OSCE PROVIDES SNAPSHOT OF SOUTH OSSETIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000303

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA AND EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID OSCE GG
SUBJECT: OSCE PROVIDES SNAPSHOT OF SOUTH OSSETIA

REF: A. (A) TBILISI 0219


B. (B) TBILISI 0194

C. (C) TBILISI 0078

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4(b)&(d).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) OSCE officials shared with us several interesting bits
of news and analysis about South Ossetia during a recent
visit to Tskhinvali. Head of Mission (HOM) Roy Reeve said
Russian officials had told him in Moscow that the South
Ossetian decision to declare Georgian Deputy State Minister
for Conflict Resolution Ruslan Abashidze "persona non grata"
-- in response to Abashidze's visit to the headquarters of
the pro-Georgian "alternative government" -- was "foolish."
Reeve was confident that the South Ossetians, under pressure
from the Russians, would soon lift the ban on Abashidze.
OSCE officials suggested that Sanakoyev was making some
in-roads in the separatist-controlled parts of South Ossetia,
having gained popularity at the expense of the Tskhinvali
authorities in a recent dispute over mandarin orange
shipments. Reeve also suggested that the Joint Peacekeeping
Force (JPKF) commander was making more of an effort to be
even-handed, largely thanks to the helpful presence of the
new Georgian peacekeeping battalion commander. End Summary.

The "De Factos" vs. "The Alternatives"
--------------

2. (C) Accompanying a USAID visit to Tskhinvali February 8
for meetings with OSCE, de facto authorities, and others
(assistance-related information from the visit will be
reported septel),Poloff learned from Reeve that Russia was
pressing the South Ossetians to lift the travel ban on
Abashidze. Reeve said Russian officials had called the ban
"foolish" (Duratskii) in meetings during Reeve's visit to
Moscow February 3-4. Reeve said the South Ossetians were
currently looking for a face-saving way to lift the ban,
which he noted had been imposed in a "fit of pique" because
Abashidze had visited "alternative government" leader
Sanakoyev in Kurta following a meeting with de facto
officials in Tskhinvali (ref B). Reeve said that as soon as
Abashidze was free to travel, the next meeting of the
Steering Committee for the donors' economic rehabilitation
projects would be held in Tskhinvali.


3. (C) OSCE's Ryan Grist, who as coordinator of the economic
rehabilitation project spends much of his time in Tskhinvali,
said it was his sense that South Ossetian society was divided
on Sanakoyev, with some people emphasizing that he had fought
bravely in the war against the Georgians, while others
claimed he had taken his recent pro-Georgian stance because
of gambling debts. Vakhtang Dzhigkaev, an Ossetian expert
with the OSCE's USAID-funded Economic Development Center,
said that while he had initially thought Ossetians would
never support a pro-Georgian alternative power structure,
people's attitudes were now changing because of the de facto
authorities' mistakes.


4. (C) Most notable, Dzhigkaev said, was the dispute over the
truckloads of mandarin oranges blocked from entering Russia
(ref C). As Dzhigkaev explained, the incident began late
last year when some truckers successfully transported
mandarins, falsely labeled as being from Abkhazia but in
reality from Ajara in government-controlled Georgia, into
Russia via South Ossetia, thereby evading the Russian ban on
Georgian agricultural goods. Learning of this, many more
South Ossetian truckers bought large quantities of mandarins,
and paid export "fees" to South Ossetian authorities, only to
be stopped at the Russian checkpoint when Russia began
enforcing the ban more strictly in November. Some truckers,
who had gone heavily into debt to buy the oranges, remained
with their trucks near the Roki tunnel in protest, but they
received no sympathy from de facto president Kokoity, who
criticized them even though his subordinates had taken money
from them. It was in this atmosphere that Sanakoyev offered
to buy all the mandarins at approximately half value. Six
truckers accepted the offer, and all were promptly jailed by
the authorities. (Comment: Everyone assumes Sanakoyev got
the funds to make this offer from either the Georgian
government or wealthy individuals allied with it. End
Comment.) Dzhigkaev said Sanakoyev had taken the oranges he
bought to a processing plant in Georgia.


5. (C) Reeve said that although OSCE was avoiding contact
with Sanakoyev's administration, he understood that uniformed
individuals had been seen in Georgian-controlled areas
wearing new badges -- apparently police forces of the
"alternative government." Reeve added that Georgia had
always had a free hand in managing these areas.


TBILISI 00000303 002 OF 002


A Lull in Shootings
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6. (C) OSCE military monitors expressed relief that there had
not been a recurrence since February 3 of the nightly
shootings that had recently erupted near Tskhinvali (ref A).
Reeve and the observers noted that for the first time they
had established which side had started one of the shootings:
two JPKF peacekeepers (one Georgian, one Russian) confirmed
that the South Ossetians had started an exchange of fire near
Nikozi. Reeve suggested the revelation of this information
was part of a pattern of increasing even-handedness by the
JPKF, whose Russian leadership has long been criticized as
pro-Ossetian. Reeve indicated that Georgian and
international complaints about the JPKF's ineffectiveness may
be having some effect on the commander, General Kulakhmetov.
Even more important, he said, was having the new Georgian
peacekeeping battalion commander on the ground, where he
could exert some influence on the JPKF. The previous
Georgian commander, who Reeve described as a close associate
of former Defense Minister Okruashvili, had been barred from
the area because the South Ossetians accused him of "war
crimes" in a previous post in 2004.

The Georgian Radar
--------------

7. (C) OSCE military observers briefed the group on
violations in the zone of conflict, noting that the majority
occurred on the South Ossetian side. They gave some
background on one of the more notable cases involving
Georgia, explaining that the radar installation near Gori is
not a violation in itself -- because it is not a weapon --
but the 5 or 6 armed individuals guarding it constitute a
violation.

Comment
--------------

8. (C) The Russians' negative reaction to the South Ossetian
PNGing of Abashidze suggests their support for Kokoity may
not be unflinching. We are beginning to suspect there may be
some significance in Russia's silence regarding Sanakoyev,
which contrasts sharply with Kokoity's strident reaction to
him. Time will tell, but for the moment it appears Kokoity's
position is weakening at home -- and perhaps in Moscow as
well. End Comment.

TEFFT