.
Pistolese said that the EU/BAM's current mandate would
expire on May 24. He expected that a decision on renewal
would not be made until about one month beforehand. In the
meantime, the EU will push for normalization. Pistolese
recommended that we continue to push for full normalization
of Rafah operations. In addition to a regular operating
schedule, he said that normalization should include the
scanning of vehicles as well as allowing exports from Rafah.



3. (SBU) As part of the EU's push for normalization at Rafah,
Marc Otte will be in the region next week for consultations
with GOI officials. If the situation does not improve
significantly, Pistolese suggested that he might recommend a
renewal for less than one year, perhaps even for as short as
one month. He also suggested that the EU/BAM could move its
base of operations to the Egyptian side of the crossing.
However, he noted that the GOI could still shut the crossing
by closing the liaison office at Kerem Shalom. Opening the
crossing without opening the liaison office would in his
opinion be a violation of the AMA and he made it clear that
the EU/BAM would not agree to this.

--------------
Rafah Crossing Stats
--------------


4. (SBU) Pistolese provided a statistical summary comparing
operations prior to the Shalit kidnapping and since. For the
212 days prior to the kidnapping, the crossing was open 211
days and the number of people crossing (in both directions)
averaged 1324 per day of operation or 1318 per day overall.
For the 266 days since the kidnapping, the crossing has been
open only 54 days. During this period throughput has
averaged 1949 per day of operation and only 395 per day
overall.


5. (SBU) The sharp reduction in days of operation has led to
a sharp decline in the total number of people traveling but
at the same time has increased dramatically the number who
attempt to transit on days the crossing is open. At times
this has led to very unruly situations. Pistolese said that
he has discussed this situation on numerous occasions with
GOI officials, who maintain that irregular operations are
necessary to foil terrorist plans, including especially
travel for training outside the country. He said that he
finds this argument totally unconvincing. So far the GOI has
only agreed to open the crossing three days per week and not
on any fixed schedule.

--------------

TEL AVIV 00000846 002 OF 002


Importance of Customs Protocol
--------------


6. (SBU) Another factor complicating Rafah operations
according to Pistolese was the failure of the Egyptian side
to exert proper control over efforts to bring goods through
the crossing. He provided pictures of buses laden with boxes
of disallowed goods waiting to be returned to Egypt,
including some with inflatable boats and even outboard motors
as well as computer equipment, food, luxury goods and so on.
Most of these goods would not normally be considered
contraband, but their import through Rafah was not allowed by
the AMA. Pistolese added that Egyptian reluctance appears to
be the main stumbling block to exports from Rafah. He
questioned why this is so, since exported goods could easily
be restricted to those destined for markets outside of Egypt.


7. (SBU) Unfortunately, according to Pistolese, Israel's
continued failure to sign the Customs Protocol was keeping
Kerem Shalom from being operated as the intended alternative.
He strongly recommended that we redouble our efforts to
persuade the GOI to complete this process. He reported that
he understood that Kerem Shalom may soon be opened for
traffic from Israel to Gaza. He thought this might
eventually pave the way for opening its gate to Egypt, too.
He also noted that even once the Customs Protocol is signed,
Egypt would have to agree to cooperate by routing goods and
large sums of cash through Kerem Shalom. He noted that large
shipments of cash through Rafah seemed to have stopped since
Haniyah's last failed effort, although this may be temporary.
Pistolese said he could not judge whether the letters that
ConGen Jerusalem and Embassy Tel Aviv sent to our respective
hosts after that incident had had an effect or not.

-------------- --------------
Pistolese Suggests Routing Cargo through Gaza Airport
-------------- --------------


8. (SBU) As an alternative to exports from Rafah, Pistolese
recommended that we turn our attention to opening the Gaza
Airport for cargo exports only (and perhaps humanitarian Hajj
flights in season). He was confident that procedures could
be developed to ensure the safety of such operations and
suggested that the EU would be ready to expand his mandate to
assist in this regard.

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