ISA CHIEF DISKIN OPPOSED TO BENCHMARKS, PROPOSES

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001705

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM KPAL KWPB EG IS
SUBJECT: ISA CHIEF DISKIN OPPOSED TO BENCHMARKS, PROPOSES
"STARTING SMALL" IN NABLUS

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: In a June 11 discussion of the security
situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (septel),Israeli
Security Agency (ISA) Head Yuval Diskin told Ambassador Jones
he personally opposes the benchmarks, viewing them as "a very
dangerous plan" that could be easily agreed upon by Israeli
and Palestinian negotiators, but impossible to implement,
with deadly consequences for Israel. Diskin stressed that he
had and would continue to advise the government against
accepting the benchmarks. He explained that, in the ISA's
analysis, the Palestinian people are not ready to see the
benchmark obligations implemented, and that Palestinian
Authority (PA) President Abbas and his security forces are
neither capable nor willing to follow through on their
responsibilities. Moving forward on the benchmarks in such a
situation would only saddle Israel with unacceptable security
risks and expose it to terrorist attacks. The Ambassador
explained that the benchmarks had been designed to be
sequenced with easier actions up front. The idea was to
build a record of success before moving onto the difficult
steps. No one expected Israel to take all the steps without
matching efforts on the Palestinian side.


2. (S) SUMMARY, CONT. In an apparently sincere effort to
provide an alternative way ahead, Diskin suggested instead
that the Palestinians be urged to demonstrate a desire to
impose security in a select West Bank location where they had
the means to do so (e.g., Nablus) for a period of time. If
the Palestinians were able to do this, then Diskin said he
would be able to convince the Israeli government to respond
in a comparable way, thereby building confidence on both
sides. Stressing that such confidence building measures
should start out small, he observed that efforts had been
made in the past to get fugitives in Nablus to promise not to
carry out violent activity, surrender their arms to
Palestinian security forces, and remain in one location.
This, he suggested, would be an activity that should not be
beyond the abilities of the Palestinian security forces, and
could help build confidence between the Israeli and
Palestinian sides. The key to success was strong high-level
political support on the Palestinian side, which so far had
been lacking. END SUMMARY.


3. (S) Diskin said that he wanted to be perfectly clear that
he is "totally against" the benchmarks. He said he had
conveyed his strong opposition to them to USSC LTG Dayton
shortly after they were shared with the Israeli side. Diskin
said that he sees the benchmarks as a "very dangerous plan":
"I know where you are going with these, and that you want to
accomplish something by the end of the year through
negotiations. This is a positive idea, but implementation of
the benchmarks would lead to disaster." Diskin explained
that it would be easy for Israeli and Palestinian negotiators
to reach a political agreement in the confines of meeting
rooms abroad. Everybody, he claimed, already understands the
formula for a final agreement. The problem, he stressed, is
that the Palestinian people (the "street") are not ready for
such an agreement: "Nothing has changed in the Palestinian
street. If the benchmarks were agreed upon and led to a
declaration of principles by the end of the year, this in
itself would be fine. But you would have a gap between the
negotiating teams and 'the street,' and this would create a
crisis. You cannot build confidence when you do not have a
strong partner on the other side." Diskin stressed that in
Israel's assessment, Palestinian Authority President Abbas
and his security apparatus are not functioning in the West
Bank or the Gaza Strip. The Palestinians would not be in a
position to implement their obligations under the benchmarks.
Israel, he said, would be required to assume all the risks
that would ensue: "How can I assume all the risks that would
come from the lifting of roadblocks and the opening of
passages between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank? I
cannot." The Ambassador explained that the benchmarks had
been designed to be sequenced with easier actions up front.
The idea was to build a record of success before moving onto
the difficult steps. No one expected Israel to take all the
steps without matching efforts on the Palestinian side.


4. (S) As a way ahead, Diskin suggested that the Israeli and
Palestinian sides focus their effort on one area, and try to
make progress there before tackling other issues. As an
example, he raised Nablus. Describing Nablus as a
particularly problematic city for Israel -- from which
numerous terrorist attacks and attempts have originated --
Diskin suggested that if the Palestinians took responsibility
for security in Nablus, which they were capable of doing,
this would be a start. Diskin lamented, however, that the

Palestinian leadership apparently is afraid or unwilling to
do this. He recounted that Palestinian businessmen had told
him that Abbas does not want to do anything to upset the
current situation, and that the Palestinian security forces
currently in Nablus are unwilling to assert themselves,
knowing that they will not get backup if they need it.


5. (S) Visibly frustrated, Diskin said, "Let the Palestinians
carry out the first confidence building measure. Then I
could remove roadblocks and free up travel." He reiterated
that Nablus and Ramallah are strategically the most important
cities in the West Bank for Israel. Fatah, he said, should
focus on the West Bank, and "make it blossom." In contrast,
Diskin stressed that Israel does not want to press Abbas to
put forces in Rafah or the northern Gaza Strip: "He will not
do it anyway, so why ask? He could put forces in the West
Bank that would be backed up by our security umbrella. After
all, we already have our forces there. Let us see them take
some responsibility in Nablus and start fighting anarchy
there." Diskin said that Israel could sign onto an agreement
concerning fugitives who are hiding in Nablus: "If they stop
attacking us, we can stop chasing them. We have tried this
before. The method is simple. You get a promise from each
fugitive that he will not attack us, and then you have him
turn his gun over to the security forces." Diskin said that
previous attempts to reach such an agreement have failed
because the security forces are afraid to enter into an
agreement with the fugitives absent political top cover. He
added that such an agreement would also require the fugitives
to stay in one location once they have signed onto it.


6. (S) Diskin reiterated that small steps need to be taken
first: "Even a journey of a hundred miles starts with a
first step." The first step, he says, cannot be confidence
building measures that entail unacceptable risks: "If we
lift the roadblocks in Kalkiliya, I can assure you that
tomorrow we will have Mohammed from Kalkiliya blowing himself
up in Tel Aviv." Diskin noted that Israel's security barrier
around the West Bank is not yet complete. He observed that
terrorists try to get into green-line Israel through
Jerusalem because the barrier around it is porous. This, he
stressed, is the reason for the roadblocks along the
Jenin-Nablus-Ramallah-Jerusalem corridor. He added, "When we
last lifted the roadblocks, we saw the terrorists adjust
their tactics accordingly." He also characterized the
roadblocks as intelligence collection points. Noting that
some are permanent and others roving, he claimed that Israeli
counter-surveillance at roadblocks has helped ISA to prevent
terrorist attacks. Diskin added that some roadblocks are
placed where they are based on ISA recommendations. In other
cases, the IDF places roadblocks at locations based on ISA
advice or on the IDF's own initiative: "In these cases, some
of these roadblocks could (safely) be removed."


7. (S) Diskin concluded, "If the Palestinians could do
something serious on security for a period of time in a
certain area, then I believe I could convince my government
to undertake something comparable."

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