CONTROVERSY OVER MANDATORY HONDURAN GOVERNMENT

UNCLAS TEGUCIGALPA 001112

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR WHA/FO TSHANNON AND WHA/CEN JFEELEY AND BDOHERTY
ALSO FOR WHA/PDA MPROCTOR

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL HO
SUBJECT: CONTROVERSY OVER MANDATORY HONDURAN GOVERNMENT
BROADCASTS FADES BUT UNDERLYING PROBLEMS REMAIN

REF: TEGUCIGALPA 923


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Honduran President Mel Zelaya decreased
the number of government mandated broadcasts, which he
originally ordered on May 23, 2007, from ten to three amid
intense public controversy among broadcasters, political
leaders, and civil society (reftel). The government
propaganda, initially planned for two hours a day for ten
days, occurred just three times on May 28 and 30 and June 1
for one hour or less each time. The Zelaya Administration
defended the broadcasts by claiming that the press was
minimizing the President's accomplishments by
sensationalizing reports on crime and violence and thereby
discouraging economic investment and development in the
country. However, his three media appearances only addressed
national telephone, energy, and tax related issues. In the
context of Chavez' actions against RCTV in Venezuela, most
public attention was focused on the decision to require
government broadcasts in the first place rather than their
content. In this determined attempt to confront "powerful
centers" such as the media, the Zelaya Administration
miscalculated public reaction in a losing game to gain
popular support. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) On May 23, 2007, President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya ordered
private television and radio stations to broadcast a series
of ten simultaneous broadcasts for two hours each from May 28
to June 7 (reftel); however, under intense public scrutiny he
later reduced the number to three shorter broadcasts. The
Zelaya Administration argued that the broadcast transmissions
mandated by the Government of Honduras (GOH) were permitted
according to a 1995 telecommunications law. Although the
National Commission of Telecommunications in Honduras
(CONATEL) usually allows for only seven minutes of
non-emergency government broadcasting at a time, CONATEL
President Rasel Tome defended their legitimacy and argued
they were not endangering any form of free speech. Tome
later announced that, if media stations did not air the
complete broadcasts, they would face fines from CONATEL.


3. (SBU) The first government broadcast on May 28, which was
shortened to an hour in length, began with Zelaya's defending
his decision to require the broadcasts. Accompanied by Tome
and Marcelo Chimirri, Acting Administrator of HONDUTEL and a
self-described mafia type leader, President Zelaya then
turned to problems at the state-owned telephone company
HONDUTEL and answered questions from two reporters invited by
him to attend. The second broadcast on May 30 for half an
hour focused on problems at the National Electric Energy
Company ENEE. The President was accompanied by Minister of
Defense Aristides Mejia, Labor Minister Rixi Moncada, and
Finance Minister Rebeca Santos, with questions from
journalists friendly to the Administration. The final
broadcast on June 1, which also lasted for a half hour, dealt
with issues at the Honduran tax collection agency DEI.


4. (SBU) Foreign Minister Milton Jimenez, who may be the one
behind Zelaya's media blitz, led a meeting with the press and
diplomatic corps on June 1 attended by EmbOff in which he
made further legal arguments as to why it was within the
Administration,s right to require the broadcasts. During
the meeting, Jimenez mentioned a newspaper story covering the
Taiwan, El Salvador and Honduras trade deal in which Zelaya
was cut out of the picture with the other officials. (NOTE:
Jimenez recounted the same incident on June 18 in a live
televised debate, which leads Post to believe that it was the
catalyst for the media blitz. END NOTE.) Jimenez also
criticized the "power centers" consisting of press owners
such as Jaime Rosenthal, Rafael Ferrari, and Jorge Canahuati,
who, according to Jimenez, manipulate information yet lack
the status of elected officials. Jimenez did not offer the
other side of the story surrounding these issues, nor did he
mention any other possible remedies that Zelaya could have
taken.


5. (SBU) Honduran television and radio stations lashed out
against the national broadcasts. The Honduran Journalism
Association (CPH) and other media sources characterized the
events as major impositions on free speech, infringements on
private business, and breaches of human rights. The CPH
reminded President Zelaya that excesses in the media are
generally less harmful than restrictions. The press also
compared these broadcasts to Chavez's decision not to renew
RCTV's license in Venezuela. In protest of Zelaya's
decision, Honduran newspapers refused to cover and/or print
the transcripts of the obligatory broadcasts. On June 2, the

Ambassador held his annual media day reception at the
official residence for prominent Honduran journalists in
which he and many of the attendees discussed freedom of
speech in Honduras.


6. (U) While Zelaya's decision engendered ardent opposition
in the media, the response in the political arena was more
mixed. Before the broadcasts began, National Congress
President Roberto Michelleti of the Liberal Party publicly
urged the President not to require their airing. Congressman
Antonio Rivera also unsucessfully motioned to overrule the
decision by Zelaya. National Party President Lobo criticized
Zelaya for never addressing the question of corruption in
HONDUTEL during the first broadcast. Several politicians,
including former Presidential candidate Olban Valladares,
referred to the broadcast requirement as authoritarian,
comparing it to similar measures taken in Ecuador and
Venezuela. Political supporters of the broadcasts framed the
issue as a matter of allowing the GOH its own right to
practice free speech.


7. (SBU) COMMENT: Despite intense attention from media and
political players, much of the public response has focused on
the decision to require national broadcasting by the GOH
rather than the content of the broadcasts themselves. This
emphasis occurred not only as a result of public resistance
to the idea but also because of the newspapers' refusal to
cover the substance of the broadcasts. The Administration's
ultimate goal of reaching out to the public and countering
negative publicity by means of television and radio has
proven largely ineffective and counterproductive. Zelaya's
controversial broadcasting has come at a vulnerable time in
his Administration; recent gallup poll results reveal that
confidence in the President has decreased significantly.
Only fifty percent of those polled responded that Zelaya
"always or almost always does what is best for the country",
showing a sixteen point decrease in popularity since January

2007. The fact that the Administration's media blitz occurred
at the same time as the termination of RCTV in Venezuela may
be purely coincidental, but Zelaya recently referred to
Chavez in terms of oil as a "friend" and has called for
Honduras to distance itself from transnationals like Texaco
and Shell.


8. (SBU) COMMENT (CONT.): Zelaya's mandatory national
broadcasts reflect a weakened President anxious to regain
control of and trust from a skeptical and pessimistic
population, but there is some truth to what the Zelaya
Administration is saying about the press. On the cover of
the June 16 edition of the local conservative newspaper, El
Heraldo, the headline read, "Torrijos Signs Free Trade with
Honduras" (not "with Zelaya") and included a photo of
Panamanian President Torrijos alone that cut out Zelaya next
to him. Over the last few months the press has largely been
ignoring President Zelaya and friction with him continues in
the aftermath of the media blitz. The remedy that the Zelaya
Administration used to seek support and respect was
misguided, but the underlying problems of a weakened
Presidency and tension with the press remain. END COMMENT.
WILLIARD