PRESIDENT ZELAYA AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS TRIP TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 001292

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CEN, CA/VO/L/A, AND CA/VO/L/C

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2017
TAGS: CVIS PGOV PREL HO
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ZELAYA AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS TRIP TO
MANAGUA AND NEW UN AMBASSADOR

REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 1247


B. STATE 98124

Classified By: AMB. CHARLES FORD. REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. In response to a request by the GOH,
Ambassador Ford met with Honduran President "Mel" Zelaya,
Foreign Minister Milton Jimenez and proposed Ambassador to
the United Nations Jorge Arturo Reina. Zelaya used the first
part of the meeting to offer another explanation for his trip
to Managua to attend the Sandinista Revolution commemoration
with Daniel Ortega and Hugo Chavez. This time the trip was to
prepare Daniel Ortega for the upcoming International Court of
Justice ruling of their shared maritime boundary that Zelaya
believes will be decided in Honduras's favor. Ambassador Ford
pointed out the trip received so much attention in Honduras
because of the lack of movement on key issues on our
bilateral agenda; there is very little else to talk about.
Zelaya agreed and committed his government to begin work on
five or six key issues of mutual interest in the areas of
regional security, economic development, corruption and
social justice.


2. (C) CONT. SUMMARY. The second part of the meeting was
devoted to Jorge Arturo Reina trying to make a case in his
own favor for the issuance of a visa so he can travel to New
York. Reina tried to argue that he was never as radical as
the USG may have believed and his terrorist-related
activities were not that serious and can be explained. He
offered to meet with Post officials to provide more details.
Neither President Zelaya nor Minister Jimenez offered any
strong support for Reina nor did they appeal to the
Ambassador for his assistance in this matter. It appears
Reina will be on his own when dealing with Post on the visa
request. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) Honduran President "Mel" Zelaya, Foreign Minister
Milton Jimenez, and recently nominated Honduran Ambassador to
the United Nations Jorge Arturo Reina met with Ambassador
Ford and Poloff on July 27. The Hondurans requested the
meeting and, while they did not offer a reason for the
request, Post expected that Zelaya wished to discuss his
selection of Jorge Arturo Reina as the new Honduran
Ambassador to the U.N. and seek Post's help in obtaining the
G-1 visa so that Reina could travel to the United States to
perform his new duties (see reftel A for a more detailed
explanation of Reina's visa problems).

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Another Reason Offered for the Managua Trip
--------------


4. (C) Zelaya began the meeting by offering another reason
for his recent trip to Managua to participate with Daniel
Ortega and Hugo Chavez in the ceremony commemorating the
Sandinista Revolution of 1979. Obviously forgetting that he
had told the Deputy Secretary that the purpose of the trip
was to warn Ortega and Chavez to stay out of internal
Honduran politics and not to support Honduran political
campaigns (reftel B),Zelaya told the Ambassador that the
focus of the trip was to establish friendly relations with
Ortega in anticipation of the eventual International Court of
Justice (ICJ) ruling on the Honduras - Nicaragua maritime
boundary case. Oral arguments in that case were heard in
March, and the GOH expects a ruling in its favor soon. Zelaya
stated that he talked with Ortega regarding the creation of a
commission to implement the ICJ's ruling. Promotion of trade
was another reason for the trip, according to Zelaya. He
pointed out that Nicaragua is the only country with which
Honduras has a positive trade balance, and Zelaya would like
to see the amount of trade between the two countries
increase.


5. (C) Zelaya attempted to brush off any objection by
Honduran politicians to his meeting with Ortega and Chavez
with the explanation that all countries have groups of
friends, and sometimes those groups do not get along with
each other. Honduras can be friends with Nicaragua and
Venezuela, who are in one group, and with the U.S. which is
in another. Zelaya did not see any problem with his close
contacts with Nicaragua and Venezuela and stated that those
contacts should not affect Honduras's relation with the U.S.
Zelaya stressed he considers the Honduras - U.S. relationship
very important and wants to maintain a close and strong
friendship.

