DAS DANIN AND IDF INTEL CHIEF MG YADLIN DISCUSS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002690

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPPS PINR SY IR LE IS
SUBJECT: DAS DANIN AND IDF INTEL CHIEF MG YADLIN DISCUSS
TENSIONS WITH SYRIA, RISKS OF UNINTENDED WAR

REF: A. TEL AVIV 02688

B. TEL AVIV 02672

C. TEL AVIV 02640

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b)(d).


1. (S) SUMMARY. During a meeting August 30, Israel Defense
Intelligence (IDI) Chief MG Amos Yadlin analyzed the ongoing
possibility of war with Syria for visiting NEA DAS Robert
Danin. While tensions have eased somewhat from their
mid-summer high, and while neither side wanted a fight,
Yadlin still believed there was a serious risk of war
resulting from a Syrian or Israeli miscalculation. Yadlin
also described the emerging Syria-Iran-Hizballah axis as a
serious threat to Israel and expressed alarm at the extent of
military integration the three were undergoing. Yadlin
agreed with DAS Danin that the survival of the democratic
process in Lebanon was important, but said Israel was more
preoccupied with immediate threats such as Iran, Syria,
Hamas, Hizballah and Al-Qaeda. END SUMMARY.

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Chronology of Tensions
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2. (S) DAS Danin asked whether Israeli thinking had changed
on the possibility of a near-term war with Syria, noting the
steady flow of war speculation appearing in the Israeli and
Syrian press over recent months. Yadlin responded by
describing the sequence of events that led to the heightened
fear of war. He said that in the spring of 2006, the GOI
first began to notice Syrian officials using the word
"resistance" -- a loaded and powerful concept in Arabic -- in
their comments about reclaiming the Golan Heights. He
described how tensions continued to mount during and
immediately after the summer war with Hizballah, as the SARG
began to think it could succeed in a war with Israel by
adopting the "Hizballah model" of targeting civilian centers
while luring the IDF into a guerilla-style ground campaign in
the Golan. However, by the end of 2006, Yadlin said, the
SARG "began to realize that it needed to slow down," because
as a territorial state with fixed targets, it had much more
to lose than Hizballah in any war with Israel. "But then the
Russians got involved," he said, "by spreading information
that the U.S. would attack Iran in the summer of 2007."
Reflecting the shared view of most Israeli commentators,
Yadlin said he thought the Russians had deliberately lied to
Bashar Assad in order to sell more weapons to Syria and to
reassert Russia's role in regional geopolitics. Shortly
after the Russian intervention, Yadlin said, the GOI received
"very good intelligence" indicating that the SARG had decided
"there would be war in the summer because the U.S. would
attack Iran." As a result, the SARG accelerated its military
training exercises in order to be ready for war with Israel
by June 1, although that target later slipped to August 31.
At his point, the worst of the tensions seemed to have
passed, he concluded.

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Prisoner's Dilemma
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3. (S) DAS Danin asked whether the Israelis still foresaw a
chance of war with Syria this year. Yadlin replied that
while both sides seemed to understand that the other was not
interested in war, there remained a serious risk that war
could erupt as the result of each side's heightened
readiness. "We're in a Prisoner's Dilemma," he said, whereby
the first to attack would gain the strategic advantage if it
appeared war was likely. In such a situation, there was a
high risk of miscalulation resulting in war. Asked by DAS
Danin how such a scenario might materialize, Yadlin said
there were three triggers that could initiate a war: 1) There
could be a "tactical mistake" -- for instance if the IDF
attacked a smuggling convoy near the Syria-Lebanon border and
the SARG believed that the attack occured inside Syria; 2)
There could be a "strategic miscalculation" resulting from
faulty analysis of the other side's intentions; or 3) an
"external actor" could push the sides into war through
provocation or deception. Still, Yadlin said, the Syrians
seemed to recognize they would be in a much better position
for war in 2008-2009 (after finishing their military
modernization program),and were likely to do what they could
to avoid war for the next year or so.


4. (S) DAS Danin asked whether the GOI saw any risk of a
limited Syrian strike in the Golan in order to distract
attention from the Hariri Tribunal and Syrian meddling in
Lebanon. Yadlin said that DefMin Ehud Barak was concerned
about exactly that, and was worried the Syrians would attack
with "two battalions in the fog of night taking two villages

TEL AVIV 00002690 002 OF 002


in the Golan." However, Yadlin said, while the Syrian
military seemed focused on the Golan, the regime itself
seemed more concerned about other issues, namely Lebanon,
Iraq, U.S. intentions, and above all, survival.

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Iran-Syria-Hizballah Axis
--------------


5. (S) DAS Danin thanked Yadlin for sending his deputy, IDI
Research Division Chief BG Yossi Baidatz, to European
capitals to brief governments about the ongoing arms
smuggling problem over the Syria-Lebanon border. Danin
acknowledged that it was a "hard but necessary" task, and
said briefings had helped to ensure a positive UNSCR 1701
report in June. Yadlin said that smuggling remained a
serious problem, and reflected a bigger, even more worrying
trend whereby Syria, Hizballah and Iran were "aligning as
never before." The three have integrated their systems for
defense funding, military training and weapons systems, he
said. This was a serious problem for Israel because it
essentially turned three of Israel's biggest threats into a
single, hostile force. Yadlin described his five main
threats as, in rank order: 1) Iran, 2) Syria, 3) Hamas, 4)
Hizballah, and 5) Al-Qaeda.

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Lebanon
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6. (S) DAS Danin said that the U.S. was committed to the the
survival of the democratic process in Lebanon, and noted that
as a result, the U.S. had to worry about the impact on
Lebanon of any potential deals between Syria and Israel.
Yadlin said the GOI was also interested in the survival of
democracy in Lebanon, but noted that compared to the array of
threats that Israel was forced to contend with every day, the
fate of the Lebanese political system, while important, was
of lesser concern.


7. (U) DAS Danin has cleared this message.

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