HONDURAS: CARIBBEAN MASS MIGRATION CONTINGENCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000133

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CEN AND PRM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM HO
SUBJECT: HONDURAS: CARIBBEAN MASS MIGRATION CONTINGENCY
ASSESSMENT

REF: STATE 3429

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES FORD FOR REASONS 1.4(D)


1. (C) Honduras is likely to accept migrants from the
Caribbean who have been interdicted by the United States, but
based on the GOH's current policies it is very likely that
any migrants temporarily settled in Honduras would not be
detained or prevented from departing Honduras to seek entry
into the United States. This is evident in the GOH's
treatment of Cuban migrants who arrive via boats. The
migrants are given an immigration document similar to a
"Notice to Appear" and are then turned loose into Honduran
society. Those Cuban migrants rarely stay much longer than
necessary in Honduras. Given the lack of employment
opportunities in Honduras as well as the very efficient human
trafficking networks that exist here, any camp would be
little more than a brief first stop on a migrant's trip to
the United States.


2. (C) Per reftel instructions, below is Post's assessment of
Honduras's probable response to the questions:

a. The GOH would likely establish a camp for Caribbean
migrants but only if the USG offered to pay for its
construction and ongoing expenses. Such a facility would
likely be acceptable to the GOH only if it was presented to
the Honduran public as a refugee facility. Any suggestion
that it was a detention facility would be unacceptable.

b. As long as the USG is footing the bill for such a camp,
GOH would allow the construction of a facility whether the US
is taking its share of migrants or not. However, given the
bad press in the region associated with the facility at GTMO,
it would be better not to refer to such a camp as a
substitute for GTMO or that it will be operated similarly to
GTMO.

c. The GOH would be willing to accept migrants but only from
fellow Spanish-speaking countries with a similar culture.

d. The GOH's willingness to accept Cuban migrants is not
dependent on whether Fidel or another leader is running Cuba.
Honduras and Cuba are moving closer together and Cuba has a
good image in Honduras due to its willingness to send doctors
and teachers to help the Honduran poor.

e. If the GOH agreed to accept Caribbean migrants on behalf
of the USG, it is very likely that they would expect to be
rewarded for their actions. The Temporary Protected Status
(TPS) program which currently allows approximately 80,000
Hondurans to reside legally in the United States expires in
July 2007. The GOH would likely seek renewal of that program
for its citizens in return for complying with any USG
requests to accept the Caribbean migrants.

f. It is unknown how large a camp the GOH would allow to be
constructed, but a thousand migrants would probably be close
to the maximum number permitted.

g. While the GOH would expect the USG to pay for the camp, it
is unlikely they would allow the USG to actually run the camp
due to ongoing sensitivities regarding Honduran sovereignty
and the fear that the USG would construct a "permanent"
military base to support the camp. The GOH cannot run its own
prison system, so although they would want to run the migrant
camp, the same problems that plague the federal
penitentiaries such as lack of training, lack of funding,
incompetence, and corruption would be duplicated at any camp.
Such a camp would be more acceptable if it were operated by
the International Organization for Migration (IOM) or similar
international organization.

h. The GOH would allow the construction of a camp only with
the understanding that it would be temporary and that
arrangements would be made to eventually remove the migrants
from Honduras to a permanent home in another country.
FORD