CW/BW AND EXPORT CONTROL CONSULTATIONS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 000610

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR CD DEL
THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL BWC TBIO FR UK IS
SUBJECT: CW/BW AND EXPORT CONTROL CONSULTATIONS WITH
ISRAEL, FEBRUARY 12-13, 2007

REF: A) GROMOLL-CROWLEY E-MAIL FROM 2/22 B) STATE
194383 C) STATE 17199

Classified By: Political Counselor Marc Sievers for reasons 1.4 (B and
D).


1. (C) Summary: International Security and Nonproliferation
DAS Donald Mahley led a team of experts from State and
Commerce to Israel on February 11-13 for consultations on
chemical and biological weapons non-proliferation and export
controls. In the discussions, Israeli MFA Director for Arms
Control Alon Bar reiterated Israel's commitment to preventing
proliferation of chemical or biological weapons. He said
that Israel is familiar with the CWC and BWC and supports
their objectives, but is not prepared to join them under the
current regional security situation. The Israeli delegation
asked about the role that challenge inspections could play in
Iran and noted steps the GOI is taking to strengthen its
export controls on dual-use and military items. Talks on BW
issues focused on the importance of national measures to
combat the threat and on Israeli efforts to ensure safeguards
on dual-use research. End Summary.


2. (C) Alon Bar, joined by his Deputy Tammy
Rahamimoff-Honig, Itamar Yaar (NSC),Schmuel Limone (MOD),
Ohad Orenstein (Industry/Labor/Trade) and several MOD
briefers held consultations on a range of multilateral arms
control and export control mechanisms with DAS Mahley, ISN/CB
Director Robert Mikulak, ISN/CB Deputy Director Jennie
Gromoll, Sarah Heidema from the DOC, and an Embassy
representative. As planned, the main focus for discussion
was implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
GOI officials requested DAS Mahley continue the decade-long
tradition of keeping the GOI apprised of ongoing
implementation efforts and the U.S. experience, in practical
terms, with key elements of the treaty. Discussions also
touched upon issues relating to the Biological Weapons
Convention, Wassenaar, MTCR, and Australia Group. MFA Deputy
Director General for Strategic Affairs (A/S-equivalent)
Miriam Ziv reviewed the talks in a lunch following the
February 12 meeting. DAS Mahley discussed these same topics
with Israeli experts at the Institute for National Strategic
Studies (formerly the Jaffee Center) in Tel Aviv on February

13. The delegation's visit renewed expert-level contacts and
provided both the USG and GOI with better understandings of
the other's positions on CW/BW and export control issues.

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GOI views on ratifying the CWC
--------------


3. (C) As anticipated, the Israeli team reiterated that the
GOI had signed the CWC during an optimistic time at the
height of the Peace Process in the early-1990's. Bar noted
that the regional situation was different today. He
maintained that Israel unilaterally follows guidelines
established under all the WMD regimes and should be
recognized for doing so even though the political context
does not allow for Israeli membership. Given official GOI
involvement in the preparatory work for CWC implementation,
it is keenly aware of the details of the Convention.


4. (C) DAS Mahley impressed upon GOI officials that only
North Korea, Israel, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon remain as
significant non-member states. OPCW Director-General Pfirter
has efforts underway to bring the Middle Eastern hold-outs on
board. As always, U.S. experts are prepared to work with the
GOI on the intricacies of CWC implementation at any time the
GOI deems it would be propitious to ratify the Convention.
Bar emphasized that the GOI had welcomed DG Pfirter in
Jerusalem only a short time ago and that Israeli experts had
traveled to The Hague as a gesture of interest in the CWC.
They had explained that the political threshold was too high
at this juncture to consider putting the CWC before the
Knesset. However, he allowed that political considerations
can change.


5. (C) MOD adviser Limone emphasized that he had participated
in the Preparatory Committee work on challenge inspections,
confidentiality, and health and safety. The GOI's national

SIPDIS
lab had passed OPCW proficiency tests and provided samples

for the OPCW database. Should the Israeli leadership decide
to join the CWC, there would be little change in Israel's
position on key CWC issues. Their views on ratification,
however, have changed, given the regional environment
vis--vis the CWC. The national mood is one of apprehension
and suspicion. Iran is a growing threat and is in blatant
violation of its treaty obligations. Even a challenge
inspection could allow them to go "scot-free." He said that
the GOI has postponed joining, but has not ruled it out.


6. (C) Limone argued that the Syrians and Lebanese (and
Egyptians less vocally) who showed up for OPCW meetings on
universality in the Middle East take pains to point out their
attendance does not indicate political movement toward
joining. The EU demarches all three countries each year on
non-proliferation and UNSCR 1540, but to no avail. He
contrasted the behavior of the Arab hold-outs with that of
Israel, which he maintained takes non-proliferation seriously
and continues to assess developments in the treaty regimes.
Israel holds detailed bilaterals with the Australians after
Australia Group (CW/BW export control) meetings. In his view
(shared by Bar),Israel is therefore not in the same
non-state party category as Syria and North Korea. DAS
Mahley responded that, in lieu of improvement in the overall
situation, the U.S. will continue to encourage all four
regional states to join the CWC as a step in the right
direction and in support of a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle
East.