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Creation of a Shared Agenda
--------------



6. (C) Passing over Zelaya's explanations for his Managua
trip, Ambassador Ford explained that the reason that trip
received so much interest is because there is very little
else to focus on in the Honduras - U.S. relationship. Zelaya
has been in office for almost 1.5 years, yet there is still
no movement on a shared agenda. In fact, it does not appear
that the Zelaya administration has an agenda and no progress
is being made on those key areas that are important to the
USG. The President responded by pulling out a small notebook
and making a list of those topics he considered most
important to address: security, commercial interests, the
Millennium Challenge Account, the justice system and the
environment.


7. (C) Ambassador Ford responded with his own list and
elaborated on specific issues within each of the following
areas: (1) Regional Security: publication of the National
Security Strategy and use of peacekeepers, along with the use
of SICA to promote regional security; (2) Economic:
society-wide macro-economic issues must be addressed, in
addition to the specific problems at the state-owned
telephone company (Hondutel) and electric company (ENEE); (3)
Rule of law and corruption to include increased prosecutions
and judicial system reform; and (4) Social justice issues.
The Ambassador stressed that those are the key areas that
must be part of a joint agenda. Zelaya agreed with the list
and stated he is ready to start the process at the
Presidential level to move that agenda forward. He tasked his
Foreign Minister with pulling together a working meeting to
make some initial decisions soon after President Lula's
August 7 visit.

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Reina's Visa Plea
--------------


8. (C) The conversation eventually turned toward the primary
purpose of the meeting: what can be done to obtain a G-1 visa
for Jorge Arturo Reina so he can assume his position at the
United Nations? Zelaya made only a few general comments in
support of his proposed ambassador, highlighting his family
relationship with Reina, Reina's long service in various
Honduran administrations and his desire for Reina to go to
New York. Zelaya did not make a direct request for the visa
nor did he argue that USG must grant Reina a visa to travel
to the U.N. Instead, after his brief introduction, he
motioned to Reina to make his own case. Foreign Minister
Jimenez did not offer any support or make any comments in
Reina's favor.


9. (C) Reina tried to disavow his early radical days and
claimed he was never a Communist. He also tried to wave off
his early activities in various radical groups, commenting
that all that happened so long ago in the 1960s and 1970s. He
is still proud of his support for the Sandinista takeover of
Nicaragua and argued that the Sandinistas were fighting for a
good cause and the whole world wanted Somoza gone. Reina was
very general in discussing the terrorist-related allegations
against him and tried to dismiss them as either never
occurring or they were not as serious as the USG may think.
In the end, Reina offered to meet with Post officials to talk
about the allegations and stated he will "come clean" about
his early activities.


10. (C) Ambassador Ford responded that Post will try to
accommodate Reina's visa request but made no guarantee as to
the eventual outcome or a timeframe for a final decision. The
one condition requested by the Ambassador, and quickly agreed
to by Zelaya, was that the GOH keep this matter out of the
papers, particularly any characterization of US views on this
visa. The local media does not need to know every step of
this visa application process. Zelaya ended the subject by
telling Reina to work with Post on this matter.


11. (C) COMMENT. Obtaining President Zelaya's commitment to
begin work on five or six key items that are essential for
the Honduran - U.S. agenda was the important result of this
meeting. Post will develop the proposed agenda in detail and
push the GOH to commence working jointly on the items. As for
the visa problem, neither Zelaya nor Reina appeared to
believe the issue will be resolved in their favor. Zelaya
offered only minimal support for his candidate while Reina's
speech was rather short and it did not appear that even Reina
believed what he was saying. Reina appeared to simply be
going through the motions of arguing on his own behalf but
not believing that his explanations would change the outcome.
This may signal that Zelaya will not give Reina much time to
resolve the visa issue and if the matter reaches an impasse

or takes too long, Zelaya may pick another candidate. Reina's
visa is now solely a matter between him and the USG, while
Zelaya and Minister Jimenez distance themselves from the
problem. END COMMENT.

FORD