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CWC and OPCW adapting; CW destruction difficulties remain
-------------- --------------


7. (SBU) DAS Mahley noted that in this tenth anniversary
year, the U.S. assessment of the functioning of the CWC and
the implementing body, the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),was positive. The OPCW is one of
the more effective multilateral organizations which does a
reasonable job of adapting to the chemical weapons (CW)
threat. It has not been as successful in regard to CW
destruction; the Russians are struggling to achieve
destruction of 20 percent of their stockpile by the
treaty-mandated date for 100 percent; the U.S. has so far
been able to destroy only 40 percent of its declared
stockpile, due in part to domestic regulatory issues, even
though the U.S. has spent billions of dollars on the program.
Over the last decade the OPCW and member states have
developed a stable and effective inspection regime. We are
considering how to adapt to a future situation when CW
destruction is complete and there is a large inspectorate and
changes in technology -- as well as somewhat outdated lists
of declared chemicals.


8. (C) ISN/CB Office Director Mikulak added that one treaty
requirement -- sampling and analysis -- has only begun and is
potentially a useful tool for inspectors. Inspectors use
blinding software to insure that only scheduled chemicals are
displayed, thus protecting commercial secrets. The
equipment, however, is cumbersome (1500 lbs for analysis
on-site). He also pointed out the importance of domestic
implementation vis-a-vis non-state actors. There is a
systematic effort underway in The Hague, where the OPCW and
the U.S. are using pressure and assistance to encourage
member states to put penal legislation into place. This is
required under UNSCR 1540 as well.

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Routine and challenge inspections
--------------


9. (C) The U.S. team noted that challenge inspections have
not occurred and have never been considered something to be
done routinely to clarify declarations. The threshold is
much higher for an illicit program. There are some team
chiefs that want to expand the scope of their routine
inspections in industry, but their numbers are dwindling.
The U.S. continues to push for increased inspections at
commercial facilities and is making some progress in shifting
the focus to those developing countries we suspect of
dual-use enterprises. The U.S. has fared well during OPCW
inspections, only having a few uncertainties, in some cases

related to records unavailable at the time of the inspection
and provided subsequently. We continue to make clear that
the CWC schedules of chemicals are for verification purposes
only and do not constitute a full list of chemical weapons or
their ingredients. The U.S. is reluctant to modify the
schedules. However, there are indications of CW being
produced from chemicals that are not on the lists and thus
not subject to declaration and inspection.


10. (C) The Israeli team was interested in whether there is a
level of inspection between routine and challenge. OPCW
Director-General Pfirter had replied that it was not a simple
answer. Mikulak noted that the OPCW had inquired of parties
about undeclared facilities; however, there are no measures
other than a challenge inspection to allow inspection of
undeclared sites. Limone maintained that challenge
inspections are now seen as a punitive tool. He asked why
USG had not pushed for a challenge inspection in Iran despite
the fact that U.S. officials had said Iran was in violation
of the CWC with alleged maintenance of chemical weapons
production facilities. DAS Mahley explained that a challenge
inspection had become such a high-profile instrument that if
one could not be confident of finding a "smoking gun" by
means of the inspection, there was a real danger that
pursuing the inspection would actually provide diplomatic
"top cover" for the proliferators. However the USG continues
to examine scenarios of how it could work with a variety of
CWC Parties.

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Export controls and tracking arms sales/transfers
-------------- --------------


11. (C/NF) Limone reported that the GOI had ensured domestic
legislation was in place; the GOI is in the last stages of
pushing updated export control laws through the Knesset. He
said that Israel is careful about exporting dual-use
equipment that could be used for military purposes. MOD
intelligence officers briefed the delegation on Iranian arms
trafficking/support for Hizballah and regional efforts to
develop CW/BW. MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic
Affairs (A/S-equivalent) Miriam Ziv later expressed
particular interest in how the Russians track arms
sales/transfers (especially those to Syria). Experts from
both sides agreed that most countries do not have
"post-shipment verification mechanisms" (beyond an end-user
certificate). The Israelis said that they had asked a
recipient country for such an assurance for their exports and
were "refused." The GOI claimed that although they maintain
"exchanges" with key Wassenaar, MTCR and AG players, Israel
is viewed with suspicion -- particularly from the Nordics and
Russia -- for implementing the measures unilaterally.

--------------
BWC issues
--------------


12. (C) During discussions on the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC),Mahley pointed out that the U.S. had led
the effort to defeat the legally-binding verification
protocol and now felt universally vindicated by this stance,
especially given developments in biotechnology and the
security environment. Some states parties remain hopeful
that the next U.S. administration will revive the
negotiations on a legally-binding mechanism. However, the
success of the 2003-2005 BWC Work Program has shown that
national measures, to include penal legislation, are the most
critical in countering the growing BW threat -- especially
from non-state actors. The norm -- and legal obligations --
established by the BWC continue to be recognized. Efforts at
pathogen security, codes of conduct for life scientists and
the correlation between BW and disease surveillance had been
made clear in the Geneva expert meetings -- most importantly
to the non-aligned states. Participation in "Work Program"
meetings doubled from that during the Protocol negotiations
and a good number of non-aligned countries had requested
assistance.


13. (C) The Israeli NSC representative noted positive efforts
by the Israeli Academy of Science to develop recommended
measures for ensuring proper safeguards for dual-use

biological research, drawing heavily on the U.S. National
Academy of Sciences "Fink Report." These comments were
echoed by academics in a February 13 discussion in Tel Aviv
at the Institute for National Strategic Studies.


14. (U) DAS Mahley and his delegation have cleared this
message.

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